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Ryan Gwillim

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial and Strategy Officer at BRUNSWICKBRUNSWICK
Executive

About Ryan Gwillim

Brunswick’s Executive Vice President and Chief Financial and Strategy Officer (CFO) since June 17, 2020; previously VP Finance & Treasurer and VP Investor Relations. He is a CPA with bachelor’s and master’s degrees in accounting and a JD from the University of Illinois; age 41 at appointment in 2020 . Under Brunswick’s leadership during his tenure, 2024 results included net sales of $5.2B, adjusted EPS of $4.57, free cash flow of $284M, and $312M returned to shareholders (dividends + buybacks) . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show a 2024 total shareholder return value of $117.40 on a $100 investment initiated 12/31/2019 and net income of $130.1M for 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Brunswick CorporationEVP & Chief Financial and Strategy Officer2020–presentOversees enterprise finance and strategy; capital allocation; investor relations .
Brunswick CorporationVP, Finance & Treasurer (IR & M&A responsibility)2019–2020Led IR and M&A; supported capital strategy and liquidity positioning .
Brunswick CorporationVP, Investor Relations2017–2019Drove investor communications during portfolio transformation .
Brunswick CorporationCorporate Counsel; Assistant GC – Corporate & Securities; Associate GC – International & M&A2011–2017Supported corporate, securities, international and M&A legal matters .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Baker & McKenzie (Chicago)AssociatePrior to 2011Corporate/securities grounding before joining Brunswick .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary (Paid)Base Salary (as of 12/31)Target Bonus (BPP)Actual Bonus PaidStock Awards (Grant-Date FV)All Other CompensationTotal
2024$667,539 $674,000 $600,785 target award amount (plan-based) $0 (below threshold) $1,899,737 $90,461 $2,657,737
2023$636,539 $391,900 $1,599,357 $136,568 $2,764,364
2022$586,539 $350,600 $1,350,439 $121,322 $2,408,900

Perquisites and benefits (2024): product program utilized $7,003; executive physical $11,466; company contributions to qualified $23,700 and non-qualified plans $48,292 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (BPP) – 2024 Design and Outcome

MetricWeightingThresholdTarget RangeMaximum2024 OutcomePayout
Adjusted EPS (Enterprise)75% (Corporate participants incl. CFO) $5.95 $6.75–$8.00 $8.75 Below threshold (no funding) 0%
Free Cash Flow (Enterprise)25% (Corporate participants) $205M $325M–$475M $595M Below threshold (no funding) 0%

Notes: Division EBIT component applies only to division NEOs; not applicable to CFO . All NEOs (including CFO) received no 2024 BPP payout due to performance below thresholds .

Long‑Term Incentives (Equity)

Award TypeMetric(s) and WeightingModifierGrant Details (2024)Vesting
Performance SharesCFROI (75%), Operating Margin (25%) ±20% TSR vs S&P 400 Consumer Discretionary (cap 200%) 11,110 target shares on 2/15/2024 (CFO) Cliff after 3-year performance period, paid based on actuals
Restricted Stock UnitsAbsolute TSR alignment via stock; retention-focused 10,780 RSUs on 2/15/2024 (CFO) Ratable 1/3 per year over 3 years (changed from prior cliff)

Completed cycle: 2022–2024 PSU payout was 9.0% of target (below three‑year targets; TSR modifier neutral) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership9,169 shares as of March 10, 2025 (less than 1% of outstanding) .
Unvested equity (12/31/2024)RSUs: 11,013 ($712,330); PSUs (target): 11,110 ($718,595) .
2024 vesting realized6,443 shares vested; value realized $541,841 .
Ownership guidelinesCFO must hold stock = 3× base salary; retention of 50% of after-tax profits on vested shares until met; all NEOs in compliance as of 12/31/2024 .
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for all employees and Directors; no pledging allowed .
Insider trading policyComprehensive policy; use of 10b5‑1 plans referenced; company avoids repurchases while possessing MNPI .

Vesting schedule and potential selling pressure: 2024 RSUs vest ratably over three years (creates a predictable annual vesting cadence); PSUs cliff‑vest after performance period, both typically released on standard schedules which can influence periodic Form 4 activity .

Employment Terms

ProvisionCFO Terms
Severance (no CIC)1.5× (salary + company DC contributions); benefits continuation up to 18 months; BPP at CEO discretion (CEO has separate guarantee) .
Change in Control (double‑trigger)2× (salary + larger of target BPP for year of termination/CIC year + DC plan contributions); full equity vesting; benefits through severance period .
Restrictive covenants18‑month non‑compete/non‑solicit; perpetual NDA and non‑disparagement; clawback expansion for restrictive covenant breaches .
Excise tax gross‑upNone; “best after tax” cutback applies .
ClawbacksSEC/Dodd‑Frank compliant restatement clawback; broader company policy for certain misconduct and covenant breaches .

Estimated payment obligations (as of 12/31/2024):

  • Absent CIC: Severance $1,118,987; Welfare benefits $54,778; Total $1,173,765; BPP target shown $606,600 (discretionary) .
  • Following CIC (double‑trigger): Severance $2,705,182; Welfare benefits $69,705; Accelerated LTIs $3,569,712; Total $6,344,599 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Pay-for-performance discipline: 2024 BPP paid 0% for all NEOs as enterprise results were below thresholds; 2022–2024 PSUs paid only 9% of target, indicating demanding multi‑year hurdles (CFROI and operating margin) and relative TSR rigor .
  • Mix and risk profile: CFO compensation emphasizes equity (RSUs and PSUs); RSU shift to 3‑year ratable vesting in 2024 increases retention but may modestly heighten predictable vest‑driven selling windows versus single cliff vest events .
  • Metrics transparency: Annual plan relies on Adjusted EPS and FCF; long‑term plan on CFROI and operating margin with a TSR modifier, aligning with cash generation and profitability priorities .
  • Shareholder alignment safeguards: Strong ownership guidelines (3× salary), prohibition on hedging/pledging, and robust clawbacks mitigate misalignment risks .

Related Party Transactions

  • None identified since January 1, 2024 under the company’s Related Person Transactions Policy .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say‑on‑pay approval: 95% support at the 2024 Annual Meeting; no direct program changes were made as a result .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 business outcomes: Net sales $5.2B; GAAP EPS $2.21; adjusted EPS $4.57; free cash flow $284M; $312M capital returned to shareholders via dividends and buybacks .
  • Strategic execution: Continued market share gains in outboard engines; extensive product launches; disciplined working capital and cost containment underpinning cash generation .

Equity Grant Details (2024)

DateTypeShares/TargetGrant-Date FV
2/15/2024Performance Shares (target)11,110 $950,127
2/15/2024RSUs10,780 $949,610

Vesting: PSUs vest based on 3‑year performance; RSUs vest 1/3 annually over 3 years .

Ownership & Deferred Compensation Detail (2024)

  • Restoration Plan (non‑qualified DC): Company contribution $48,292; executive contribution $35,722; aggregate year earnings $72,988; aggregate balance $621,571 .
  • 2024 “All Other Compensation” components summarized above include qualified plan $23,700, non‑qualified plan $48,292, product program $7,003, executive physical $11,466 .

Investment Implications

  • Incentive outcomes and discipline: Zero 2024 cash bonus and 9% PSU payout for the 2022–2024 cycle demonstrate tight performance gates; this supports alignment but may increase retention risk if external offers provide greater cash certainty .
  • Vesting-driven supply: Annual RSU vesting through 2026 creates recurring potential Form 4 activity; investors should monitor vesting windows for technical selling pressure rather than fundamental signals .
  • Alignment and downside protections: Strong stock ownership requirements, anti‑hedging/pledging, and clawbacks enhance alignment and reduce governance red flags; absence of excise tax gross‑ups is shareholder‑friendly .
  • Change‑in‑control economics: At 12/31/2024, estimated double‑trigger CIC package of ~$6.3M (including equity acceleration) suggests manageable dilution/overhang; terms are standard for mid‑cap industrials and double‑trigger mitigates windfall risk .