Camille Burckhart
POPULARAbout Camille Burckhart
Camille Burckhart is Executive Vice President and Chief Information and Digital Strategy Officer at Popular, Inc. (BPOP), a role she has held since July 2015; she previously led the Technology Management Division as SVP from December 2010 to June 2015. She is age 45 and oversees innovation, technology and operations; she also serves on the Board of Directors of Nuestra Escuela (since Aug 2016) and the Board of Trustees of Fundación Banco Popular (since Oct 2018) . During her tenure, Popular reported 2024 GAAP net income of $614.2M (adjusted $646.1M, +10% YoY for comp purposes), a year-end share price of $94.06 (+15% YoY), tangible book value per share up 14% YoY to $68.16, and 2022–2024 three‑year TSR of 29.1% (75.6th percentile vs peers), reflecting progress in a multi‑year digital/technology transformation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Popular, Inc. | EVP, Chief Information and Digital Strategy Officer (Innovation, Technology and Operations Group) | Jul 2015 – present | Executive leadership over technology and digital strategy across the enterprise . |
| Popular, Inc. | SVP, Technology Management Division | Dec 2010 – Jun 2015 | Led enterprise technology management prior to elevation to EVP . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nuestra Escuela | Director | Aug 2016 – present | Governance of Puerto Rico education non‑profit . |
| Fundación Banco Popular | Trustee | Oct 2018 – present | Oversight of philanthropic initiatives; Popular disclosed ~$1.1M matching and $1.0M additional contributions in 2024; Popular also provided ~$1.6M in resources . |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual salary/bonus for Ms. Burckhart is not disclosed; she was not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in 2024 (NEOs were CEO, CFO, Former CFO, President/COO, CRO, Popular Bank COO) .
- For context, Popular emphasizes pay‑for‑performance with significant at‑risk compensation for NEOs; base salary increases in 2024 were limited to the incoming CFO (design context only) .
Performance Compensation
Popular applies a consistent incentive architecture across executives, with corporate metrics and transformation milestones determining the short‑term incentive (STI), and PSUs/RS driving long‑term incentives (LTI).
2024 Short‑Term Incentive (program results and weights)
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Target definition | 2024 Actual/Payout factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted after‑tax Net Income | 35% | Board‑set target (undisclosed) | 66% of target earned (applied to NEOs; corporate result) . |
| Adjusted after‑tax ROATCE | 15% | Board‑set target (undisclosed) | 67% of target earned (applied to NEOs; corporate result) . |
| Transformation Milestones | 25% | Key multi‑year transformation milestones | 107% of target earned (collective, same for all NEOs) . |
| Individual Goals | 25% | Role‑specific financial/non‑financial goals | Varies by executive (range shown for NEOs) . |
Notes:
- STI payouts range from 0% to 150% of target; threshold generally at 85% of target; stretch at 115% of target .
- For STI calculations, 2024 GAAP net income was adjusted solely for FDIC Special Assessment to $623.3M for plan purposes .
Long‑Term Incentive (design)
| Component | Weight | Performance horizon | Metrics/vesting | 2024 grant features |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | 50% | 3‑year (e.g., 2024–2026 cycle) | 50% Relative TSR vs U.S. banks $25B–$500B assets; 50% absolute 3‑yr average ROATCE; payout 0–150%; dividends as equivalents paid on actual shares earned; vest on certification at end of cycle . | 2024 PSUs granted at target; vest based on future performance . |
| Restricted Stock (Time‑vested) | 50% (target) | 4 years | Vests 25% annually; award sizing may vary 0–150% of target based on prior‑year performance; includes non‑solicit covenants in terms . | 2024 RS granted at target for CEO and above target for other NEOs (context) . |
PSU Payout (Completed 2022–2024 cycle)
| Metric | Target Framework | Actual result | Payout factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR (50%) | Percentile vs U.S. banks $25B–$500B assets | 75.6th percentile | 150% of target . |
| Absolute 3‑yr Avg ROATCE (50%) | Threshold 9.0%; Target 12.25% | 11.88% | 94.38% of target . |
| Combined | Weighted average | — | 122.19% of target (plus dividend equivalents) . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Policy/Status |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x salary; other executive officers 3x salary within five years; as of Feb 2025, all NEOs met or were on track to meet requirements (guideline applies broadly to executives) . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers (no hedging/monetization; no pledging/margin) . |
| Clawback | Compensation recoupment policy compliant with SEC Rule 10D‑1/Nasdaq 5608 plus potential misconduct triggers; applies to cash and equity incentives . |
| Change‑in‑control vesting | Double‑trigger for awards under the 2020/2004 Omnibus Plans (single‑trigger generally only for pre‑Apr 30, 2013 awards under 2004 plan) . |
| Beneficial ownership snapshot (group) | All directors, nominees, NEOs, executive officers and PAO/Comptroller as a group: 1,545,834 shares, 2.23% of outstanding as of Mar 11, 2025 . |
Employment Terms
- Agreements: The company discloses no employment or change‑in‑control agreements with NEOs, no tax gross‑ups, and no special executive retirement programs (CIC vesting is via plan rules above) .
- Puerto Rico statutory severance (Law 80): PR‑based employees hired before Jan 26, 2017 are entitled to severance if terminated without just cause—2 months + 1 week/year (<5 yrs); 3 months + 2 weeks/year (5–15 yrs); 6 months + 3 weeks/year (>15 yrs) .
- Award covenants: 2024 restricted stock award terms include non‑solicitation of employees/customers; plan awards contain risk controls and forfeiture provisions (e.g., cause) .
- Ownership/insider trading policy: Popular’s Insider Trading Policy governs transactions; pledging/hedging prohibited as above .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Incentives tie to core profitability (adjusted net income, ROATCE), strategic transformation milestones, and multi‑year TSR/ROATCE, with robust clawback and risk oversight—supporting alignment between technology execution (within Ms. Burckhart’s remit) and shareholder value .
- Retention/pressure signals: Four‑year RS vesting, three‑year PSU cycles, and 3x salary ownership guidelines increase retention and reduce near‑term selling pressure; hedging/pledging prohibitions further limit adverse alignment risks .
- Execution track record: Corporate results in 2024 (adjusted net income +10% YoY; TBVPS +14% YoY; 3‑yr TSR at 75.6th percentile) alongside disclosed modernization and digital rollout progress suggest credible multi‑year technology transformation—key to Ms. Burckhart’s scope .
- Governance support: Strong say‑on‑pay approval (95.6% in 2024) and double‑trigger CIC vesting indicate shareholder‑friendly comp governance, lowering governance discount risk .
Note: Individual compensation amounts, vesting schedules, or share ownership specifically for Ms. Burckhart are not disclosed in the proxy; insights above reflect corporate‑level program design/payouts and governance applicable to executive officers .