Ewout Steenbergen
About Ewout Steenbergen
Ewout Steenbergen is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Booking Holdings (BKNG) since March 15, 2024; he is 55 years old and previously served as CFO of S&P Global, President of Engineering Solutions post the IHS Markit merger, and led AI unit Kensho; prior roles include CFO of Voya Financial. In 2024 under BKNG’s leadership team (including during Steenbergen’s tenure), the company delivered record results: revenue $23.7B (+11% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA $8.3B (+17%), net income $5.9B (+37%), and a year-end stock price up 40% with stated TSR of 41% for the year, outpacing the NASDAQ .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P Global Inc. | EVP & Chief Financial Officer | 2016–2024 | Led finance through portfolio transformation and IHS Markit merger; oversight of performance and capital allocation . |
| S&P Global Inc. | President, Engineering Solutions | 2022–2024 | Ran the Engineering Solutions segment following the IHS Markit merger . |
| Kensho Technologies (S&P Global AI unit) | Leader | 2018–2024 | Led development of AI/ML capabilities supporting analytics . |
| Voya Financial, Inc. | EVP & Chief Financial Officer | — | Public company CFO experience prior to S&P Global . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| AXA Group (France) | Director | Current |
| UNICEF USA | Director | Current |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Detail | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (paid in 2024) | Prorated from Mar 15, 2024 start | $656,298 |
| Target Bonus % of Base | Short-term incentive target | 180% |
| Actual 2024 Bonus (paid 2025) | Reflects ~2x target cap for NEOs and strong performance | $2,362,673 |
| Sign-on Bonus | To offset forfeited awards at prior employer | $1,000,000 |
Performance Compensation
Short-term Incentive (Bonus Plan) – 2024
- Plan metrics and outcomes (companywide, equally weighted): Revenue growth target 9% (actual 10%); Compensation EBITDA growth target 9% (actual 15%). Senior executives’ bonus pool funded at 2.07x target (below 3x max), with individual NEO bonuses capped at 2x; Steenbergen’s 2024 payout was approximately 2x target, at $2,362,673 .
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Implication |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth vs 2023 | 50% | 9% | 10% | Above target; supports higher pool funding |
| Compensation EBITDA growth vs 2023 | 50% | 9% | 15% | Above target; supports higher pool funding |
| Pool funding | — | — | 2.07x of target | NEOs capped at 2x target; Steenbergen paid ~$2.36M |
Long-term Incentive (Equity) – 2024 Grants
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Mix and structure: For 2024, BKNG’s standard mix was 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs; Steenbergen’s initial year followed a 50% PSU / 50% RSU mix plus a separate two-year New Hire RSU to bridge forfeited awards; from 2025, he follows 60%/40% like other NEOs .
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PSUs (granted May 12, 2024)
- Target shares: 972; Maximum: 1,944; Grant-date fair value: $4,023,662 .
- Three-year performance period ending Dec 31, 2026; metrics equally weighted: Revenue and Compensation EBITDA; rTSR modifier (+/–25%) vs travel/tourism peers and an absolute TSR governor capping at target if absolute TSR is not positive; overall cap 2x .
- 3-year goal ranges (aggregate): Revenue: <$64.1B (0x) to ≥$80.3B (2x) with $75.8B at 1x; Compensation EBITDA: <$19.9B (0x) to ≥$27.9B (2x) with $25.4B at 1x .
| Equity Type | Grant Date | Shares (Target/Max) | Vest/Performance | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | May 12, 2024 | 972 / 1,944 | Cliff vest after 3-year period ending 12/31/2026, subject to performance | Equal-weight Revenue and Compensation EBITDA; rTSR modifier (+/–25%); absolute TSR governor; max 2x |
- RSUs (granted May 12, 2024)
- Annual RSUs: Grant-date value $3,699,189; vest in three equal annual installments on the first three anniversaries of grant (i.e., May 12, 2025/2026/2027), subject to continued service .
- New Hire RSUs: Grant-date value $9,000,599; vest 75% on May 12, 2025 and 25% on May 12, 2026; intended to replace forfeited awards and support retention .
| Equity Type | Grant Date | Grant-Date Value | Vesting Schedule | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual RSUs | May 12, 2024 | $3,699,189 | 1/3 each on May 12, 2025/2026/2027 | Ongoing LTI, retention |
| New Hire RSUs | May 12, 2024 | $9,000,599 | 75% on 5/12/2025; 25% on 5/12/2026 | Offset forfeited prior awards; initial alignment |
- Dividend equivalents: RSUs and PSUs accrue dividend equivalents payable only upon vesting/performance satisfaction .
- 2024 stock options: None granted to NEOs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Mar 31, 2025) | 2,098 shares; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Shares Outstanding Basis | 32,699,135 shares outstanding as of Mar 31, 2025; Steenbergen’s ownership ≈0.006% (2,098/32,699,135), derived from disclosed figures . |
| Vested vs Unvested (12/31/2024) | Unvested RSUs: 3,337 (2,365 New Hire RSUs; 972 Annual RSUs). Unearned PSUs (max basis): 1,944 . |
| Upcoming Vesting Cadence | New Hire RSUs: 75% on 5/12/2025; 25% on 5/12/2026. Annual RSUs: 1/3 on 5/12/2025/2026/2027. PSUs measured over 2024–2026 with settlement post-period, subject to rTSR/TSR governor . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Requirement: lesser of 5,000 shares or shares valued at 3x base salary. As of Mar 31, 2025, shares counted toward guideline: 0; permitted to meet over time given 2024 hire date . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging of company stock prohibited for NEOs/directors; short-selling and margin restrictions apply . |
| 10b5-1 Plans | Encouraged; must be adopted in open window; generally minimum 1-year term; early termination constrained . |
| Clawbacks | SEC-compliant financial restatement clawback plus misconduct clawback for excessive incentive compensation . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Effective Date | March 15, 2024; Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer . |
| Agreement Term | Initial 3-year term from Mar 15, 2024; auto-renews for 1-year periods unless notice given ≥90 days before expiration . |
| Severance (No Cause / Good Reason) | 1x base salary + target bonus paid over 12 months; pro-rata actual annual bonus; continuation of group health, life, and disability insurance benefits for 1 year . |
| Change-in-Control Severance (Double Trigger) | If terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 6 months before or 12 months after a CIC: 2x base salary + target bonus over 24 months; pro-rata actual annual bonus; continuation of group health, life, and disability insurance benefits for 1 year . |
| Equity Treatment on CIC/Termination | No single-trigger vesting; acceleration generally pro-rata based on time served upon qualifying termination at/after CIC; full acceleration only upon death . |
| Death/Disability | Accrued comp; pro-rata target (death) or actual (as applicable) annual bonus; limited continuation of benefits (dependents’ health benefits for death; health/life/disability for disability) for 1 year . |
| 280G Cutback | Best-net provision: reduce parachute payments if reduces excise taxes on an after-tax basis . |
| Restrictive Covenants | One-year non-compete and non-solicit post-termination . |
| Perquisites | Reimbursement for certain legal services and work-from-home allowance in connection with hiring; otherwise no material executive-only perquisites . |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 CFO performance highlights: Provided strategic capital management amid inflation and rate volatility; advanced cost discipline and procurement/talent sourcing; supported record financial performance and strong capital returns (~$6B repurchases, $1.2B dividends); ensured smooth transition with former CFO; strengthened finance function and investor communications .
- Company performance context (2024): Gross bookings $165.6B (+10%), revenues $23.7B (+11%), net income $5.9B (+37%), Adjusted EBITDA $8.3B (+17%), and year-end stock price $4,968 (+40%), with stated TSR of 41% for the year .
Compensation Structure Observations
- Cash vs equity mix: Introduction of individual bonus caps (2x target) and increased base salaries to align with peers; for 2024, NEO mix adjusted to 60% PSUs/40% RSUs; Steenbergen initially at 50%/50% plus New Hire RSUs to mitigate macro risk and bridge forfeitures .
- Performance rigor: 2024 bonus pool funded at 2.07x (below 3x max) with Revenue and Compensation EBITDA growth targets set above 2023’s strong base; PSUs include robust 3-year goals, rTSR modifier, and an absolute TSR governor capping at target if TSR ≤ 0 .
- Peer benchmarking: Compensation peer group spans leading travel/e-commerce/tech firms; BKNG targets market-competitive pay between 50th–75th percentile while prioritizing performance linkage .
- Shareholder alignment: 2024 say‑on‑pay approval 90%; ongoing engagement led to bonus caps and mix changes; stock-based comp dilution <0.6% in 2024 .
Related Governance
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and short-term trading; robust 10b5-1 plan guardrails; SEC‑compliant clawback and misconduct clawback; stock ownership guideline compliance required over time for new hires (Steenbergen still within compliance runway) .
Director/Committee and Consultant Context (for compensation oversight)
- Talent & Compensation Committee (independent) oversees compensation program; advised by independent consultant Semler Brossy on peer group, PSU/RSU mix, bonus cap, risk assessments, and 280G analyses .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Steenbergen’s 2024 bonus outcome (~2x target) is supported by above-target revenue and Compensation EBITDA growth; 2024 PSUs embed stringent 3-year goals and TSR governance, which curbs windfalls in down markets—supportive of shareholder alignment .
- Near-term vesting overhang: Significant RSU vesting cadence (notably the 75% New Hire RSU tranche in May 2025, then remaining 25% in May 2026 and annual RSU tranches through 2027) could create episodic selling pressure, though hedging/pledging restrictions and 10b5‑1 plan practices may smooth execution .
- Retention risk: Employment agreement provides competitive severance (1x; 2x on double-trigger CIC) and a one-year non‑compete/non‑solicit, plus unvested equity value (RSUs/PSUs) that strengthens retention; no single-trigger CIC acceleration—a governance positive .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is modest (≈0.006% of shares), with guideline compliance permitted over time due to 2024 hire; alignment primarily via unvested equity and performance-linked PSUs .
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