Pete Beckmann
Builders FirstSourceAbout Pete Beckmann
Pete R. Beckmann is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Builders FirstSource (appointed November 6, 2024). He is 48, joined legacy companies in 1999, and previously served as SVP and VP of FP&A before becoming CFO; he holds a bachelor’s in finance and marketing from Colorado State University and completed the Wharton Executive Development Program . During his tenure as a senior leader, BLDR delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $2.33B in 2024 (vs. $2.8B AOP target) with ROIC of 20.7% and working capital at 9.0% of sales, and in 2023 posted 157.3% TSR alongside Adjusted EBITDA of $2.9B and ROIC of 27.9%—key inputs to incentive outcomes and pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Builders FirstSource | EVP & CFO | Nov 2024 – Present | Finance leadership during digital and value‑added growth; capital allocation; executive certifications on 10‑K/10‑Q . |
| Builders FirstSource | SVP, Financial Planning & Analysis | Jan 2021 – Nov 2024 | Enterprise FP&A leadership (reporting/analysis, forecasting, planning, capital investment) . |
| Builders FirstSource | VP, FP&A | Jul 2015 – Jan 2021 | Corporate FP&A leadership through ProBuild integration period . |
| ProBuild Holdings, Inc. | VP, Operations – Finance; other finance leadership roles | 2002 – 2015 | Regional operations finance and integration groundwork pre‑BLDR combination . |
External Roles
- No external board roles disclosed for Beckmann .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 (weighted) | 2025 terms (post‑promotion) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | — | $375,405 salary earned in 2024 (weighted; promotion in Nov) | $600,000 base salary as CFO, effective Nov 6, 2024 . |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of salary) | — | 100% target for 2024 plan | 100% target bonus as CFO . |
| Equity – Regular annual cycle | — | 2024 LTIP target value $300,000 (50% RSUs/50% PSUs) | Grant in Q1’25: $1,750,000 RSUs/PSUs per 2025 proxy; 8‑K/A (Nov 2024) initially indicated $1,500,000 (updated later) . |
| Other Benefits | — | 401(k) employer contribution $10,350 | Nonqualified Deferred Compensation participant; 2024 contributions $96,670; YE balance $102,752 . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive – 2024 Corporate Incentive Plan (CIP): payout = 73% of target for corporate NEOs (including Beckmann) based on the following metrics and results .
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout (% of total target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Adjusted EBITDA | 70% | $2.24B | $2.80B | ≥$3.36B | $2.33B | 28.7% . |
| Working Capital as % of Sales | 15% | 10.2% | 9.5% | ≤6.8% | 9.0% | 19.2% . |
| Safety (RIR Reduction) | 5% | 1.54 | 1.39 | 1.24 | 1.39 | 5.1% (corporate NEOs) . |
| Safety Training | 5% | 85% | 90% | 100% | 99.9% | 10.0% . |
| RIC Training | 5% | 85% | 90% | 100% | 99.9% | 10.0% . |
| Total Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 73.0% (Beckmann) . |
- 2024 actual bonus earned: $273,789 for Beckmann (73% of $375,135 target) .
- 2022 PSU cycle (ROIC-based with TSR modifier) paid at 184.8% of target for eligible NEOs based on ROIC tranches and top‑quartile TSR (66.8%) through 12/31/2024; this PSU construct informs ongoing plan design .
Long-Term Incentives – Design and Vesting
- Mix: 50% time‑vested RSUs (3 equal annual installments) and 50% PSUs (3‑year cliff vest) .
- PSU metric: ROIC across four tranches (2024, 2025, 2026, and 3‑year average) with a ±10% TSR modifier vs. Dow Jones U.S. Construction & Materials Index; payouts 50–200% by tranche .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (most recent proxy) | 56,905 shares beneficially owned as of March 28, 2025 (<1%) . |
| Initial Section 16 filing at promotion | Form 3 filed Nov 8, 2024: 20,053 shares direct; 42,598 shares indirect (by spouse) . |
| 2024 Stock Vested | 9,041 shares vested; value realized $1,688,661 (NEOs did not exercise options in 2024) . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold 3x base salary; unvested RSUs count; retain 50% of net shares until met; all executives were compliant or within grace period (Oct 2024 evaluation) . |
| Hedging & Pledging | Hedging and pledging of company stock prohibited without prior written approval under Insider Trading Policy . |
Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure
- Time‑based RSUs: vest in equal annual installments, generally on first three anniversaries of grant (March cycle); PSUs: cliff vest after 3 years subject to ROIC/TSR; vesting events can create settlement‑related liquidity needs around vest dates, though policy restricts hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines require retention .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms for Beckmann |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Executives do not have individual employment agreements; covered by Executive & Key Employee Severance Plan . |
| Severance (non‑CIC) | Tier II Participant: cash equal to 1.5x (base salary + target bonus) + pro‑rata bonus; 18 months health continuation; pro‑rata vesting of time‑based awards and performance awards based on actual results at period end . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Tier II: 2.0x (base salary + target bonus) + pro‑rata target bonus; 24 months health continuation; performance equity based on greater of target or actual (as applicable) for in‑process periods . |
| Equity on CIC | Company practice indicates “double‑trigger” vesting for equity awards upon CIC; award agreements govern specifics . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non‑compete, non‑solicit, and non‑recruitment for 18 months post‑termination (Tier II), subject to state law . |
| Clawback | NYSE‑compliant compensation recoupment policy effective Dec 1, 2023 for restatements (3 prior fiscal years) . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift and alignment: 2024 LTIP design remained 50/50 PSUs/RSUs with ROIC as the PSU core metric and TSR modifier—aligning payouts to capital efficiency and market performance .
- Pay-for-performance outcomes: 2024 annual bonus funded at 73% (below target) on EBITDA underperformance (vs. $2.8B AOP) partially offset by working capital discipline and operational/safety achievements, indicating downward sensitivity to profit delivery .
- Promotions and market positioning: Upon promotion, Beckmann’s ongoing target bonus is 100% of salary with a materially higher 2025 equity grant (updated to $1.75M in the 2025 proxy), reinforcing retention and long-term alignment after the CFO transition .
Performance & Track Record
| Period/Metric | Outcome |
|---|---|
| 2023 TSR | 157.3% for the year, reflecting significant share appreciation and capital return program . |
| 2023 Operating | Adjusted EBITDA $2.9B; ROIC 27.9%; Working Capital as % of Sales 9.2% . |
| 2024 Operating | Adjusted EBITDA $2.33B (target $2.8B), ROIC 20.7%, Working Capital as % of Sales 9.0% . |
| Strategic execution | $117M 2024 productivity savings; digital platform launched; 13 acquisitions in 2024; continued buybacks . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: As CFO, Beckmann’s compensation structure (100% target bonus; sizable 2025 PSUs/RSUs; ownership guidelines; anti‑hedging/pledging) is designed to maintain retention and tie pay to multi‑year ROIC/TSR outcomes—a favorable alignment for long‑term investors .
- Incentive sensitivities: Annual bonuses remain highly sensitive to EBITDA delivery and working capital discipline; 2024 under‑target payout demonstrates downside accountability if profit targets are missed despite operational efficiencies .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Tier II severance (2.0x base+bonus under CIC) and equity acceleration mechanics present manageable dilution/cash obligations; presence of a clawback and restrictive covenants mitigates governance risk .
- Trading signals: Vesting calendars (annual RSU tranches; 3‑year PSU cliffs) can create episodic settlement flows, but policy limits hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines enforce post‑vest retention, tempering forced selling pressure .