Alan Korman
COLUMBUS MCKINNONAbout Alan Korman
Alan S. Korman, 64, is Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Corporate Development and Secretary at Columbus McKinnon (CMCO). He joined CMCO in January 2011, served as Chief Human Resources Officer from 2018–2021, and was promoted to his current role in July 2022; prior roles included Vice President, General Counsel, Corporate Development and Secretary. Before CMCO, he held senior leadership roles at Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., including VP, General Counsel & Secretary, and served as President of Pentron Ceramics, Inc. . During fiscal 2025, company performance was mixed: net sales were $965M, Adjusted EBITDA was $150.5M, and net cash provided by operations was $46M; GAAP net loss was $5.1M amid pension settlement and consolidation/transaction costs . Over the SEC “Pay vs. Performance” window, cumulative TSR equated to $72.26 on a $100 base for FY2025 and Adjusted EBIT was $102.3M (company-level) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Columbus McKinnon | SVP, General Counsel, Corp. Development & Secretary | 2022–present | Senior legal, M&A and corporate secretary leadership during portfolio transformation and strategic initiatives . |
| Columbus McKinnon | Chief Human Resources Officer | 2018–2021 | Led HR during transformation, talent development and organizational initiatives . |
| Columbus McKinnon | VP, General Counsel, Corp. Development & Secretary | 2011–2018 | Corporate legal, governance and deal execution . |
| Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. | VP, General Counsel & Secretary | 1994–2011 | Senior legal leadership at global dental products company . |
| Pentron Ceramics, Inc. | President | (pre‑2011) | Business leadership in dental materials segment . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Mr. Korman in the proxy biography .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY2025 detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $465,000 (3% increase; +$15,000 YoY) . |
| Target annual bonus (% of base) | 60% . |
| Target annual bonus ($) | $279,000 . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Design and Outcome (FY2025)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Result | Payout vs target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBIT (consolidated) | 37.5% | $101.8M | $127.3M | $146.4M | $101.9M | 50% . |
| Free Cash Flow | 37.5% | $48.0M | $56.5M | $65.0M | $24.2M | 0% . |
| Strategic Goals | 25.0% | 0–200% scale | 100% | 200% | — | 98% avg NEO payout . |
| Overall payout (Korman) | — | — | — | — | — | 50% of target; 30% of base salary paid . |
Long-Term Incentives (FY2025 grants)
| Instrument | Grant date | Quantity/terms | Pricing/target | Grant date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 7/22/2024 | 8,694 target (4,347 thr / 17,388 max) | Sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement over FY2025–FY2027; 50/50 weighting; 25% annual + 25% cumulative; payout 50–200% . | $327,677 . |
| RSUs (time-based) | 5/20/2024 | 3,496 | 33% vesting annually over years 1–3 . | $160,047 . |
| Stock options (NQ) | 5/20/2024 | 8,823; 10-year term | Exercise price $45.34; 33% vest p.a. . | $151,138 . |
Vesting mechanics and prior-cycle PSU vesting:
- RSUs: 33% annually over 3 years; dividends accrue and are delivered in shares upon vesting .
- Options: 33% annually; 10-year life; FMV strike at grant .
- FY2023 PSU grant (ROIC metric): Certified ROIC at 5.8% for FY2025; 63.3% of target vested (shares delivered in FY2026) .
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Metric ($) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 413,314 | 444,231 | 461,494 |
| Stock awards | 338,822 | 411,013 | 487,724 |
| Option awards | 184,177 | 195,001 | 151,138 |
| Non-equity incentive comp | 242,726 | 245,903 | 139,709 |
| NQDC earnings | 5,314 | 3,214 | 2,478 |
| All other comp | 22,563 | 10,874 | 25,847 |
| Total | 1,206,916 | 1,310,236 | 1,268,390 |
Observations:
- FY2025 cash bonus declined vs FY2024 due to FCF underperformance; PSUs remain primary LTI (50% mix) tied to multi-year growth/margin goals .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 51,648 shares; <1% of outstanding . |
| Direct holdings | 37,298 shares . |
| ESOP shares | 302 shares (also disclosed in ESOP termination 8‑K) . |
| Unvested RSUs (subject to forfeiture) | 14,048 shares . |
| Options outstanding (selected recent grants) | 8,823 (5/20/2024, $45.34, exp. 5/20/2034); 10,038 unexercisable (5/22/2023, $36.16, exp. 5/22/2033); plus earlier grants . |
| PSUs unearned (as of 3/31/2025) | 8,694 (FY2025 grant); 5,618 (FY2024 grant); 5,129 (FY2023 grant) . |
| Ownership guidelines | Other NEOs (incl. Korman): 3x base salary; 50% after-tax retention until met . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited (no margin accounts; no pledging permitted) . |
| Clawback | Expanded clawback for restatements or misconduct; covers cash and equity incentives . |
Vesting/expiration cadence:
- RSUs vest 2025–2027 (for 2024 grants); options roll off through 2034 by grant; PSUs settle after FY2027 based on performance .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | CMCO has no individual employment agreements with NEOs other than CEO; NEOs (incl. Korman) are covered by the Executive Severance Plan . |
| Severance (non‑CIC) | 1x base salary; LTI treated as “Retirement” per award/plan; 12 months medical at active-employee rate; outplacement up to $15,000 (release required) . |
| Change-in-control agreements | Double-trigger; if terminated without cause (or resign for good reason) within 6 months pre-/24 months post‑CIC: lump sum up to 3x (salary + greater of current or pre‑CIC target bonus); 36 months COBRA cash; 3 years pension-equivalent accrual; unless otherwise provided/assumed, equity (options, RSUs, earned PSUs) fully vests; unearned PSUs addressed per plan/assumption . |
| Award agreements | Plan permits inclusion of non-compete, non-solicit, confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions; breach can result in cancellation/recoupment . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix emphasizes at-risk pay: FY2025 LTI target 130% of base salary for Korman; mix: 50% PSUs (sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement), 25% RSUs, 25% options—aligned with multi-year value creation .
- AIP tied to profitability and cash conversion: 75% on Adjusted EBIT and FCF, 25% on strategic goals; FY2025 FCF underperformance drove below-target AIP (50% of target for Korman) despite near-threshold EBIT and strong strategic execution .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay received over 88% support; committee considered feedback in design changes and disclosure enhancements .
Related Policies and Red Flags
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging, no repricing of options without shareholder approval, no CIC excise tax gross‑ups, expanded clawback—mitigate governance risk .
- Section 16(a) compliance: company disclosed certain late Form 4s (including grants and vesting events on May 20–22, 2024) across multiple insiders, including Korman; operational rather than trading‑driven .
Performance & Track Record Context (Company-level)
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Net Sales ($M) | 1,013.5 | 965 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 166.7 | 150.5 |
| Net Income ($M) | 46.6 | (5.1) (loss) |
| CAP “TSR” value (base $100) | 183.61 | 72.26 |
| Adjusted EBIT ($M) | 119.238 | 102.300 |
Notes: FY2025 results reflect pension settlement, impairment and pending Kito Crosby acquisition costs; strategic rationale emphasizes scale/margin expansion and deleveraging potential .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: High at‑risk, multi‑year equity with rigorous PSU metrics (sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement) and robust ownership/retention and anti‑pledge policies signal alignment; double‑trigger CIC at up to 3x cash indicates meaningful retention protection but also potential severance overhang in change‑of‑control scenarios .
- Near‑term selling pressure: Scheduled RSU tranches (33% annually) and option vesting cadence could create periodic supply; 2024 grants imply vesting through 2027; however, anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership retention rules partially mitigate forced selling .
- Pay-for-performance sensitivity: FY2025 AIP paid at 50% of target (30% of base for Korman) due to FCF miss, evidencing downside sensitivity; PSUs contingent on multi-year execution provide upside if growth/margin expand as planned (including post‑Kito Crosby) .
- Governance quality: Expanded clawback, no option repricing without shareholder approval, and strong say‑on‑pay support reduce governance risk, supporting confidence in incentive integrity .