Sean Godbout
BIOGENAbout Sean Godbout
Biogen’s Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer & Global Corporate Controller (principal accounting officer), effective March 1, 2025; age 50, joined Biogen in 2007 after roles at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. He holds a B.S. (Cornell ILR), an M.S. in Accounting and an MBA (Northeastern), and is a CPA in Massachusetts . Company performance context for incentive alignment: in 2024 Biogen exceeded revenue and non‑GAAP EPS targets (Revenue: $9,032M vs $8,855M target; non‑GAAP EPS: $16.33 vs $15.30 target), driving a 131.8% annual bonus company multiplier; long‑term incentives emphasize three‑year EPS CAGR and relative TSR with capped payouts when absolute TSR is negative .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Biogen | VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Global Corporate Controller (Principal Accounting Officer) | Mar 2025 – present | Leads principal accounting officer function and global corporate controllership during CFO transition |
| Biogen | Global Corporate Controller | Oct 2023 – Mar 2025 | Oversaw global corporate controllership; continuity through finance leadership transition |
| Biogen | Corporate Controller | Sep 2019 – Oct 2023 | Led corporate controller function |
| Biogen | Various finance roles | 2007 – 2019 | Progressive responsibility across finance prior to Controller roles |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP | Roles prior to joining Biogen | Pre‑2007 | Foundation in public accounting |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed in company filings; prior employer: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary | $400,000 (effective upon appointment) |
| Target annual bonus | 40% of base salary (prorated per plan if applicable) |
| Annual LTI eligibility (2025) | To be granted under plans and guidelines in effect at time of grant (specific target value not disclosed) |
| Bonus plan structure (company‑wide) | Annual bonus plan with common company performance goals and payout structure across levels; company multiplier applies globally |
| 2024 company performance multiplier | 131.8% (rounded 132.0%) |
Note: Individual bonus payouts also depend on individual performance multipliers; those for Mr. Godbout are not disclosed .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (Company metrics and 2024 results)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Achieved | Company Multiplier Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | 35% | $8,412 | $8,855 | $9,298 | $9,032 | 105.0% |
| Non‑GAAP diluted EPS ($) | 35% | 13.62 | 15.30 | 16.19 | 16.33 | 150.0% |
| Pipeline development | 25% | Achievement | Achievement | Achievement | Goal Maximum | 150.0% |
| Corporate responsibility | 5% | Achievement | Achievement | Achievement | At Goal | 100.0% |
| Overall Annual Bonus Company Multiplier | — | — | — | — | — | 131.8% (whole‑percent 132.0%) |
Long‑Term Incentive (Program design and payout curves)
| Element | Metric | Performance period | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Payout features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (performance‑based equity) | 3‑yr EPS CAGR | 2024–2026 | 50% of target | 100% | 200% | Settled in stock at end of period; value depends on stock price at vest |
| PSUs (relative performance) | 3‑yr cumulative rTSR vs peer group | 2024–2026 | 25th percentile (25%) | 55th percentile (100%) | 75th percentile (200%) | If absolute TSR over 2024–2026 is negative, payouts capped at target; interpolation between points |
| RSUs (time‑based) | Service‑based vesting | Typical: 3 annual installments | — | — | — | 1/3 per year over ~3 years |
Program emphasis: Increased performance‑based equity to 60% of total LTI (from 50% in 2023); NEO LTI incorporates equally‑weighted EPS CAGR and rTSR; design set by CMDC to align with long‑term value creation .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Holding/Policy | Detail |
|---|---|
| Common stock owned | 310 shares (Form 3 at appointment) |
| RSUs outstanding (grant date, vesting) | 1,552 RSUs granted 02/06/2025; vest in three equal annual installments starting one year after grant |
| 610 RSUs granted 02/07/2024; vest in three equal annual installments starting one year after grant | |
| 53 RSUs granted 10/02/2023; vest in three equal annual installments starting one year after grant | |
| 257 RSUs granted 02/08/2023; vest in three equal annual installments starting one year after grant | |
| Options | None disclosed; no options listed on Form 3 |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging, margin purchases/borrowing against accounts holding company stock, pledging, and short sales by employees and officers |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Disclosed guidelines apply to CEO (6x salary) and EVPs (3x salary); no CAO‑specific multiple disclosed |
Vesting cadence implies potential periodic sell‑to‑cover transactions around anniversary dates; hedging/pledging prohibitions mitigate alignment risk .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Effective appointment | Appointed VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Global Corporate Controller; principal accounting officer effective March 1, 2025 |
| Title on SEC signature pages | Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer and Global Corporate Controller (Principal Accounting Officer) |
| Severance (VP plan) | Termination other than for cause/death/disability: lump sum equal to minimum 6 months of base salary + target bonus, plus 1 month per full year of service up to 12 months |
| Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger) | If within two years of a transaction/CIC there is a qualifying termination or involuntary employment action: lump sum equal to 1x base salary + target bonus; medical/dental continuation if severance payable |
| Clawback | Company recoupment policy (exceeds Dodd‑Frank) allows recovery/forfeiture for detrimental or competitive activity and in certain accounting restatements |
| Insider trading | Robust policy with trading windows and prohibitions as above |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and risk: Cash mix is modest (salary $400k, 40% bonus target), while equity is multi‑year with performance‑linked PSUs and time‑based RSUs; hedging/pledging bans and clawback enhance alignment .
- Vesting‑related flow: Three‑year annual RSU vesting across multiple grants (2023–2025) creates predictable calendar points for potential sell‑to‑cover activity around February/October anniversaries; monitor Form 4s near those dates for short‑term trading signals .
- Retention and CIC economics: VP‑level severance is moderate (up to 12 months base+bonus; 1x on CIC double‑trigger), which limits golden‑parachute overhang while providing baseline retention support .
- Performance linkage: Company bonus outcomes hinge on revenue and non‑GAAP EPS alongside pipeline and responsibility goals; 2024 outperformance (Revenue and EPS above target; 131.8% company multiplier) supports pay‑for‑performance construct into his tenure as PAO .
- Data gaps: As a newly appointed executive officer, detailed 2025 LTI target values and any individual bonus multiplier are not disclosed; update assessments upon next proxy and Form 4 filings .