Kathryn Haviland
About Kathryn Haviland
President & Chief Executive Officer of Blueprint Medicines since 2022; age 49; joined BPMC in 2016 (CBO → COO → CEO). Education: B.A. in Biochemistry/Molecular Biology & Economics (Wesleyan University); M.B.A. (Harvard Business School) . Under her leadership, AYVAKIT net product revenue reached $479M in 2024 (+~135% YoY), 2025 product revenue guidance is $680–$710M, and the company reduced operating cash burn by >50% and ended 2024 with $863.9M in cash (plus $78.7M in Q1’25 from IDRx proceeds) . Executive pay is heavily performance-based with PSUs tied to relative TSR vs the S&P Biotech Index (0–200% payout; capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blueprint Medicines | COO; previously CBO; now President & CEO | 2016–present; CEO since 2022 | Led commercialization, corporate strategy; elevated to CEO to scale revenue and pipeline |
| Idera Pharmaceuticals (now Aceragen) | VP, Rare Diseases & Oncology Program Leadership | 2014–2015 | Program leadership in oncology/rare diseases |
| Sarepta Therapeutics | Head of Commercial Development | 2012–2014 | Built commercial pathways in rare disease |
| PTC Therapeutics | Executive Director, Commercial Development | 2007–2012 | Commercial development for small molecules/gene therapy |
| Genzyme (Sanofi) | Corporate development/project management roles | 2005–2007 | Corporate development at a leading biotech |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Fulcrum Therapeutics | Chairperson; Audit and Nominating & Governance member | Chair since 2022; director since 2018 |
| Bicara Therapeutics | Director; Compensation Committee member | Since 2023 |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 700,976 | 782,250 | 821,363 |
| Target Bonus % (CEO) | — | — | 80% of base salary |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 454,430 | 719,670 | 854,217 |
| All Other Comp ($) | 12,200 (401k match) | 13,200 (401k match) | 13,800 (401k match) |
| Total Reported Comp ($) | 6,217,694 | 6,432,012 | 13,477,004 |
Notes:
- 2024 CEO annual bonus is 100% corporate goals; corporate score certified at 130% of target .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Framework (2024)
| Corporate Objective | Weight | Assessment vs Target | Weighted Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand SM leadership & AYVAKIT revenue | 50% | 140% | 70% |
| R&D pipeline execution | 30% | 100% | 30% |
| Financial discipline & organizational resilience | 20% | 150% | 30% |
| Total | 100% | — | 130% |
- Key achievements referenced by the Compensation Committee: AYVAKIT 2024 net product revenue $479M (~135% YoY); initiated Phase 3 elenestinib; progressed BLU-808; >50% reduction in operating cash burn; YE’24 cash $863.9M .
Long-Term Incentives (Design)
- PSUs: 3-year performance; payout based on relative TSR vs S&P Biotech Index; 0–200% schedule with payout examples: 25th percentile = 50%; 50th = 100%; 75th = 150%; 100th = 200%; capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative .
- Options: 10-year term; strike = closing price on grant date; 1/48 monthly vest for annual grants .
- RSUs: 25% on first anniversary; 25% annually thereafter (4-year total) .
2024 CEO Equity Grants (March 1, 2024)
| Instrument | Quantity | Grant Price/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 80,000 | Strike $95.12; 10-year term; time-vest |
| RSUs | 40,000 | Time-vest 4-year schedule |
| PSUs (rTSR) | 27,000 | 3-year rTSR vs S&P Biotech; 0–200% payout |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 332,877 BPMC shares as of 3/31/2025; <1% of shares outstanding |
| Option Exercises (2024) | None reported for Haviland |
| Shares Vested (2024) | 26,827 shares vested from RSU/PSU; value realized $2,551,784 |
| Outstanding Awards (selected) | Options outstanding across multiple grants (e.g., 39,000 @ $81.44 exp. 2/16/2028; 35,000/45,000 @ $43.15 exp. 3/1/2033; 15,000/65,000 @ $95.12 exp. 3/1/2034); RSUs/PSUs unvested including 30,000 RSUs (MV $2.62M), 27,000 PSUs (MV $2.67M) at 12/31/2024 |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO 3x base salary; only owned shares and RSUs count (options and unearned PSUs excluded); all executives in compliance as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and employees; “No margin accounts, pledging or hedging” |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Summary |
|---|---|
| Employment | At-will; standard confidentiality/IP assignment agreement; 12-month non-compete and non-solicit post-employment (subject to applicable law) |
| Severance (no CIC) | If terminated without cause or resign for good reason: 1x base salary paid over 12 months; up to 12 months of medical/dental benefit payments (COBRA) |
| Change-in-Control (double trigger within 12 months post-sale) | Lump sum 2x base salary + 2x target annual bonus; 24 months medical/dental payments; full and immediate vesting of time-based equity (performance awards per plan) |
| Excise Tax | “Cutback” to avoid 280G excise tax if it yields a better after-tax outcome (no tax gross-ups) |
Illustrative Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Bonus | Benefits | Equity Acceleration | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause (no CIC) | — | — | — | $5,879,759 | $5,879,759 |
| Death/Disability | — | — | — | $14,925,867 | $14,925,867 |
| Termination without Cause within 12 months after Sale Event (successor assumes) | $1,642,726 (2x salary) | $1,314,180 (2x target) | $57,604 (24 months) | $16,645,233 | $19,659,743 |
Notes: Equity acceleration amounts reflect specific PSU treatment as disclosed (e.g., rTSR multipliers applied to 2023/2024 PSU targets at 12/31/2024) .
Governance, Pay Practices, and Shareholder Signals
- Clawback: Updated 2023; recovers incentive-based compensation for restatements covering prior three completed fiscal years .
- Ownership/Alignment: High mix of at-risk pay; PSUs expanded in 2025 to all senior leaders VP+; corporate bonus cap increased to 200% starting 2025 (individual cap 150%) aligning with peer medians .
- Say-on-Pay: ~98% approval at 2024 AGM; frequency vote ~99% for annual .
- Equity Plan: 2024 Stock Plan approved by ~71% of votes; consolidated share authorization; no evergreen .
- Director Resignation Policy, over-boarding limits, and prohibition on hedging/pledging strengthen governance profile .
- Related party transactions: 2022 IDRx licensing and equity stake; GSK acquisition of IDRx closed Feb 2025; BPMC received $78.7M proceeds; approved under RPT policy (founders on IDRx board) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and shift: In 2024, >2/3 of CEO equity was performance-based (options + PSUs); PSUs comprised ~31% of CEO equity value; continued shift toward performance vehicles promotes alignment vs pure RSUs .
- Metrics rigor: Corporate goals balanced across revenue growth (AYVAKIT), pipeline execution, and financial discipline; corporate performance certified at 130% in 2024 reflecting outperformance on revenue and cash burn .
- Future leverage: Raising corporate bonus cap to 200% starting 2025 increases upside leverage; monitor for pay-for-performance balance during potential revenue step-up (2025 guidance $680–$710M) .
- No repricing, no tax gross-ups, standard double-trigger CIC; stock ownership guidelines exclude options/unearned PSUs—conservative approach .
Equity Ownership & Trading Pressure Indicators
- Near-term supply: 2024 vesting of 26,827 shares; continuing 4-year RSU vest cadence implies annual supply; no CEO option exercises in 2024 (reduces immediate sell pressure from option monetization) .
- Policy mitigants: No hedging/pledging allowed; robust blackout/insider trading policy disclosed via 10-K exhibit reference .
Say-on-Pay & Peer Benchmarking
- Peer group used for 2024 pay-setting included 17 biopharma companies (e.g., Exelixis, Sarepta, Ionis, ACADIA, Ultragenyx, Jazz, Halozyme, Apellis, Agios, CRISPR, Neurocrine, PTC, Amicus, BioCryst, Alkermes, Deciphera, Ultragenyx) selected for size/stage comparability and talent market relevance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance-linked pay (rTSR PSUs; options) plus stringent ownership and anti-pledging policies align CEO incentives with long-term TSR and revenue scale-up (positive for governance/alpha) .
- Retention: Significant unvested equity (RSUs/PSUs/options) and competitive double-trigger protection reduce near-term retention risk during strategic inflection (pipeline, global launches) .
- Incentive risk: 2025 higher corporate bonus cap (200%) adds upside cyclicality; monitor goal rigor vs macro headwinds and revenue execution to ensure pay tracks outcomes (watch 2025 product revenue $680–$710M guidance) .
- Trading signals: No 2024 option exercises by CEO; RSU/PSU vesting continues on schedule; insider selling pressure appears limited by policy and vest cadence, but monitor Form 4 filings for any changes (not assessed here) .