Sign in

Nina Barton

Executive Vice President and Group President – Care & Connection at CLOROX CO /DE/CLOROX CO /DE/
Executive

About Nina Barton

Nina Barton, age 52, is Executive Vice President and Group President – Care & Connection at The Clorox Company, a role she has held since July 22, 2024 . She previously served as CEO of Vytalogy Wellness (Jarrow Formulas/Natrol) from July 2021 to Nov 2023 and held senior growth and digital leadership roles at The Kraft Heinz Company (including Global Chief Growth Officer) after earlier marketing roles at Johnson & Johnson, L’Oréal, and Procter & Gamble . During FY25 (her first full fiscal year overlapping CLX), company net sales were essentially flat at $7,104M vs $7,093M in FY24, gross margin expanded 220 bps to 45.2%, and Economic Profit (EP) increased to $756M from $573M; CLX cumulative TSR value (indexed to $100 at 6/30/2020) stood at 63.41 in FY25 versus 69.76 in FY24 . Her compensation is tied to company-level metrics (Net Customer Sales, Net Earnings Attributable to Clorox, Gross Margin) and long-term EP growth (PSUs) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Vytalogy Wellness (Jarrow Formulas/Natrol)Chief Executive OfficerJul 2021 – Nov 2023Led wellness portfolio; subsequent Senior Advisor (Nov 2023–Jul 2024)
The Kraft Heinz CompanyGlobal Chief Growth Officer; prior Zone President of Canada/President of Digital Growth; President, Global Digital & Online Growth; SVP U.S. Marketing/Innovation/R&D2015 – 2021Drove global growth strategy and digital transformation
Kraft Foods Group, Inc.Vice President, Marketing; Senior Marketing Director2011 – 2015Led marketing initiatives across U.S. brands
Johnson & Johnson; L’Oréal; Procter & GambleVarious marketing and leadership rolesEarlier careerBrand building in consumer products

External Roles

  • No public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Ms. Barton in CLX’s FY25 10-K/2025 proxy materials reviewed .

Fixed Compensation

ComponentFY25 Amount / DetailNotes
Base Salary (annualized as of 6/30/2025)$700,000 Hired effective Jul 22, 2024
AIP Target (% of salary)90% Company-wide AIP used; no individual multiplier
AIP Payout (FY25)$475,003 (Company Multiplier 80%; prorated for start date) Based on Net Customer Sales, Net Earnings Attributable to Clorox, Gross Margin
One-time Cash Sign-on$840,728 (clawback if resign/for cause within 2 years of hire) Inducement to join CLX
Perquisites (FY25)Total $37,030 Financial planning $18,970; Exec auto $13,200; Parking $3,420; Exec health $1,440
401(k) Company Contribution (FY25)$34,715
Nonqualified Company Contributions (FY25)$14,808
NQDC – Executive/Company Contributions and Balance (FY25)Exec contrib $14,000; Company contrib $14,808; Balance $31,703
PensionNo participation in pension plans

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – FY25 Design and Outcome

MetricWeightThreshold (0%)Target (100%)Max (200%)Actual (ex. specified items)Result
Net Customer Sales50%$6,721M$7,075M$7,252M$6,870M47%
Net Earnings Attributable to Clorox30%$571M$635M$711M$650M103%
Gross Margin20%42.0%44.0%46.0%44.7%126%
Company Multiplier80%
ExecutiveBase SalaryAIP Target (% of Salary)Company MultiplierFY25 Payout
Nina Barton$700,000 90% 80% $475,003

Notes: For FY25 and beyond, CLX removed the individual multiplier so AIP is solely a function of company results (alignment emphasis) .

Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – Structure and Ms. Barton’s FY25 Grants

  • LTI mix: 60% PSUs, 40% RSUs; PSUs tied to three-year EP growth; annual grants typically in September .
  • FY25 one-time stock award for Ms. Barton: $6,000,000 (primarily buyout of forfeited prior employer equity + inducement), 60% PSUs/40% RSUs .
  • Ms. Barton’s FY25 LTI target value: $8,000,000 (total economic value including one-time awards) .
Award TypeGrant DateTarget (#)Max (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)Performance/Vesting
PSUs9/17/202429,13658,272$4,798,408 3-year EP growth; 0–200% payout
RSUs (Off-cycle inducement)7/22/2024$2,399,99418,041 RSUs; time-based; under 2005 Plan
RSUs (Annual)9/17/2024$799,8994,857 RSUs; time-based; under 2005 Plan

Program context:

  • PSU metric is EP growth; PSU cycles pay after three years subject to certification by MDCC . For the FY23–FY25 PSU cycle, the MDCC approved a 133% payout on Aug 11, 2025 (company-wide) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (8/31/2025)4,297 shares; “Percent of Class” below 1%
Right to Acquire within 60 Days (from 8/31/2025)1,253 shares (from vesting/exercisable awards)
Unvested RSUs (as of FY25 year-end)18,627 units ($2,236,544) and 4,977 units ($597,588)
Outstanding PSUs (target)22,391 units ($2,688,487) and 7,466 units ($896,443)
Stock Ownership Guideline3x base salary for NEOs
Compliance Status (as of 9/10/2025)Not yet met (new hire in FY25)
Post-vest Share RetentionMust retain 75% of net shares until guideline met
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors and officers; also barred from margin accounts

Notes: Long-term awards granted under the 2005 Stock Incentive Plan; annual grants typically each September .

Employment Terms

Change-in-control (CIC) plan and severance framework:

  • CIC severance: Generally 2x (CEO 3x) the sum of base salary + average AIP for prior 3 years; healthcare up to 2 years (CEO 3), continued financial planning for year of termination, vesting of outstanding pre-CIC stock awards, and prorated average AIP; excise tax “cutback” applies if beneficial .
  • Definitions: “Cause” and “Good Reason” as specified; adverse CIC plan changes require 12 months’ notice; restrictive covenants include confidentiality, non-disparagement, and non-solicitation/non-diversion for two years post-employment .

Estimated potential payments/value for Ms. Barton (as of FY25 year-end assumptions):

ScenarioCash PaymentStock OptionsRSUsPSUsHealth & WelfareFinancial PlanningTotal Estimated Value
Involuntary Termination Without Cause$1,872,500 $43,525 $1,916,025
Involuntary Termination After CIC$3,290,000 $2,834,132 $3,584,930 $43,525 $18,970 $9,212,151
Resignation/Retirement
Disability or Death$2,834,132 $3,584,930 $6,419,062

Additional terms:

  • AIP retirement eligibility: Ms. Barton is not eligible for retirement under AIP; full AIP if active as of June 30 (assumption for table setting) .
  • Options: Ms. Barton holds no stock options .
  • Sign-on cash clawback: repay if voluntary resignation/termination for cause within two years of hire .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy first-year package with $6M one-time make-whole/inducement award (60% PSUs/40% RSUs) plus annual LTI indicates strong retention emphasis amid lateral hire; LTIs concentrate on EP growth vs. relative TSR, aligning to CLX’s internal value creation framework .
  • AIP simplified to company-only multiplier (no individual multiplier) increases linkage to enterprise results; FY25 Company Multiplier was 80% on mixed performance (sales below target, margins/earnings above target) .
  • Hedging/pledging prohibitions and a 3x salary ownership guideline with 75% post-vest retention until compliance enhance alignment; Ms. Barton is not yet in compliance given new hire timing .
  • CIC protection provides 2x multiple and full vesting of pre-CIC awards upon a qualifying termination after CIC, which is standard but can amplify equity value at exit; no gross-up (cutback structure) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Pay design ties near-term cash to company-wide sales, earnings, and gross margin and long-term equity to three-year EP growth; combined with strict anti-hedging/pledging and retention/ownership rules, this is generally shareholder-aligned .
  • Vesting/supply overhang: Substantial unvested awards (RSUs of 18,627 and 4,977; PSUs at target of 22,391 and 7,466) create scheduled future releases that can contribute to selling pressure when units settle (subject to retention/ownership rules) .
  • Retention risk: Significant one-time make-whole and CIC protections reduce near-term flight risk; sign-on cash clawback runs two years from 7/22/2024 hire date, further discouraging early departure .
  • Performance lens: In Ms. Barton’s first overlapping year, CLX delivered margin and EP improvement with flat sales; company TSR remained pressured on a multi-year basis. AIP paid at 80%, signaling balanced accountability amidst transformation and portfolio shifts .
  • Downside/exit economics: After-CIC termination could unlock ~$9.2M in cash/benefits/equity value based on FY25 year-end assumptions; while typical for large-cap CPG, investors should factor potential dilution/expense in strategic scenarios .