Brian Evanko
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and President and Chief Executive Officer, Cigna Healthcare at 
Cigna
CignaExecutive
About Brian Evanko
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of The Cigna Group and, since Feb 5, 2024, also President and CEO of Cigna Healthcare, expanding his responsibilities across finance and the company’s largest operating platform . Under his tenure in 2024, The Cigna Group delivered 27% revenue growth to $247.1B and adjusted EPS of $27.33, while acknowledging underperformance in stop-loss medical costs; the Board funded the 2024 EIP pool at 92% and awarded Evanko 85% of target for his individual EIP based on contributions to capital deployment, expense savings and portfolio actions . Over FY 2022–2024, reported net income moved from $6.7B to $3.4B as the portfolio evolved; multi‑year EBITDA remained >$10B annually (S&P Global) and TSR is a core long-term incentive metric alongside cumulative adjusted income from operations per share .
Company performance (context for his 2024 pay decisions):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | $179.36B* | $194.10B | $246.15B |
| EBITDA ($) | $10.44B* | $10.85B* | $11.45B* |
| Net Income ($) | $6.70B | $5.16B | $3.43B |
Values with an asterisk were retrieved from S&P Global.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Cigna Group | EVP, CFO | –2025 (current) | Led capital deployment, expense actions, investor comms; supported Medicare divestiture prep . |
| Cigna Healthcare (business unit) | President & CEO (dual role with CFO) | Feb 2024–2025 (current) | Drove operating focus while addressing stop‑loss pressure; advanced growth and affordability initiatives . |
External Roles
- None disclosed in the 2024 or 2025 proxy or relevant 8‑K filings.
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Detail |
|---|---|
| Annual base salary rate | $1,000,000 effective Feb 5, 2024 . |
| Salary paid (2024 SCT) | $994,231 . |
| EIP target (annual cash) | $2,000,000 . |
| Actual EIP paid (2024) | $1,700,000 (85% of target) . |
Multi‑year Summary Compensation (select items):
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 836,731 | 3,493,584 | 1,078,170 | 1,500,000 | 57,196 | 6,965,681 |
| 2023 | 923,077 | 3,852,298 | 1,296,909 | 1,650,000 | 57,158 | 7,794,857 |
| 2024 | 994,231 | 5,813,611 | 1,725,052 | 1,700,000 | 51,738 | 10,284,632 |
Performance Compensation
2024 EIP metrics, targets and funding:
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Funding factor | Weighted contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted income from operations | 50% | +8.8% vs 2023 | +3.9% | 77% | 39% |
| Adjusted revenue growth | 20% | +17.8% vs 2023 | +26.5% | 168% | 33.6% |
| Expansion of addressable markets | 10% | +28.0% (HSS, behavioral, virtual) | +25% | 88% | 8.8% |
| Strategic priorities (affordability, ESG) | 20% | Multiple KPIs | Mixed (two at/favorable, one below) | 90% | 18% |
| Calculated funding | 99% | ||||
| Committee discretion | −7% → Approved EIP pool 92% |
2024 Long‑Term Incentives (granted 2/28/2024):
| Award type | Count/Terms | Grant date fair value |
|---|---|---|
| Strategic Performance Shares (SPS) | 10,254 target (12.5%–200% payout range) | $4,088,504 |
| Restricted stock (time‑based) | 5,127 shares | $1,725,107 |
| Stock options | 18,677 @ $336.475 strike | $1,725,052 |
LTI program design:
- SPS measures: 50% relative TSR vs custom peer set and 50% cumulative adjusted income from operations per share over 3 years; cliff vests in year 4 based on results .
- Other NEO equity mix: 50% SPS, 25% options, 25% restricted stock (consistent with 2023) .
2024 realized/vesting activity:
- Options exercised: 5,806 shares; value realized $1,300,150 .
- Stock awards vested: 12,689 shares; value realized $4,230,005 (includes 2021–2023 SPS and time‑based RS) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership, outstanding equity and vesting:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (1/31/2025) | 149,907 shares (less than 1% of class) . |
| Stock ownership guideline | 6x base salary; all NEOs, including Evanko, were in compliance as of 12/31/2024 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors, executive officers, employees . |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback plus broader award‑level recoupment for covenant breaches/misconduct . |
Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024:
| Category | Amount | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Options exercisable | 77,081 | — (strike prices vary) |
| Options unexercisable | 36,622 | — |
| Unvested time‑based stock | 21,901 | $6,047,742 |
| Unearned SPS (2023–2025, 2024–2026 at target) | 19,059 | $5,262,952 |
Upcoming vesting schedule (as of 12/31/2024):
| Instrument | Vesting date(s) | Tranche(s) |
|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 3/1/2025, 3/1/2026, 3/1/2027 | 7,099; 5,423+5,423; 6,226 |
| Restricted stock | 3/1/2025, 3/1/2026, 3/1/2027 | 12,254; 2,936+1,709; 1,709 |
| SPS (equity incentive plan, at target) | 2026, 2027 (payout post‑period) | 8,805; 10,254 |
Note: Values for stock awards in use $276.14 closing price on 12/31/2024.
Employment Terms
- No individual employment contract; offer letter set 2024 targets (base $1.0M; EIP target $2.0M; LTI target $6.0M) upon his expanded role effective Feb 5, 2024 .
- Executive Severance Benefits Plan (involuntary termination not for cause): 78 weeks of base pay + 150% of current EIP target; pro‑rated EIP; continued vesting of equity scheduled within 12 months; 6 months outplacement; COBRA subsidy up to 18 months; subject to NDA, non‑compete, non‑solicit and cooperation covenants (repayment if breached) .
- Change‑of‑Control (double‑trigger): 156 weeks base salary + 3x higher of last EIP paid or current EIP target; pro‑rated EIP; full vest of options and restricted stock; SPS paid at 100% of award; outplacement and COBRA subsidy; potential cutback to avoid excise tax if more favorable after‑tax .
Potential payouts (hypothetical, if event occurred 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Severance | Annual Incentive | Equity vesting | Other | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary (no cause) | $4,500,000 | $2,000,000 | $4,286,459 | $39,758 | $10,826,217 |
| Termination upon CoC (double trigger) | $9,000,000 | $2,000,000 | $10,898,632 | $39,758 | $21,938,390 |
| Death/Disability | — | — | $10,898,632 | — | $10,898,632 |
Governance, Say‑on‑Pay, and Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑pay approval: 88% (2023 meeting) and 83% (2024 meeting), reflecting continued but moderating support; the Committee formalized EIP funding mechanics and disclosure enhancements following engagement with holders representing ~70% of outstanding shares .
- Compensation governance: double‑trigger CIC, robust clawbacks, significant stock ownership and post‑vesting holding, no option repricing without shareholder approval, and prohibition on hedging/pledging .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance linkage is explicit: 2024 EIP paid at 85% for Evanko vs 92% pool funding amid stop‑loss cost pressure; LTI remains majority performance‑based with SPS keyed to relative TSR and cumulative adjusted EPS, aligning equity realization with multi‑year value creation .
- Retention risk appears mitigated by competitive targets (base/EIP/LTI reset in 2024), meaningful unvested equity, stringent ownership/retention rules, and double‑trigger CIC economics; near‑term insider selling pressure is tempered by one‑year post‑vesting retention (50% of net shares) and anti‑hedging/pledging policies .
- Alignment: Beneficial ownership (149,907 shares) and sizable unvested equity create skin‑in‑the‑game; no pledging permitted. CIC and severance terms are market‑standard (approx. 1.5x cash severance in a non‑CIC scenario; 3x under CIC), limiting excessive parachute risk while preserving continuity through transactions .
- Execution watch‑items: Recovery of Cigna Healthcare stop‑loss margins into 2025–2026 will influence future EIP/SPS outcomes; EIP 2025 introduces customer/patient and coworker satisfaction metrics (25% weight), increasing exposure to service quality KPIs that may diversify payout drivers beyond pure financials .