Michael Landsittel
Chief Financial Officer at BPMC
Executive
About Michael Landsittel
Michael Landsittel, age 53, is Blueprint Medicines’ Chief Financial Officer (CFO) since January 2019, after joining the company in 2014 and holding progressively senior finance roles; he is a CPA (Illinois) with a B.B.A. from the University of Michigan and an M.B.A. from Dartmouth’s Tuck School . During 2024, BPMC delivered $509 million in total revenue and narrowed net loss to $67 million, while AYVAKIT net product revenue reached $479 million (~135% YoY growth) and cash burn was reduced by more than 50%, underscoring execution against commercial and financial objectives . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show company TSR translating to $109 from a fixed $100 investment in 2024, versus $114 for the Nasdaq Biotech Index peer group .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blueprint Medicines | Chief Financial Officer | 2019–present | Led finance through commercial scale-up, disciplined capital allocation and cash burn reduction |
| Blueprint Medicines | VP Finance; Sr. Director Finance | 2016–2019; 2014–2016 | Built finance, FP&A, controls through transition from R&D to commercial-stage |
| Algeta ASA | Sr. Director of Finance (U.S.) | 2012–2014 | Supported XOFIGO launch, U.S. operations build-out |
| Infinity Pharmaceuticals | Director of Financial Planning | 2012 | Budgeting/forecasting, long-range planning support |
| Genzyme (acquired by Sanofi) | Business development/strategic planning roles | 2002–2012 | Corporate development and strategic planning in biopharma |
| Arthur Andersen LLP | Associate | — | Foundational accounting experience, CPA credential |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public company directorships disclosed for Landsittel in the proxy |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 513,300 | 551,532 | 573,593 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | — | — | 50% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | 259,858 | 317,131 | 387,175 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate goals (AYVAKIT revenue growth; R&D progress; financial discipline) | 75% of bonus for non-CEO execs (corporate vs individual split shown below) | 100% | 130% of target | Corporate portion capped at 130% in 2024; moved to 200% cap starting 2025 | |
| Individual goals (Finance/IS/facilities capability evolution) | 25% of bonus | 100% | 150% of target | Individual portion capped at 150% | |
| Landsittel 2024 bonus math | Corporate 75% (of 50% target) / Individual 25% (of 50% target) | $286,797 target (50% of base) | Corporate $279,627; Individual $107,548; Total $387,175 | Based on 130% corporate and 150% individual achievement | |
| PSUs – rTSR vs S&P Biotech Index | — | 25th→100th percentile scales 50%→200% payout; <25th=0% | 2023 PSU expected payout 178%; 2024 PSU 114% (as of 12/31/24) | 3-year performance cycle; vest at 3rd anniversary contingent on service; negative rTSR caps payout at 100% even if percentile >50th | PSUs vest at cycle end (e.g., Mar 1, 2026; Mar 1, 2027) |
2024 Equity Grants to Landsittel:
- Options: 25,000; RSUs: 12,500; PSUs: 5,000 (grant 3/1/2024; option exercise price $95.12) .
- General vesting: options vest monthly 1/48 over 4 years; RSUs vest 25% annually over 4 years; PSUs follow 3-year rTSR cycle with 0–200% payout .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (shares) | 191,339 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Vested vs unvested status (selected year-end 2024 positions) | Unvested RSUs include tranches vesting through Mar 1, 2027; PSUs scheduled for Mar 1, 2026 (target 2,700) and Mar 1, 2027 (target 5,000) with payout based on rTSR |
| Options – exercisable vs unexercisable | Multiple grants outstanding across 2026–2034 expiries; 2024 grant unexercisable tranche 20,313 at $95.12 as of year-end |
| Option exercises / stock vested in 2024 | 48,181 options exercised ($4,276,032 value realized); 12,640 RSUs vested ($1,202,317) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and employees; no pledging of company stock |
| Ownership guidelines | NEOs must hold ≥1x base salary; in compliance as of 12/31/24 (options and unearned PSUs excluded from count) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Base Case (non-CoC) | Change-in-Control (double trigger within 12 months) |
|---|---|---|
| Severance cash | 1x base salary ($573,593) | 1.5x base + 1.5x target bonus ($860,390 + $430,195) |
| Health continuation | 12 months ($28,903 aggregate cash equivalent) | 18 months ($43,355 aggregate cash equivalent) |
| Equity vesting | Time-based awards do not auto-accelerate in ordinary severance; see equity acceleration table | Full and immediate acceleration of all time-based awards; PSU treatment per award agreement and sale event provisions |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Standard restrictive covenants; non-compete and non-solicit for 12 months post employment (subject to applicable law) | |
| Excise tax | “Best-net” cutback to avoid 280G excise tax if beneficial | |
| Illustrative equity acceleration values (12/31/24) | Acceleration value $913,278 if successor does not assume awards in a sale event | Acceleration value $4,473,305 if successor assumes and termination occurs within 12 months of sale event |
Compensation Mix and Trends
| Component | FY 2022 ($) | FY 2023 ($) | FY 2024 ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards (RSUs/PSUs grant-date fair value) | 766,375 | 699,539 | 1,868,200 |
| Option Awards (grant-date fair value) | 811,778 | 613,428 | 1,348,483 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (bonus) | 259,858 | 317,131 | 387,175 |
| Total Compensation | 2,363,511 | 2,194,830 | 4,191,251 |
Governance signals:
- Clawback: 2023 updated policy to recoup incentive compensation for current/former executive officers upon financial restatement (3-year lookback) .
- Say-on-pay: 98% approval in 2024; annual frequency preference at ~99% .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: Strong pay-for-performance design with corporate and individual goals tied to revenue growth, R&D milestones, and financial discipline; multi-year PSUs based on rTSR add market-linked alignment and capped payouts when rTSR is negative, limiting windfalls .
- Vesting and potential selling pressure: 2024 showed sizable option exercises (48,181) and RSU vesting; forward PSU schedules (2026/2027) and RSU tranches may create periodic liquidity events; pledging and hedging are prohibited, mitigating alignment risks .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CoC severance (1.5x base + 1.5x target bonus) plus full acceleration of time-based equity supports retention through strategic transactions but implies meaningful payout in M&A scenarios; ordinary-course severance at 1x base is moderate .
- Performance track record: Material AYVAKIT revenue growth (~135% YoY to $479m) and >50% cash burn reduction in 2024 signal strong CFO execution in scaling commercial operations and capital discipline; total revenue of $509m and improving losses provide fundamental underpinning for compensation outcomes .
Overall: Compensation structure is tightly linked to measurable corporate outcomes and market performance, with appropriate clawbacks and ownership policies. Watch near-term vesting dates for RSUs/PSUs as potential supply events; change-in-control terms could be value-relevant in M&A, while current governance (no hedging/pledging; stock ownership compliance) supports alignment.