DeEtte Gray
About DeEtte Gray
DeEtte Gray (age 55) is President, U.S. Operations at CACI (since July 2024). She previously led CACI’s Business & IT Solutions Sector (2019–2024) and served as President, U.S. Operations (2017–2019), after senior roles at BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin . Under the FY2025 incentive framework she oversaw, CACI delivered revenue of $8.628B and net income of $499.8M, with EBITDA and key U.S. Ops metrics between Target and Stretch; FY2025 TSR translated a $100 initial investment into $219.80 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic scope/notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CACI | President, U.S. Operations | Jul 2024 – Present | Executive officer leading U.S. operations |
| CACI | President, Business & Information Technology Solutions Sector | Jul 2019 – Jul 2024 | Led BIT Solutions Sector |
| CACI | President, U.S. Operations | 2017 – 2019 | Prior leadership of U.S. Ops |
| BAE Systems, Inc. | President, Intelligence & Security Sector | 2012 – 2017 | Senior leadership in national security market |
| Lockheed Martin | VP, IS&GS – Defense Product Line | 2007 – 2012 | Senior role in defense product line |
Fixed Compensation
| Fiscal year | Base salary ($) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | 712,990 |
Perquisites (FY2025):
- Automobile expenses: $5,094; Tax and investment services: $22,032 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Bonus (FY2025)
- Summary: Ms. Gray’s FY2025 earned bonus was $1,143,985 (128.4% of target), including a 110% Individual Modifier; without the modifier, payout would have been 116.7% .
- Gate: U.S. Operations EBIT Dollars must meet a minimum to qualify (met) .
| Metric (U.S. Ops unless noted) | Weight | Target | Actual | Result vs target | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBIT Dollars ($M) | Gate | 878.7 | 909.1 | Met minimum | Gate to bonus payment |
| EBIT Margin % | 40% | 10.64% | 10.9% | Between Target and Stretch | Cut 93%, Stretch 107% of Target |
| Revenue ($M) | 30% | 8,257 | 8,341 | Between Target and Stretch | Cut 90%, Stretch 120% |
| Collections ($M) | 30% | 8,257 | 8,294 | Between Target and Stretch | Cut 90%, Stretch 120% |
| Company EBITDA ($M) | — | 941.85 | 966.85 | Between Target and Stretch | Corporate metric context |
| Company Revenue ($M) | — | 8,398 | 8,627 | Between Target and Stretch | Corporate metric context |
| Earned Bonus ($) | — | 891,238 | 1,143,985 | 128.4% of Target | Individual Modifier 110% |
Program guardrails: Annual bonus cap 250% of target; Individual modifier ±25%; Cut/Target/Stretch calibration as shown above .
Long-Term Incentives (granted Oct 1, 2024 for FY2025 program)
- Mix: 50% RSUs (time-based, 3-year ratable vesting) and 50% PRSUs (3-year performance) .
- Performance PRSUs: Metric is 3-year cumulative Free Cash Flow (FY25–FY27). Vesting: 50% at 90% of target (threshold), 100% at target, 200% at 110% of target (stretch). Vest at the end of year 3 .
| Award (Grant date) | Shares (Target) | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting schedule |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (10/1/2024) | 1,978 | 1,000,116 | 1/3 each on 10/1/2025, 10/1/2026, 10/1/2027 |
| PRSUs (10/1/2024) | 1,978 (Target) | 1,000,116 | Cliff vest after 3 years; 50–200% earned based on 3-year cumulative FCF (90–110% of target) |
Prior-cycle PRSUs (context): FY2023/2024 PRSUs are tied to 3-year cumulative EBITDA (ending FY2025/FY2026) .
Upcoming Vesting and Outstanding Awards (as of 6/30/2025)
| Grant date | Type | Unvested shares | Next vest/measurement | Valuation notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4/26/2022 | Time-based RSUs | 10,636 | 4/26/2026 (single vest) | $5,070,181 market value at $476.70 close (6/30/2025) |
| 10/1/2022 | Time-based RSUs | 894 | Equal installments 10/1/2023–10/1/2025 | $426,170 market value at 6/30/2025 |
| 10/1/2022 | PRSUs (3-yr EBITDA) | 2,682 | Performance period FY2023–FY2025 | $1,278,509 market value at 6/30/2025 |
| 10/1/2023 | Time-based RSUs | 2,124 | Equal installments 10/1/2024–10/1/2026 | $1,012,511 market value at 6/30/2025 |
| 10/1/2023 | PRSUs (3-yr EBITDA) | 3,186 | Performance period FY2024–FY2026 | $1,518,766 market value at 6/30/2025 |
| 10/1/2024 | RSUs | 1,978 | Equal installments 10/1/2025–10/1/2027 | See above |
| 10/1/2024 | PRSUs (3-yr FCF) | 1,978 (Target) | Performance period FY2025–FY2027 | See above |
Note: Market values use $476.70 close on 6/30/2025 (footnote references) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Data | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 34,963 (includes 5,297 RSUs vesting within 60 days) | |
| Ownership as % outstanding | <1% (denoted by “*” in table) | |
| Stock ownership guideline | 5x base salary for Ms. Gray | |
| Compliance with guideline | All NEOs were in compliance as of July 1, 2025 | |
| Hedging / Pledging | Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging; no pledging disclosed in proxy | |
| Sale restrictions until compliant | Executives may sell only half of net shares from vesting until full compliance |
Insider selling pressure context:
- Multiple RSU tranches vest annually each October; however, policy requires retaining half of net vest shares until guideline is fully met, dampening near-term sale flow .
- PRSUs concentrate vesting at performance period end (in FY2027 for FY2025 grants), creating potential event-driven supply but aligned with longer-term performance .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms for Ms. Gray | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Employment status | Executive officer; President, U.S. Operations (since July 2024) | |
| Severance (no CIC) | Company policy: 6 months’ base salary upon involuntary separation without cause | |
| Severance (with CIC) | Cash severance only upon termination without cause by Company; equity generally double-trigger; see totals below | |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | Post-2022 grants: continued vesting upon termination without cause (≥1 year post-grant) subject to non-compete and non-solicit covenants | |
| Equity vesting on CIC | “Double trigger” since 2010 (CIC plus qualifying termination) | |
| Retirement treatment | For FY2022+ grants, retirement eligible (Rule of 65; age ≥55 and service) → continue to vest as if employed | |
| Clawback | SEC 10D-compliant clawback plus broader SOX 304-style policy | |
| Deferred compensation | Aggregate balance $2,503,098; aggregate earnings FY2025 $145,010 |
Illustrative severance/CIC values (as of 6/30/2025):
- Termination without cause (no CIC): Total $12,159,711 (includes $356,495 cash severance and $9,306,137 unvested equity value) .
- Termination without cause following a CIC: Total $14,045,536 (includes $356,495 cash severance and $11,191,963 unvested equity value) .
Additional Program Governance and Context
- Pay philosophy: Majority at-risk; FY2025 target TDC mix ~65% LTI, 21% STI, 14% base at the program level .
- FY2025 target compensation for Ms. Gray: Base $712,990; Target bonus $891,238 (125% of base); Target equity $2,000,000 (50% RSUs/50% PRSUs) .
- Performance factors: Corporate metrics (Revenue, EBITDA), U.S. Ops metrics (EBIT Dollars, EBIT Margin %, Revenue, Collections); FY2025 included impact of the Azure Summit Technologies acquisition in targets .
- Say-on-Pay support: 98% approval in 2024; prior years 96% (2022) and 94% (2023) .
- Peer group used for benchmarking (FY2025): BAH, Bread Financial, Broadridge, Cognizant, FIS, Fiserv, Jacobs, KBR, L3Harris, Leidos, MAXIMUS, Parsons, SAIC, Tetra Tech, Unisys .
- Related party transactions: None requiring disclosure for executive officers .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Ms. Gray’s 2025 bonus outcomes and LTI design tightly link pay with U.S. Operations profitability/margin and 3-year cash flow, reinforcing value-creation through disciplined growth and cash conversion .
- Retention risk: Moderate. She has sizeable unvested RSUs/PRSUs across 2022–2024 grants and a 5x salary ownership requirement, with continued vesting provisions tied to non-compete/nonsolicit, supporting retention and alignment .
- Selling pressure: Manageable. Annual RSU vesting could add periodic supply, but mandatory retention of half of net vested shares until guideline compliance and the concentration of PRSU vesting at cycle-end temper near-term disposition risk .
- Change-in-control economics: No individual CIC agreement; cash severance limited (6 months base on non-CIC termination), with double-trigger equity—balanced shareholder protections without excessive cash obligations .
- Governance quality: Robust clawbacks, no tax gross-ups, no option repricings, and strong shareholder support on Say-on-Pay reduce red-flag risk and indicate healthy compensation oversight .