Gilberto Monzón
POPULARAbout Gilberto Monzón
Gilberto Monzón, age 65, is Executive Vice President, Specialized Businesses Group at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), a subsidiary of Popular, Inc. (BPOP). He assumed this role in May 2023 after leading BPPR’s Individual Credit Group from October 2010 to April 2023 . During his current tenure, Popular reported 2024 GAAP net income of $614.2 million and adjusted net income of $646.1 million (+10% YoY), and BPOP shares rose 15% in 2024; performance shares for the 2022–2024 cycle vested at 122.19% of target on 76th percentile TSR and 11.88% average ROATCE, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment at the company level .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR) | EVP, Individual Credit Group | 2010–2023 | Led consumer credit through a multi-cycle environment; positioned to support loan growth and credit performance objectives . |
| Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR) | EVP, Specialized Businesses Group | 2023–present | Oversees specialized lending lines within broader transformation and growth priorities . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| San Jorge Children’s Hospital Professional Board | Director | 2011–Oct 2022 |
| Coalition for the Prevention of Colorectal Cancer of Puerto Rico | Director | 2014–present |
| Museum of Art of Puerto Rico | Board of Trustees | Jan 2021–present |
| Champion Petroleum Inc. (wholesale distribution) | President & Chairman | Aug 2022–present |
| Fundación Metro Pavia | Director | Dec 2024–present |
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed: Monzón is not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in the proxy; BPOP provides detailed compensation tables for NEOs only .
- Program features applicable to executive officers:
- Limited perquisites; market-median targeting for total compensation opportunity .
- No special retirement or severance programs; no employment or change-in-control agreements stated in program features .
- Prohibition on hedging and pledging of Popular securities by executive officers .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STI) – Framework and 2024 Outcomes
| Component | Weight | Target Mechanics | 2024 Outcome (NEO program reference) | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted after-tax Net Income | 35% | Corporate financial goal | 66% of target credited by Committee (NEO reference) | Annual cash; payouts 0–150% of target |
| Adjusted after-tax ROATCE | 15% | Corporate financial goal | 67% of target credited by Committee (NEO reference) | Annual cash; payouts 0–150% of target |
| Strategic (Transformation milestones) | 25% | Company-wide milestones | 107% of target credited (NEO reference) | Annual cash; same degree of achievement across NEOs |
| Individual goals | 25% | Role-specific goals | Varied by NEO (range 98%–140% in table); not disclosed for Monzón | Annual cash; 0–150% of target |
Notes: STI targets in 2024 were 135% of base for CEO and 80% for other NEOs; Monzón’s target is not disclosed (non-NEO) . Threshold at 85% and stretch at 115% of target; payouts 50%–150% per component if above threshold .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – Structure and Recent Vesting
| Instrument | Weight | Performance Metrics | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares | 50% of LTI target | 50% Relative TSR vs U.S. banks $25B–$500B assets; 50% absolute 3-yr avg ROATCE | 0%–150% of target shares | Cliff after 3 years (performance-based) |
| Time-vested Restricted Stock | 50% of LTI target | N/A (time-based; granted vs performance assessment) | N/A | 25% per year over 4 years |
Recent cycle result: 2022–2024 performance shares vested at 122.19% of target based on TSR at 76th percentile (150% payout on TSR slice) and 3-yr avg ROATCE 11.88% (94.38% on ROATCE slice) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Metric | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x base salary; other executive officers 3x base salary . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executive officers (hedging/monetization and pledging not allowed) . |
| Clawback policy | Compensation Recoupment Policy applies to cash and equity; restatement trigger per Rule 10D-1 and Nasdaq, plus potential misconduct triggers . |
| Beneficial ownership (individual) | Not disclosed for Monzón (non-NEO); aggregate group (27 persons incl. directors, NEOs, exec officers, PAO) held 1,545,834 shares (2.23%) as of Mar 11, 2025 . |
| Shares pledged | Not permitted under Corporate Governance Guidelines . |
| Insider trading windows | Subject to Insider Trading Policy and procedures; policy filed with 10-K . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Company Program/Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Program indicates no employment or change-in-control agreements for executive officers; specifically none for NEOs . |
| Severance | No special executive retirement or severance programs . |
| Change-of-control | Double-trigger vesting for equity upon change in control . |
| Non-compete/non-solicit | Not broadly disclosed for all executives; used in specific award circumstances (e.g., retired CFO award) . |
Performance & Track Record (Company context during his tenure)
- 2024 outcomes: GAAP net income $614.2m; adjusted net income $646.1m (+10% YoY); capital strong (CET1 16%); TBVPS $68.16 (+14% YoY); stock +15% in 2024; NIM +11 bps YoY; non-performing loan ratio down 7 bps to 0.95% .
- Pay-for-performance validation: 2022–2024 performance shares vested at 122.19% of target (TSR 76th percentile; 3-yr avg ROATCE 11.88%) .
- Say-on-Pay: 95.6% approval in May 2024, indicating broad shareholder support for the compensation program .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/hedging banned; no tax gross-ups; no repricing; annual clawback framework compliant with SEC/Nasdaq and broader misconduct triggers; overall indicates strong compensation governance .
- Related-party transactions: No transactions disclosed involving Monzón; related party procedures detailed and overseen by Audit Committee .
Compensation Committee & Governance Notes
- Talent & Compensation Committee: fully independent; oversees executive pay, risk reviews, succession planning, and human capital matters; independent consultant advised committee .
- Ownership guidelines and double-trigger vesting further align executives with long-term shareholder value .
Investment Implications
- Alignment/retention: Four-year vesting on RS used alongside three-year performance shares (TSR and ROATCE) creates meaningful at-risk, time-based retention hooks for senior executives, including Monzón, in a high-governance framework (no pledging/hedging; clawbacks; ownership guidelines) .
- Payout sensitivity: 2024 STI corporate components paid below target (66% NI; 67% ROATCE) while strategic execution scored above target (107%), signaling balanced incentives tied to profitability and transformation; monitor credit performance given Monzón’s credit/lending background .
- Transparency gap: As a non-NEO, Monzón’s individual salary, bonus, and grants are not disclosed; investors should monitor Form 4 filings and future proxies for ownership changes and award vesting related activity. Overall, company-level pay design and strong Say-on-Pay support reduce governance risk, but lack of individual-level data limits granular sell-pressure analysis .