Christos Dimopoulos
About Christos Dimopoulos
Co-President, Agribusiness at Bunge Global SA (BG), Christos Dimopoulos is 51 and has served as Co-President since April 2022; he joined Bunge in 2004 after roles with Tradigrain and Intrade Risk Management, rising through trading and supply chain leadership positions to co-lead the global Agribusiness segment focused on origination, processing, merchandising and risk management . His pay design emphasizes risk-adjusted trading outcomes and long-term value creation via a dedicated Risk Management & Optimization Incentive (RMOI) and performance-based RSUs tied to 3-year EPS and Adjusted ROIC with a Relative TSR modifier .
Selected company performance indicators (context)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return – value of $100 investment | $119 | $173 | $190 | $197 | $156 |
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 8.30 | 12.93 | 13.91 | 13.66 | 9.19 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bunge Global SA | Co-President, Agribusiness | Apr 2022–present | Co-leads global origination/processing and merchandising; accountable for risk management and optimization across value chains |
| Bunge Global SA | President, Global Supply Chains | –2022 | Led global supply chain optimization prior to appointment as Co-President |
| Bunge Global SA | Trading and Agribusiness leadership roles | 2004–present | Progressively senior trading/merchandising roles spanning regions and platforms |
| Tradigrain | Trading/risk roles (Europe/US) | n/d | Commodity trading and risk roles prior to Bunge |
| Intrade Risk Management | Risk roles (Europe/US) | n/d | Risk management roles prior to Bunge |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed in company filings | – | – | – |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (USD) | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary (rate at year-end) | $775,040 | $775,040 | Paid in CHF; shown in USD at 1.1072 USD/CHF as of 12/31/2024 |
| Perquisites | n/d | $23,916 | Automobile allowance tied to overseas employment |
| Pension/SERP | None | None | NEOs do not participate in Bunge U.S. pension plan |
Performance Compensation
Annual incentives (cash)
| Plan | Metric(s) & weighting | 2024 target | 2024 actual payout | Vesting/deferral |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RMOI (applies to Dimopoulos; not eligible for AIP) | 50% Adj PBT(I) ± scorecard; 50% Risk Adjusted Profit | 125% of base salary = $968,800 | 213% of target = $2,058,700; paid $1,453,200; deferred $605,500 | Deferred portion paid in 3 annual installments; subject to reduction/forfeiture based on future risk management performance |
| AIP (company annual incentive) | – | Not applicable | – | – |
Long-term incentives (equity)
| Award | Grant date | Metric(s) | Target/Grant | Vesting/measurement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PBRSUs (2024–2026 cycle) | 3/15/2024 | 50% 3-yr cumulative EPS; 50% 3-yr avg AROIC; RTSR ±25% modifier; max 200% | 12,632 target units; grant-date fair value $1,159,870 | 3-yr performance ending 12/31/2026; typically vests on 3rd anniversary of grant subject to results |
| TBRSUs (time-based) | 3/15/2024 | Service | 8,421 units; grant-date fair value $799,953 | Cliff vest 3/15/2027 |
Historical performance LTI (payouts determined in 2025)
| PBRSU cycle | EPS result | AROIC result | RTSR modifier | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | 200% of target | 200% of target | 23rd percentile; -25% modifier | 175% of target |
Notes: RMOI performance thresholds/targets not disclosed due to competitive sensitivity .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership and outstanding awards (as of dates shown)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (3/14/2025) | 95,902 shares; right to acquire within 60 days: 54,100 shares; “percent of class” <1% |
| Unvested/uneared equity (12/31/2024) | TBRSUs not vested: 8,596 units (vest 3/15/2027) ; PBRSUs unearned: 12,895 units (2024–2026 cycle; measures to 12/31/2026) |
| Additional cycle outstanding (12/31/2024) | TBRSUs: 8,480 units (vest 3/15/2026) ; PBRSUs: 12,721 units (2023–2025 cycle; measures to 12/31/2025) |
| Stock options (all vested) | 3,450 @ $81.68 exp. 2/26/2025; 5,300 @ $50.07 exp. 3/1/2026; 6,500 @ $81.00 exp. 3/8/2027; 5,800 @ $75.99 exp. 2/28/2028; 18,500 @ $51.89 exp. 3/12/2029; 18,000 @ $42.76 exp. 3/10/2030 |
| 2024 equity vesting/realization | Options exercised: 2,700 shares; value realized $31,131 |
| Share ownership guidelines | NEO guideline: 3x base salary; all NEOs met guidelines as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers; no margin or pledging permitted |
Vesting schedule and potential selling pressure
| Date | Instrument | Quantity |
|---|---|---|
| 3/15/2026 | TBRSUs (2023 grant) | 8,480 |
| 3/15/2026 (post-certification) | PBRSUs (2023–2025 cycle) | 12,721 target units (payout 0–200% of target; RTSR modifier) |
| 3/15/2027 | TBRSUs (2024 grant) | 8,596 |
| 3/15/2027 (post-certification) | PBRSUs (2024–2026 cycle) | 12,895 target units (payout 0–200% of target; RTSR modifier) |
Employment Terms
| Term | Summary |
|---|---|
| Severance (non‑CoC) | If terminated without “Cause” or resigns for “Good Reason”: lump sum equal to 12 months base salary + 12 months target annual bonus (RMOI target for Dimopoulos); pro‑rata current year incentive; COBRA reimbursement up to 18 months; equity generally vests pro‑rata (PBRSUs subject to minimum one‑year service and performance) |
| Change‑of‑Control (double trigger) | If terminated without “Cause” or resigns for “Good Reason” within 2 years post‑CoC: 24 months base salary + 2x target annual bonus; pro‑rata current year incentive; COBRA reimbursement up to 18 months; all outstanding equity accelerates (performance awards vest at greater of actual or target) |
| Restrictive covenants | 24‑month non‑compete and non‑solicit required to receive severance |
| Clawbacks | Executive recoupment policy for misconduct-related restatement plus Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback for erroneously awarded incentive pay |
| Deferred compensation | RMOI deferral program: aggregate balance $1,066,613; 2024 distributions $208,379 (related to earlier cycle deferral) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix & at‑risk orientation: Dimopoulos’ annual variable pay is dominated by the RMOI (target 125% of base; 2024 payout 213%) and multi‑year PBRSUs (60% of LTIP), directly linking rewards to risk‑adjusted trading results and 3‑year EPS/AROIC with an RTSR modifier; time‑based RSUs are 40% of LTIP and vest after three years .
- 2024 outcomes vs. 2023: RMOI paid $2.06M in 2024 vs. $2.59M in 2023 (reflecting tougher margin environment), while stock awards granted in 2024 totaled ~$1.96M (PBRSU + TBRSU fair value) vs. ~$2.07M in 2023 .
- Pay governance: No single‑trigger CoC; no golden parachute excise tax gross‑ups; no option repricing; robust clawbacks and prohibitions on hedging/pledging .
Compensation peer group (for benchmarking; set near median): Alcoa, ADM, Conagra, Corteva, Dow, General Mills, Ingredion, International Paper, Kellonova, Mosaic, Nutrien, PPG, Sysco, Tyson, US Foods, WestRock .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Skin-in-the-game: 95,902 shares beneficially owned as of 3/14/2025, with additional 54,100 shares acquirable within 60 days; multiple vested options outstanding (several in-the-money at 12/31/2024 close), and meaningful unvested RSU exposure ensure alignment with long-term TSR .
- Ownership policy: NEOs must hold at least 3x base salary; all NEOs compliant as of year-end 2024; mandatory post‑vest holding until guideline met; hedging/pledging prohibited .
Performance & Track Record (select indicators)
- 3‑year LTI (2022–2024) paid at 175% of target, driven by 3‑year EPS and AROIC both at 200% of targets, partially offset by RTSR at the 23rd percentile (‑25% modifier) .
- Company PvP context: Value of $100 invested stood at $156 in 2024 (down from $197 in 2023) and Adjusted EPS was $9.19 in 2024 (vs. $13.66 in 2023) amid a weaker margin environment highlighted by management .
SAY‑ON‑PAY & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑pay support: 96.7% approval at the 2024 AGM, reflecting investor endorsement of the pay‑for‑performance framework, including distinct AIP/RMOI and multi‑year PBRSU metrics .
Compensation Committee/Consultants
- The HRCC uses Semler Brossy as independent advisor, targets median against a 16‑company peer set, and assesses risk to avoid imprudent incentives; the 2024 LTIP continues best practices (no single‑trigger CoC; no repricing; minimum vesting) .
Related Party Transactions, Hedging/Pledging, and Red Flags
- Related party transactions: None disclosed for Dimopoulos; Board maintains a formal related‑party review policy .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; no margin accounts or pledging allowed for insiders .
- Clawbacks: Robust policies in place (misconduct restatement and Dodd‑Frank) .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger CoC; no option repricing .
Employment Terms (Severance & CoC Economics)
| Scenario | Cash multiple | Equity | Health | Restrictive covenants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without Cause / Good Reason (non‑CoC) | 1x base + 1x target bonus; pro‑rata current year incentive | Pro‑rata vesting (PBRSU subject to performance) | COBRA reimb. up to 18 months | 24‑month non‑compete & non‑solicit |
| CoC + qualifying termination (double trigger, 2 yrs) | 2x base + 2x target bonus; pro‑rata current year incentive | Accelerated; performance awards vest ≥ of actual or target | COBRA reimb. up to 18 months | 24‑month non‑compete & non‑solicit |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong. High at‑risk mix (RMOI + PBRSU) with quality‑of‑earnings and risk‑capital charges aligns trading behavior with risk‑adjusted returns; 3‑year EPS/AROIC and RTSR further link pay to durable performance .
- Retention: Moderate to strong. Significant unvested RSUs (2023 and 2024 grants) and CoC double‑trigger protections anchor retention through 2026–2027; RMOI deferrals add stickiness tied to future risk outcomes .
- Overhang/flow: Potential selling pressure around 3/15/2026 and 3/15/2027 upon TBRSU/PBRSU vesting; 2024 included modest option exercises (2,700 shares) .
- Risk controls: Explicit prohibition on hedging/pledging, robust clawbacks, and no single‑trigger CoC mitigate governance risk; absence of excise tax gross‑ups is shareholder‑friendly .