Rishi Bansal
BankUnitedAbout Rishi Bansal
Chief Investment Officer of BankUnited, N.A. since February 2017, Bansal oversees the investment securities portfolio, residential loan portfolio, mortgage warehouse business, and Pinnacle Public Finance; he joined BankUnited in July 2009 after fixed income roles at Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, and is 51 years old with degrees from IIM Ahmedabad (PGDM) and IIT Delhi (B.Tech, Chemical Engineering) . 2024 performance outcomes tied to his incentive plan included achieving maximum results on core funding metrics (NIDDA/total deposits 27.3% and wholesale funding ratio 23.4%), while the relative NPA metric paid zero; overall AIP paid 150% of target and his personal AIP payout was $708,750 . Long-term PSUs for the 2021–2024 cycle vested at 63.73% of target (APR 31.87%), with BKU’s 4‑year TSR ranking at the 37.70th percentile; Bansal received 5,420 shares from this cycle .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BankUnited, N.A. | Executive Vice President, Mortgage Portfolio | Pre-2017 (prior to CIO appointment in Feb 2017) | Part of advisory group that worked on the Bank’s acquisition; led mortgage portfolio initiatives prior to elevation to CIO . |
| Merrill Lynch | Managing Director, Fixed Income | 2007–2009 | Senior leadership in fixed income during pre/post-crisis period, experience leveraged to manage BKU’s securities and loan portfolios . |
| Lehman Brothers | Fixed Income Trader | 1998–2007 | Developed trading expertise across rates/credit, informing BKU ALM and portfolio strategies . |
External Roles
- No external public-company board roles or committee positions are disclosed in Bansal’s proxy biography .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 466,875 | 472,500 | 472,500 |
| Target AIP ($) | — | — | 472,500 |
| Actual AIP payout ($) | 420,289 | 517,388 | 708,750 |
| Stock awards grant-date fair value ($) | 784,950 | 784,898 | 784,896 |
| All other compensation ($) | 13,725 | 14,850 | 15,525 |
| Total compensation ($) | 1,685,839 | 1,789,636 | 1,981,671 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Structure and Results
| Component | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Absolute: NIDDA/Total Deposits | 25% | ≥19% | ≥22.5% | ≥26% | 27.3% | Maximum (200%) |
| Absolute: Wholesale Funding Ratio | 25% | ≤37.5% | ≤30% | ≤26% | 23.4% | Maximum (200%) |
| Relative: NPA Ratio vs peers (excl. guaranteed SBA) | 25% | 25th pct = 50% | 50th pct = 100% | 75th pct = 200% | 0.63% (10th pct) | 0% |
| Strategic objectives | 25% | Committee discretion | Committee discretion | 200% cap | Maximum (200%) | Maximum (200%) |
| 2024 AIP payout breakdown for R. Bansal | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Target AIP | 472,500 |
| Relative metrics (25% bucket) | — (below threshold) |
| Absolute metrics (50% bucket at 200%) | 472,500 |
| Strategic (25% bucket at 200%) | 236,250 |
| Total AIP paid | 708,750 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTIP)
- 2024 grants and design:
- RSUs: 14,016 units granted on Mar 29, 2024; grant-date fair value $392,448; one-third vested 12/31/2024, with remaining thirds vesting 12/31/2025 and 12/31/2026 .
- PSUs (2024–2026 performance period): Target 14,016 units; payout grid 0–200% based on 60% relative (avg 3-year NCO ratio, ROAA improvement, 3-year TSR) and 40% absolute (new-market loan commitments+deposits; SVP+ retention rate) metrics (each metric 20% weight) .
| 2024–2026 PSU metrics | Weight | Methodology/Targets |
|---|---|---|
| Relative avg 3-yr net charge-off ratio | 20% | APR vs 2024 peer group; 25th/50th/75th pct = 50%/100%/200% . |
| Relative avg 3-yr ROAA improvement | 20% | APR vs 2024 peer group; 25th/50th/75th pct = 50%/100%/200% . |
| Relative 3-yr TSR | 20% | APR vs KBW Regional Bank Index; 25th/50th/75th pct = 50%/100%/200% . |
| Absolute: New-market loan commits + deposits | 20% | Threshold ≥$2.0B; Target ≥$2.5B; Max ≥$2.75B . |
| Absolute: SVP+ high-performer retention | 20% | Threshold ≤9.0%; Target ≤6.0%; Max ≤3.5% . |
- 2021–2024 PSU results: APR 31.87% (weighted across TBVPS CAGR, avg net charge-offs, 4‑yr TSR) led to 63.73% of target vesting; Bansal received 5,420 shares .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 36,979 shares; includes 17,652 RSUs; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Outstanding unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 17,652 units; market value $673,777 at $38.17/sh . |
| RSU vesting schedule | 12,980 vest on 12/31/2025; 4,672 vest on 12/31/2026 . |
| Outstanding unearned PSUs at 12/31/2024 (max assumption) | 68,765 units; market/payout value $2,624,760 at $38.17/sh (performance not yet achieved) . |
| 2024 stock awards vested | 15,106 RSUs ($576,596); 5,420 PSUs ($206,881) . |
| Ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for NEOs; Bansal requirement approx. $1,417,500; in compliance as of Feb 2025 ratification . |
| Anti-hedging/pledging | Hedging and pledging of company stock prohibited for directors and executive officers . |
| Compensation recovery (clawback) | Policy compliant with SEC/NYSE; recoups erroneously awarded incentive comp after a restatement . |
| Deferred compensation (2024) | Executive contributions $299,211; aggregate earnings $218,435; year-end balance $3,360,378 . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms for R. Bansal |
|---|---|
| Change-in-control agreement | If terminated by the Company without Cause or by the executive due to a base salary reduction, each within 6 months following a CIC: cash severance equal to 1x base salary, paid 6 months after CIC . |
| CIC retention bonus | Separate lump-sum retention bonus equal to 1x base salary paid 6 months post‑CIC, subject to continued employment through that date . |
| Equity vesting treatment at/after CIC | Equity assumed/continued is not single‑trigger accelerated; double‑trigger acceleration upon termination without cause/for good reason within 24 months post‑CIC . |
| Estimated payments (as of 12/31/2024; $38.17/sh) | CIC alone: $472,500; CIC + qualifying termination: cash severance $472,500 plus equity acceleration $2,245,312; total $2,717,812 . |
| Excise tax gross‑up | Company states no excise tax gross‑ups; general compensation governance practice . |
Compensation Committee Framework and Peer Context
- 2024 compensation peer group (unchanged from 2023) includes 16 regional banks (e.g., Ameris, BOK Financial, Cadence, Pinnacle Financial Partners, Prosperity, SouthState, Synovus, Texas Capital, UMB, Valley, Webster, etc.) .
- Pay program emphasizes at‑risk pay with capped incentives, multi‑year vesting, ownership/retention policy, anti‑hedging/pledging, and a clawback; no guaranteed bonuses, repricing, or excise tax gross‑ups .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance linkage appears tight: 2024 AIP paid at 150% of target driven by maximum outcomes on funding-profile metrics (NIDDA 27.3%; wholesale funding 23.4%), while the credit-quality relative metric paid zero, indicating balanced incentives across risk and profitability . This alignment suggests incentives to sustain deposit mix improvement and reduce wholesale dependence, supportive of NIM/ROAA expansion.
- Equity exposure is meaningful via unvested RSUs and large unearned PSU overhang (unvested RSUs 17,652; unearned PSUs 68,765 at YE 2024), while outright beneficial ownership is modest (<1%); anti‑hedging/pledging and 3x‑salary ownership rules mitigate misalignment and selling risk, though upcoming RSU vesting on 12/31/2025 and 12/31/2026 could create periodic tax‑related sales .
- CIC structure mixes a single‑trigger retention bonus with double‑trigger equity acceleration, limiting windfalls while ensuring continuity; estimated CIC+termination value ($2.72M) is dominated by equity, reinforcing long‑term alignment but also highlighting event‑driven dilution/overhang considerations for shareholders .
- LTIP discipline: 2021–2024 PSU paid 63.73% of target (APR 31.87%) with TSR at ~38th percentile, evidencing downside sensitivity of realized pay when long‑term relative performance is below median, a governance positive for investors .
Appendix: Key Tables
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Bansal)
| Grant | Date | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Shares/Units | Grant-date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (cash) | 3/29/2024 | 236,250 | 472,500 | 945,000 | — | — |
| PSUs (2024–2026) | 3/29/2024 | 7,008 | 14,016 | 28,032 | — | 392,448 |
| RSUs (time‑based) | 3/29/2024 | — | — | — | 14,016 | 392,448 |
2024 Stock Awards Vested (Bansal)
| Type | Units vested | Value realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 15,106 | 576,596 |
| PSUs (2021–2024) | 5,420 | 206,881 |
Beneficial Ownership and Outstanding Awards (Bansal)
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Beneficially owned shares | 36,979 (includes 17,652 RSUs) |
| Unvested RSUs (market value) | 17,652; $673,777 at $38.17/sh |
| Unearned PSUs at max (market/payout value) | 68,765; $2,624,760 at $38.17/sh |
| RSU vesting dates | 12,980 on 12/31/2025; 4,672 on 12/31/2026 |
Ownership Policy and Trading Restrictions
- Ownership guideline: 3x salary; required ~$1,417,500; in compliance (as of Feb 2025) .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Hedging and pledging prohibited for directors and executive officers .
Say‑on‑Pay (context)
| Proposal (May 22, 2025) | For | Against | Abstain | Broker non-vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advisory vote on NEO compensation | 53,172,019 | 12,470,451 | 101,345 | 3,513,839 |