Mario Ramos Lara
COLUMBUS MCKINNONAbout Mario Ramos Lara
Mario Y. Ramos Lara, 52, is Chief Product Technology Officer and GM Latin America at Columbus McKinnon (CMCO). He joined CMCO in June 2018 as VP, Global Product Development, was promoted to SVP, Product Development & Marketing in July 2022, and assumed his current role in February 2025; previously he spent 18 years at Schneider Electric in strategic marketing, product management, global engineering, and technology leadership roles in Monterrey, Mexico . Company performance context during his tenure: net sales rose from $649.6M in FY2021 to $1,013.5M in FY2024 before moderating to $963.0M in FY2025, with Adjusted EBITDA improving from $77.2M to $166.7M then $150.5M; cumulative TSR moved from 212.53 (FY2021) to 183.61 (FY2024) and fell to 72.26 in FY2025, reflecting macro and stock price pressure .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Columbus McKinnon | VP, Global Product Development | 2018–2022 | Led product development initiatives aligned to CMCO’s intelligent motion strategy . |
| Columbus McKinnon | SVP, Product Development & Marketing | 2022–2025 | Drove product and marketing integration supporting growth and margin expansion . |
| Columbus McKinnon | Chief Product Technology Officer; GM Latin America | 2025–present | Focus on product technology leadership and Latin America growth execution . |
| Schneider Electric | VP, Strategic Marketing, Product Management & Partnerships (Final Distribution) | Pre-2018 | Led strategy and partnerships in a core business line . |
| Schneider Electric | VP, Global Engineering; Director of Engineering (Low/Medium Voltage); Director, Global Technology Center (Monterrey) | Pre-2018 | Managed global engineering and technology operations enhancing product innovation . |
External Roles
None disclosed in company filings .
Fixed Compensation
- Detailed base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus for Ramos are not disclosed (he is not listed as a Named Executive Officer in the proxy) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Design and FY2025 Results
- AIP prioritized Adjusted EBIT and Free Cash Flow; strategic goals were also included. FY2025 results: Adjusted EBIT met threshold (50% of target), Free Cash Flow below threshold (0% of target), and average strategic goals payout ~98% for NEOs .
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Result | FY2025 Perf. % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBIT ($M) | 101.8 | 127.3 | 146.4 | 101.9 | 50% |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | 48.0 | 56.5 | 65.0 | 24.2 | 0% |
| Strategic Goals (avg for NEOs) | 0–200% | 0–200% | 0–200% | — | 98% |
Note: Exact AIP weighting and individual payouts for Ramos are not disclosed .
Long-Term Incentives (Structure and Metrics)
- PSU metrics for FY2025 grants: Sales Growth and Adjusted EBITDA margin improvement (equally weighted), measured over FY2025–FY2027; payout scale below .
| Performance Level | Sales Growth | EBITDA Margin Improvement | Payout (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum | 9% | +80 bps | 200% |
| Target | 5% | +50 bps | 100% |
| Threshold | 1% | 0 bps | 50% |
| Below Threshold | — | — | 0% |
- Prior PSU cohort (FY2023 grant) vested at 63.3% based on ROIC of 5.8% for FY2025 (threshold 5.5%, target 8.5%, max 10%) .
Vesting Schedules (Program Mechanics)
| Award Type | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 33% annually over 3 years from grant date; dividends reinvested and paid in shares upon vesting . | |
| Stock Options | 33% annually; 10-year term; exercise price set at average of high/low on grant date (e.g., NEO grants on 5/20/2024 had $45.34 exercise price) . | |
| PSUs | 100% vest on 3rd anniversary, contingent on performance (FY2025 grants: sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement) . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Stock Ownership Guidelines (Officers)
| Title | Ownership Level | Retention Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| CEO | 5x annual base salary | 50% |
| CFO | 4x annual base salary | 50% |
| Other NEOs and Officers | 3x annual base salary | 50% |
| Other Non-Executive Officers | 2x annual base salary | 40% |
- Retention requirements apply to after-tax shares from vesting/exercise; unexercised options and unearned PSUs excluded from guideline calculations. Officers must retain shares until guidelines are met; NEOs currently subject to retention requirement .
Hedging/Pledging Policy
- No permitted hedging, pledging, short sales, or derivative transactions in Company stock, strengthening alignment and reducing risk signals .
Insider Transactions Timeline (Ramos-specific)
| Date | Event | Details |
|---|---|---|
| 5/20/2024 | RSU and option grants filed late on Form 4 | Non-qualified stock options and RSUs granted; late Section 16(a) filing noted for Ramos among other officers . |
| 5/22/2024 | RSU vesting filed late on Form 4 | RSU vesting occurred; late Section 16(a) filing noted for Ramos among other officers . |
Note: Beneficial ownership totals (shares owned/RSUs/options) are not itemized for Ramos in the Security Ownership table (it covers Directors and NEOs) .
Employment Terms
- Change-in-control equity treatment: Double-trigger acceleration (requires a change in control plus termination within 2 years), with specific award treatment defined in award agreements; plan prohibits repricing without shareholder approval .
- Severance policy (company-wide baseline): Eligible U.S. employees involuntarily terminated without cause generally receive one week of base pay per full year of service upon signing a release; detailed multiples and change-in-control cash severance are disclosed for NEOs (e.g., up to 3x salary+bonus) but not for non-NEO officers like Ramos .
- Clawback policy: Broader than SEC requirements; mandatory recovery for financial restatements and discretionary recovery for misconduct (e.g., violations of confidentiality, non-solicit, non-compete) covering cash and equity incentives .
- Award agreements may include non-compete/non-solicit, with forfeiture or recovery upon breach; awards are generally non-transferable except by law .
Company Performance Context (FY2021–FY2025)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales ($000) | 649,642 | 906,555 | 936,240 | 1,013,540 | 963,027 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($000) | 77,198 | 140,072 | 147,770 | 166,653 | 150,495 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%) | 11.9% | 15.4% | 15.8% | 16.4% | 15.6% |
| Net Income ($000) | 9,106 | 29,660 | 48,429 | 46,625 | (5,138) |
| TSR (Value of $100) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMCO Cumulative TSR | 212.53 | 171.66 | 151.72 | 183.61 | 72.26 |
| Peer Group TSR (Dow Jones U.S. Diversified Industrials) | 159.26 | 147.62 | 155.40 | 219.31 | 272.34 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Ramos’ incentives are tied to company-level drivers (Adjusted EBIT, Free Cash Flow) and PSUs tied to multi-year sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement—supporting alignment with value creation, but FY2025 underperformance on FCF and TSR increases execution risk on PSU vesting through FY2027 .
- Selling pressure windows: RSU and option grants/vestings around May anniversaries (e.g., 5/20 and 5/22) can create periodic supply; retention requirements and anti-hedging/pledging policies mitigate risk of opportunistic disposals or leverage .
- Change-in-control protections: Double-trigger equity acceleration supports retention and continuity; lack of disclosed cash severance multiples for Ramos suggests lower parachute optics versus NEOs, potentially enhancing perceived alignment .
- Track record: Company’s multi-year expansion in Adjusted EBITDA and margins through FY2024 aligns with product and technology leadership roles like Ramos; FY2025 EBITDA margin remained resilient despite net income pressure, keeping PSU path achievable with effective execution on growth and margin initiatives .