Donald McCree
About Donald McCree
Donald H. McCree III (age 63) is Senior Vice Chair and Head of Commercial Banking at Citizens Financial Group; he has led the Commercial Banking Division since August 2015 and was elevated to Senior Vice Chair in 2024, overseeing Corporate & Investment Banking, Commercial Lending, CRE, Capital Markets & Advisory, Asset Finance, Treasury Solutions, Underwriting & Portfolio Management, and Enterprise Payments . CFG’s pay program ties a large portion of his compensation to performance via PSUs based 50% on cumulative EPS and 50% on average ROTCE with a +/-20% relative TSR modifier; company-level “Pay vs Performance” disclosure shows 2024 Underlying ROTCE of 10.5%, GAAP net income of $1,509mm, and TSR of $136.1 on a $100 base (peers $132.6), framing the environment for incentive outcomes . For the 2024 performance year, CFG set a corporate performance factor at 99.8%, and McCree’s overall variable compensation payout was 98.7% of target, reflecting balanced financial (60%) and business execution (40%) criteria plus individual assessment overlays .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and predecessors | Senior leadership positions across corporate and investment banking | 30+ years | Deep CIB operating experience leveraged at CFG to expand coverage, product capability, and capital markets execution |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| University of Vermont | Trustee; UVM Foundation Board of Directors | Not disclosed | Governance and fundraising leadership; alumni connectivity |
| National Constitution Center (Philadelphia) | Trustee | Not disclosed | Non-profit governance; civic engagement |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | All Other Compensation ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 700,000 | 29,575 |
| 2023 | 700,000 | 36,670 |
| 2024 | 700,000 | 30,175 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Variable Compensation Outcomes (by component)
| Year | Target Variable Comp ($) | Achievement (%) | Cash Bonus ($) | RSUs ($) | PSUs ($) | Total Variable ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 4,050,000 | Not disclosed | 1,215,000 | 1,012,500 | 1,822,500 | 4,050,000 |
| 2023 | 3,500,000 | Not disclosed | 875,000 | 962,500 | 1,662,500 | 3,500,000 |
| 2024 | 3,900,000 | 98.7% | 962,500 | 1,058,750 | 1,828,750 | 3,850,000 |
PSU Design and Targets
| Grant Year/Performance Period | Metric | Weight | Threshold | Maximum | TSR Modifier | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 grant (2024–2026) | Average ROTCE | 50% | 4.35% | 13.38% | +/-20% vs peer TSR, max 150% total | Single vest after 3 years (3/1/2027) |
| 2024 grant (2024–2026) | Cumulative EPS | 50% | $4.60 | $15.79 | +/-20% vs peer TSR, max 150% total | Single vest after 3 years (3/1/2027) |
| 2025 grant (2025–2027) | Average ROTCE | 50% | 6.48% | 14.57% | +/-20% vs peer TSR, max 150% total | Single vest after 3 years (schedule per plan) |
| 2025 grant (2025–2027) | Cumulative EPS | 50% | $7.58 | $18.05 | +/-20% vs peer TSR, max 150% total | Single vest after 3 years (schedule per plan) |
Notable PSU Payout History
- 2022 PSU Awards (performance 2022–2024) approved at 84.8% of target; TSR percentile 44% (no modifier impact) .
Corporate and Individual Performance Framework
- Corporate performance factor: 60% financial + 40% business execution; 2024 factor determined at 99.8% .
- Individual adjustment band: +/-20% vs corporate factor; McCree’s 2024 outcome: 98.7% of target .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 28, 2025)
| Holder | Shares | % Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Donald H. McCree III | 288,981 | <1% (of 437,133,889 shares) |
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO/CFO/Head of Consumer Banking at 6x salary; Other Executive Committee Members at 3x salary; executives have 5 years to comply; as of 12/31/24 all NEOs were in compliance .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for executives and directors .
Outstanding Unvested Equity (Dec 31, 2024)
| Award | Shares/Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 RSUs | 6,091 | 266,542 |
| 2022 PSUs (earned/vesting mechanics per plan) | 27,895 | 1,220,685 |
| 2023 RSUs | 16,221 | 709,831 |
| 2023 PSUs (projected at plan methodology) | 32,848 | 1,437,428 |
| 2024 RSUs | 30,429 | 1,331,573 |
| 2024 PSUs (target basis per plan methodology) | 52,560 | 2,300,026 |
- RSU vesting: annual pro rata over 3 years; March 2023 RSUs had remaining vests on 3/1/2025 and 3/1/2026; March 2024 RSUs scheduled to vest 3/1/2025, 3/1/2026, 3/1/2027 .
- PSU vesting: single vest after 3-year performance period (e.g., 2024 grant vests 3/1/2027; 2023 grant vests 3/1/2026) with TSR modifier; no acceleration absent qualifying termination post‑CoC .
Shares Vested in 2024
| Name | Shares Vested (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Donald H. McCree III | 59,115 | 1,869,807 |
Deferred Compensation
- McCree made no contributions and had no plan balance activity disclosed for 2024; only the CEO and Coughlin appeared in the nonqualified deferral table .
Employment Terms
| Item | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Yes (standard NEO form) |
| Notice Period on Resignation | 120 days |
| Non‑Solicit | 12 months post-termination (customers and colleagues) |
| General Severance (no CoC) | Minimum 26 weeks of base salary if made redundant or terminated without cause, subject to release; health benefits at active rates for one month and up to 12 months outplacement per practice |
| CoC Severance (double trigger) | If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 24 months of CoC: 2x (base salary + average cash bonus over prior 3 years) + pro‑rata bonus (average cash bonus basis) |
| Equity on CoC | PSUs assessed at CoC for actual earned to date, then remain time‑vesting; if double‑trigger termination within 12 or 24 months (starting with 2024 grants), unvested RSUs and PSUs fully vest |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant Clawback Policy (Dec 1, 2023) plus broader ARP process for risk events; potential forfeiture/clawback of awards |
| Tax Gross‑Ups | No excise tax gross‑ups; no tax gross‑ups except standard relocation program |
Estimated Potential Payments (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Cash ($) | Equity ($) | Health ($) | Outplacement ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary Termination with Good Reason | 350,000 (12) | 5,445,276 (14) | 1,125 | 5,700 | 5,802,101 |
| Change of Control Qualifying Termination (Double Trigger) | 4,452,500 (13) | 7,745,301 (14) | 1,125 | 5,700 | 12,204,626 |
| Change of Control Only (No Termination) | — | 7,745,301 (14) | — | — | 7,745,301 |
| Death | — | 7,745,301 (14) | — | — | 7,745,301 |
| Disability | — | 7,745,301 (14) | — | — | 7,745,301 |
| Retirement | — | 7,745,301 (14) | — | — | 7,745,301 |
Notes: (12) Pro‑rata bonus construct; (13) 2x base + average cash bonus plus pro‑rata bonus; (14) equity treatment per plan and award agreements .
Performance & Track Record (2024 Highlights)
- Expanded middle‑market teams in FL and CA; grew NYC metro presence to support opportunistic IB fee generation aligned to Private Bank and Wealth expansion .
- Advanced coverage for emerging MM clients and expanded products (Payments, Treasury Solutions, Advisory) while maintaining strong Commercial Banking NPS .
- Delivered strong capital markets fees and share gains; executed balance‑sheet redeployment to higher‑return relationships/fee transactions; progressed swap dealer registration; led disciplined CRE workout .
- Drove tech/digitization (LoanIQ to cloud, client portal enhancements, applied AI predictive models) to enhance client experience .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at‑risk mix with long‑term equity (PSUs and RSUs) comprising 65–75% of variable pay; at least 50% of LTI via PSUs with 3‑year performance period, aligning pay with multi‑year EPS/ROTCE outcomes and relative TSR .
- 2024 corporate factor at 99.8% and McCree’s 98.7% of target indicate disciplined funding and tight linkage to financial/business execution; no outsized discretionary upside .
- PSU calibration tightened with explicit 2024–2026 and 2025–2027 EPS/ROTCE ranges and TSR cap at 150%; 2022 PSU payout at 84.8% evidences downside sensitivity when EPS/ROTCE underperform targets .
- No options granted; equity is RSU/PSU only, which lowers risk of underwater option repricing; plan expressly prohibits repricing; no dividend equivalents paid on unearned/unvested units .
Risk Indicators & Governance
- Hedging and pledging prohibited; executives subject to ownership and holding requirements; all NEOs in compliance as of 12/31/24 .
- No single‑trigger vesting or severance on CoC; double‑trigger only; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Clawback policy plus ARP process broaden recoupment triggers beyond restatements to risk events and misconduct .
- Section 16(a) compliance: one late Form 4 for McCree reporting a charitable gift of 11,129 shares on Nov 26, 2024, filed Dec 2, 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
- Ownership as % outstanding is <1%; nonetheless, stock ownership guidelines require significant skin‑in‑the‑game (3x salary for other Executive Committee members), with mandatory post‑vest holding of 50% of net shares until in compliance .
- Upcoming vesting cadence (RSUs 3/1/2025–2027; PSUs single vest at close of 3‑year cycles) could create periodic selling windows; however, pledging/hedging is disallowed and retention guidelines temper immediate liquidity .
Employment & Contracts (Economics and Restraints)
- Retention economics primarily via ongoing annual LTI; McCree did not receive the 2024 off‑cycle Leadership Succession Awards that targeted Woods and Coughlin, which included additional PSUs/RSUs/restricted cash for succession continuity .
- Double‑trigger CoC protections are standard at 2x cash plus equity vesting; general severance minimum (26 weeks) provides baseline downside protection but is modest versus peers, limiting windfalls .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong multi‑year linkage to EPS/ROTCE and relative TSR with 3‑year PSU cliff and capped outcomes fosters prudent risk‑taking; 2022 PSU payout below target validates pay‑for‑performance .
- Retention/Selling Pressure: Material unvested RSUs/PSUs (aggregate indicated market value ~$7.7mm in multiple scenarios) and ownership/holding rules reduce near‑term selling pressure; watch March 1 annual vest dates for potential liquidity events .
- Change‑in‑Control: Double‑trigger terms (~$12.2mm illustrative total) are meaningful but not excessive; no tax gross‑ups and no single‑trigger lower risk of entrenchment behaviors .
- Governance/Risk: Comprehensive clawback, hedging/pledging bans, and risk reviews mitigate adverse incentive behaviors; isolated late Form 4 (charitable gift) appears non‑economic but worth monitoring for process rigor .
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