Sign in

Kevin McCoy

Chief Nuclear Officer at BWX TechnologiesBWX Technologies
Executive

About Kevin McCoy

Kevin M. McCoy (age 68) serves as President, Government Operations at BWX Technologies and has been in this role since February 2022, with 3 years of tenure at BWXT as of the 2025 proxy date . He holds a BS in Mechanical Engineering from SUNY Stony Brook, an MS in Mechanical Engineering and an Engineer’s degree in Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering from MIT, and an MBA from Emory University . BWXT’s executive pay program ties incentives to Operating Income, Free Cash Flow, EBITDA, ROIC, and relative TSR; for context, company-level 2024 performance showed TSR of $191.93 per $100 initial investment, Net Income of $282.3M, and Adjusted EBITDA of $498.7M . The annual cash incentive (EICP) for McCoy also incorporates Government Operations segment operating income for part of his weighting, reflecting direct alignment to his business unit’s performance .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Irving Shipbuilding Inc.President2013–2021Led a major Canadian shipbuilder; deep shipyard and nuclear industrial operations experience .
U.S. NavyChief Engineer2005–2008Senior engineering leadership; nuclear operations background .
U.S. NavyCommander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)2008–2013Oversaw complex, high-risk systems and naval shipbuilding/maintenance .

External Roles

  • Not disclosed for McCoy in the 2025 proxy .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year compensation (SCT reported values):

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)735,000 735,000 753,750
Stock Awards ($)357,547 501,275 1,159,011
Option Awards ($)0 120,001 149,987
Non-Equity Incentive (EICP) ($)472,973 550,000 845,000
All Other Compensation ($)44,100 56,338 66,774
Total ($)1,609,620 1,962,614 2,998,182

2024 target total direct compensation and salary adjustments:

  • 2024 Target TDC: Base $760,000; Annual Incentive $532,000; LTI $750,000; Total $2,042,000 .
  • 2024 Salary adjustment: January $735,000 → April $760,000 (+$25,000) .

Performance Compensation

Annual cash incentive (EICP) design and 2024 outcomes:

ComponentWeightThresholdTargetMaxActual
Operating Income (McCoy measured 37.5% on consolidated, 32.5% on Government Operations)70%$347.4M $408.7M $470.0M $419.3M
Free Cash Flow25%$212.7M $250.3M $287.8M $269.4M
Safety (TRIR)0.83 0.66 0.55 0.56
Safety (DART)0.36 0.29 0.24 0.27

Individual payout mechanics and result (2024):

ItemValue
Earnings from Salary$753,750
Target Percentage70.0%
Aggregate Financial & Safety Multiplier128.0%
Individual Performance Adjustment125%
Performance Percentage Applied160%
Total 2024 EICP Payout$845,000

LTI performance share (PRSU) metrics and mechanics:

  • Weighting: 40% cumulative Adjusted EBITDA; 40% average annual ROIC; 20% relative TSR, over a 3-year performance period; payout thresholds at 50% (threshold), 100% (target), 200% (max) of granted units .

2024 long-term incentive grants to McCoy (grant date 2/29/2024; exercise/base price for options $100.83):

Award TypeThreshold UnitsTarget UnitsMax UnitsGrant-Date Fair Value ($)
PRSUs (standard 2024 cycle)2,231 4,462 8,924 509,061
PRSUs (special one-time grant)2,479 4,958 9,916 499,915
RSUs (time-based)1,488 150,035
Stock Options5,259 149,987; strike $100.83

Vesting and realizations in 2024:

  • Shares acquired on vesting: 1,712; value realized: $151,177; shares withheld for taxes: 816; no option exercises by NEOs in 2024 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership13,761 shares as of March 6, 2025
Included OptionsFootnote indicates 6,775 shares underlying vested options are included
Ownership as % of OutstandingEach executive officer’s holdings individually constitute less than 1% of outstanding shares
Stock Ownership GuidelinesNEOs must hold ≥3x base salary; 5-year compliance window; selling restricted until guideline met; governance committee oversees compliance
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors, officers, employees; includes options trading, zero-cost collars, margin pledging, and short sales
Clawback PoliciesNYSE-compliant clawback recovering incentive-based comp for 3 years preceding restatement, regardless of fault; additional misconduct-based forfeiture provisions

Employment Terms

Severance and change-in-control protections:

  • Executive Severance Plan for involuntary termination not for cause: lump-sum cash equal to 52 weeks’ base salary; subject to general release and non-compete, nondisclosure, and other restrictive covenants .
  • Change-in-control agreements: generally double-trigger (termination within 24 months; 30 months for CEO), providing accelerated vesting of equity awards, cash severance, prorated target EICP, prior year EICP if unpaid, and health benefits; no excise tax gross-ups; “modified cutback” to optimize after-tax outcomes .

Estimated potential payments for McCoy (assuming event on 12/31/2024; equity valued at $111.39/sh):

ScenarioSeverance ($)EICP ($)Benefits ($)Outplacement ($)Financial Planning ($)RSUs ($)PRSUs ($)Options ($)Total ($)
Involuntary Termination Not for Cause760,000 14,756 17,000 12,650 966,791 1,771,197
Change in Control with Termination2,584,000 532,000 59,024 17,000 12,650 428,629 2,232,701 305,078 6,171,082
Disability760,000 14,756 12,650 428,629 2,232,701 305,078 3,753,814
Death12,650 428,629 2,232,701 305,078 2,979,058
Retirement12,650 12,650

Other employment terms and governance:

  • No employment agreements with executive officers (company-wide policy) .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: McCoy’s EICP was driven by Operating Income and FCF outcomes above target, plus safety metrics, resulting in a 160% performance factor and $845,000 cash payout; his assessment included Government Operations segment performance and acquisition integration achievements, indicating direct linkage to his operational execution .
  • Equity-heavy incentives and retention: 2024 LTI mix included two PRSU grants (one special $500,000 PRSU) and RSUs plus stock options, emphasizing multi-year EBITDA/ROIC/TSR performance and retention given 3-year PRSU cycles and ownership guidelines restricting sales before guideline compliance .
  • Insider selling pressure: No option exercises occurred in 2024; vesting volume was modest (1,712 shares; $151,177 realized), and pledging/hedging is prohibited, which reduces forced selling and alignment risk; beneficial ownership is <1% of shares outstanding individually, consistent with the broader leadership group .
  • Change-of-control economics: Double-trigger treatment with accelerated vesting and cash severance (no tax gross-ups; modified cutback) creates balanced protection without shareholder-unfriendly gross-ups, while non-compete covenants are required for severance—lowering transition and retention risk .
  • Benchmarking and risk controls: Compensation is benchmarked to a defined A&D peer set, with linear, capped payouts and clawbacks (NYSE-compliant), mitigating incentive risk and potential overpayment, and signaling an emphasis on sustainable value creation .