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Matti Shem Tov

Matti Shem Tov

Chief Executive Officer at CLARIVATE
CEO
Executive
Board

About Matti Shem Tov

Clarivate’s CEO since August 9, 2024 (director since August 2024), age 64, with 30+ years leading software, data, and analytics businesses (Ex Libris, ProQuest; operating partner at Lone View Capital). He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences and an MBA from Bar‑Ilan University . 2024 company performance: revenue $2,557m vs $2,629m in 2023, Adjusted EBITDA $1,060m vs $1,117m; market cap $3.5bn vs $6.2bn prior year . Pay‑versus‑performance disclosure shows 2024 “value of $100” company TSR of 30.24 (peer group 152.33) and Adjusted EBITDA of $1,060.4m .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Clarivate PlcChief Executive OfficerAug 2024–presentChosen to drive “accelerated organic growth”; prior ProQuest/Ex Libris experience aligns with Clarivate’s software/data strategy .
Lone View CapitalOperating PartnerJun 2022–Mar 2024PE operating partner experience across software/data assets .
ProQuest LLCChief Executive OfficerSep 2017–Jun 2022 (incl. post‑acquisition)Led a global data/analytics/software provider; continued through Clarivate’s Dec 2021 acquisition integration phase .
Ex Libris Ltd.President & CEO2003–2017Built a leading cloud software franchise for academic/national/research institutions .
Surecomp LimitedPresident; prior leadership rolesPrior to 2003Led a global commercial banking software firm .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No public company directorships within past five years disclosed .

Fixed Compensation

Item2024
Base salary (annual rate)$900,000
Salary earned (partial year from Aug 6 start)$352,695
Target annual bonus (AIP)100% of salary (prorated for 2024)
Actual 2024 AIP cash paid$229,252 (prorated)

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 structure and outcomes

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximum2024 ResultPayout vs target
Pre‑bonus Adjusted EBITDA ($m)90% 0% at $1,074 100% at $1,172 200% at $1,271 $1,118 62%
Voice of Customer (NPS)10% 90% at <42 100% at 42 110% at >42 41 90%
Individual modifierNot applied0 p.p.
Final AIP payout (all NEOs except former CEO)65% of target

Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – 2024 grants and design

AwardUnits/TargetGrant date value
RSUs (hire grant)282,258$1,750,000
PSUs (2024–2026 cycle)282,258 target$1,960,000
Sign‑on RSUs (1‑yr cliff vest)80,645$499,999

Key design elements:

  • RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; PSUs cliff‑vest after 3 years subject to performance .
  • 2024/2023 PSU cycles use Adjusted diluted EPS and Adjusted EBITDA with a 3‑year relative TSR modifier vs S&P 500; 2022 cycle used Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA Margin, Adjusted diluted EPS, Adjusted EBITDA plus TSR modifier .
  • Company disclosure shows 2022 PSU overall payout of 50.8% of target after TSR modifier (context for program rigor) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership653,781 shares (<1% outstanding)
Ownership breakdown333,178 shares held directly; 320,603 held via IBI Trust Management
Unvested equity at FY‑end 2024362,903 RSUs ($1,843,547 MV) and 282,258 target PSUs ($1,433,871 MV)
Scheduled vesting (time‑based)174,731 on 08/13/2025; 94,086 on 08/13/2026; 94,086 on 08/13/2027
Sign‑on RSU vestFirst anniversary of grant (Aug 2025)
Pledging/hedging policyHedging prohibited; pledging/margin accounts prohibited for directors/executives
Stock ownership guidelinesCEO: 6x base salary; RSUs count, PSUs unearned do not; all on track as of Jan 1, 2025

Potential trading pressure watch: A material RSU tranche vests in August 2025, which can increase available float even if sales are not required .

Employment Terms

TermSummary
Start dateEmployment commenced Aug 6, 2024; CEO effective Aug 9, 2024
Contract jurisdictionIsraeli contract of employment
Target pay opportunitiesAIP target 100% of salary (max 200%); 2024 equity grant $3.5m (50% RSUs/50% PSUs); 2025 target LTI at least $6m (50%/50%)
Sign‑on equity$500k RSUs (1‑year cliff); if terminated for cause prior to/within one year after full vesting, must repay after‑tax value
Relocation clauseIf required to relocate to London or New York, a pro‑rata portion of unvested RSUs accelerates based on time employed in Israel
Restrictive covenantsConfidentiality/IP perpetual; 12‑month post‑termination non‑compete and non‑solicit apply (via agreements/ESP framework)
Severance (ESP) – no change in control18 months base salary + 1.5x AIP target; up to 18 months COBRA if applicable; unvested RSUs vest to the extent they would have vested over 18 months; PSUs forfeited
Severance (ESP) – within 12 months post‑CIC24 months base salary + 2x AIP target; up to 24 months COBRA; unvested RSUs and PSUs accelerate (PSUs at Board‑determined performance)
Death/DisabilityUnvested RSUs and PSUs accelerate (PSUs at target)
Estimated values (illustrative at 12/31/24)Involuntary termination (non‑CIC): total $3.59m; CIC termination: $6.88m; death/disability: $3.28m (includes equity at 12/31/24 pricing)
ClawbacksSEC/NYSE‑compliant recoupment policy for restatements; additional “detrimental conduct” clawback for serious misconduct/policy breaches

Board Governance

  • Board service: Director since August 2024; no committee assignments . Independence: not independent due to CEO role .
  • Dual‑role implications: Clarivate separates Chair and CEO; Andrew Snyder is an independent Non‑Executive Chair. Nine of ten director nominees are independent; all standing committees are fully independent—mitigating CEO/director dual‑role governance concerns .
  • Board activity: Six formal meetings in 2024; each director attended ≥75% of meetings/committees served .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and alignment: Majority of CEO pay is at‑risk (AIP and PSUs/RSUs); 2024 AIP funded at 65% of target on below‑target Adjusted EBITDA and NPS outcomes—evidence of formulaic pay‑for‑performance .
  • LTI rigor: PSU design uses multi‑year earnings/EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier; 2022 PSU cycle paid ~50.8% after TSR underperformance vs S&P 500—downside sensitivity is active .
  • Governance controls: Ownership guidelines (CEO 6x), prohibitions on hedging/pledging, robust clawbacks; no single‑trigger equity, no option repricing, no excise tax gross‑ups .
  • Shareholder feedback: Say‑on‑pay passed with ~99% support in 2024; HRCC retained independent consultant (Pay Governance) and remained consistent into 2025 given strong support .

Performance & Track Record (context during tenure)

  • 2024 results (transition year): Revenue $2,557m (–$72m YoY), Adjusted EBITDA $1,060m (–$57m YoY); Free cash flow $357.5m; market cap disclosure $3.5bn at year‑end .
  • PVP indicators: “Value of $100” TSR at 30.24 (peer group 152.33) for 2024 disclosure; net loss reflects significant non‑cash impairments (context for GAAP vs non‑GAAP) .
  • Strategic activity: Product launches across AI‑enabled search and data offerings; selective M&A (acquired Rowan TELS, Global QMS) and divestitures (Valipat, ScholarOne) to refocus portfolio .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Equity overhang and issuance: Proposal to add 25m shares to the 2019 Plan; three‑year average burn rate 1.52%, overhang would move to 8.13% if approved (Board states offset by repurchases) .
  • Related party transactions: Not specific to Shem Tov; Board discloses CIG/Exor relationships and oversight via Audit Committee process .
  • Insider policies: Strict hedging/pledging prohibitions and blackout pre‑clearance reduce misalignment risk .

Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking context)

DNB; EFX; EXLS; FDS; FICO; IT; ICLR; INF; MCO; MORN; MCSI; SSNC; TDC; TRI; TRU; VRSK; WKL .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Engagement

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~99%; HRCC engages shareholders and uses an independent consultant (Pay Governance) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Large at‑risk mix, rigorous PSUs (TSR modifier), strong clawbacks, and no hedging/pledging are positive for pay‑performance alignment and governance quality .
  • Near‑term supply watch: Concentrated RSU vest in Aug 2025 (including sign‑on) could add stock supply; monitor any 10b5‑1 plans/Form 4 activity around those dates .
  • Retention and transition: Employment terms (ESP) provide competitive severance while maintaining double‑trigger CIC vesting—balanced retention without single‑trigger windfalls .
  • Execution risk: 2024 under‑target AIP outcomes and weak TSR underscore a multi‑year turnaround requirement under the new CEO; tracking Adjusted EPS/EBITDA progress and relative TSR will be key for PSU monetization and equity‑driven confidence .

Note: All quantitative items and governance terms above are drawn from Clarivate’s 2025 DEF 14A (covering FY2024).