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John E. Bassett, III

Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer at BASSETT FURNITURE INDUSTRIES
Executive

About John E. Bassett, III

Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer at Bassett Furniture Industries (BSET) and one of the company’s named executive officers (NEOs) in recent proxy statements . Total beneficial ownership reported at 52,663 shares as of January 23, 2025 (less than 1% of outstanding) with 8,788,356 shares outstanding on that date . Company performance over the last three fiscal years shows declining revenue and EBITDA alongside softening TSR: revenues fell from $485.6M in FY2022 to $329.9M in FY2024, EBITDA declined from $39.8M to $1.4M*, and Pay-vs-Performance TSR values moved from 124 (FY2022) to 112 (FY2024) (revenues) .
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus % of SalaryActual Bonus ($)Notes
FY2024286,250 26% target; 13% threshold; 60% max 0 No FY2024 bonuses paid (operating income below threshold)
FY2023276,250 29% target; 14% threshold; 72% max 0 No FY2023 bonuses paid (all measures below thresholds)
FY2022268,333 46% target; 23% threshold; 81% max 217,750 FY2022 bonuses paid at maximum (operating income and net sales exceeded max goals)

Perquisites were modest: “No named executive officer received personal benefits in excess of $10,000” in FY2024 and FY2023 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan – Metrics, Targets, and Payouts

YearMetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout
FY2024Company Operating Income≥75% $2.75M $5.5M $10.0M Below threshold 0%
FY2023Company Operating Income≥75% $13.1M $17.4M $24.4M Below threshold 0%
FY2023Wood Division Operating Income (Bassett)≤25% $10.7M $14.2M $16.3M Below threshold 0%

Equity Awards and Vesting

  • Last executive equity grants were time-vested restricted stock awards in January 2022 and January 2023; no grants since January 2023 .
  • 2023 grant: 2,400 shares RS to Bassett on 1/11/2023 (grant date fair value $42,120), vesting ratably over three years .
  • 2022 grant: 2,400 shares RS on 1/12/2022 (grant date fair value $37,968), vesting ratably over three years .
As ofUnvested RS (#)Vesting ScheduleShares Vested in FYValue Realized ($)
FY2024 YE2,400 800 on Jan 11, 2025; 800 on Jan 12, 2025 1,600 in FY2024 24,904
FY2023 YE4,000 800 on Jan 11, 2024; 800 on Jan 12, 2024; 800 on Jan 11, 2025; 800 on Jan 12, 2025 800 in FY2023 14,520
FY2022 YE2,400 800 each on Jan 12, 2023, 2024, 2025

Stock options: none outstanding for Bassett in FY2024, FY2023, FY2022 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Date (Record)Beneficial Ownership (Shares)Shares OutstandingOwnership %
Jan 23, 202552,663 8,788,356 ~0.6% (calculated from )
Jan 18, 202452,233 8,817,298 ~0.6% (calculated from )
Jan 19, 202350,712 8,950,068 ~0.6% (calculated from )
  • Unvested restricted stock held at FY2024 year-end: 2,400 shares .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: Senior Vice President = 2x base salary; all NEOs are in compliance .
  • Anti-hedging/pledging: Officers/directors prohibited from hedging and pledging company stock .

Note: Two RS tranches (800 each) scheduled to vest in January 2025 may incrementally increase potential insider selling liquidity upon vesting .

Employment Terms

ProgramKey EconomicsTriggers/TermsNotes
Severance Program (SVP level)Cash up to 1x base salary + average bonus + prorated bonus; 12 months health coverage; 3 months outplacement up to $7,500 Termination by Company without cause (non‑CoC) Benefits cease if executive joins a competitor
Employment Continuity Agreement (Change-in-Control)Lump sum = 1x “required base salary” + most recent target bonus + 3‑year average bonus; 12 months health; life/LTD PV; 3 months outplacement ($7,500 cap) Double trigger: termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 2 years after CoC Equity vests only on double trigger unless not assumed
Equity Vesting on CoCNo single-trigger acceleration; “double trigger” applies for options/RS Qualifying termination within 2 years post-CoC 2021 Stock Incentive Plan
ClawbackNon-fault recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based comp for covered officers for 3 years preceding an accounting restatement Adopted to comply with NASDAQ rules (Oct 2023) Policy posted on company website
Deferred CompManagement Savings Plan (up to 75% salary and 100% bonus deferrals); employer contributions vesting rules; distributions per plan Account-based with deemed investments Bassett had $70,150 exec contrib., $13,500 employer contrib., and $272,004 aggregate balance in FY2022
Long-Term Cash Award (2017)$400,000 award under Management Savings Plan; vests at/after age 63 or earlier upon death/disability Paid in 10 annual installments post-termination Granted to Bassett, Daniel, Cohenour

No excise tax gross-up under severance or change-in-control arrangements .

Compensation Committee, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay

  • Organization, Compensation and Nominating (OCN) Committee: W.C. Wampler, Jr. (Chair), V.W. Hamlet, W.C. Warden, Jr. .
  • Independent consultant: Korn Ferry; no conflicts noted .
  • 2024 Peer Group included: American Woodmark, Culp, Ethan Allen Interiors, Flexsteel Industries, Haverty Furniture, Hooker Furnishings, Kirkland’s, La‑Z‑Boy, Lovesac, Sleep Number (added), Purple Innovation; Kimball International removed (acquired); Bowflex removed (bankruptcy) .
  • Say‑on‑Pay support: ~97% in 2024 ; ~96% in 2023 ; ~98% in 2022 .

Related Party Transactions

  • A son (Tyler Bassett) of John E. Bassett, III was an employee: $168,636 (salary, restricted stock and benefits) in 2023; $161,522 (salary and benefits) in 2024. Approved under related party policy by OCN Committee .
  • Prior disclosure: $210,397 in 2022 and $168,636 in 2023 (salary, non‑equity incentive, restricted stock and benefits) .

Performance & Track Record

Company-level outcomes during Bassett’s recent NEO tenure:

  • Pay-versus-Performance TSR (value of initial $100 investment): 124 (FY2022), 116 (FY2023), 112 (FY2024) .
  • Revenues and EBITDA trend:
MetricFY2022FY2023FY2024
Revenues ($)485,601,000 390,136,000 329,923,000
EBITDA ($)39,824,000*10,906,000*1,376,000*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Context: FY2023–FY2024 annual bonuses paid at zero due to performance below thresholds, indicating strong pay-for-performance linkage in weak industry conditions .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs. equity mix: 2022 paid maximum annual bonus; 2023–2024 no annual bonuses as thresholds were not met .
  • Shift to time-vested RSUs: Last performance-based long-term awards were in 2018; modest time-vested RS grants occurred in 2022 and 2023 to support retention; no grants since Jan 2023 .
  • At‑risk pay calibration: FY2023 target bonus at 29% of salary (max 72%); FY2024 target at 26% (max 60%), with ≥75% weighting on operating income, reinforcing operating leverage focus .
  • Governance safeguards: Double-trigger equity vesting, clawback policy, anti-hedging/pledging, no excise tax gross-ups .

Equity Ownership Details (Granular)

  • Unvested RS supply: 2,400 unvested shares at FY2024 YE; 1,600 shares scheduled to vest in Jan 2025 (two 800-share tranches) .
  • No options outstanding (no embedded option-driven selling pressure) .
  • Ownership guidelines: As SVP, required to hold 2x base salary in stock; Bassett is in compliance .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is credible: zero cash bonuses in FY2023–FY2024 and heavy weighting to operating income indicate compensation flexes down when results deteriorate .
  • Retention vs. performance trade-off: Time-vested RS awards (2022–2023) support retention but dilute performance sensitivity vs. performance shares; absence of new grants since Jan 2023 tempers incremental overhang .
  • Near-term supply watch: 1,600 RS shares scheduled to vest in January 2025 could add modest insider selling liquidity, though no pledging/hedging is permitted .
  • Downcycle execution risk: Company revenues and EBITDA have compressed materially since FY2022 while TSR softened, framing execution risk for operations leadership; however, governance mitigants (clawback, double‑trigger CoC, no gross‑ups) limit shareholder‑unfriendly outcomes .