Julie Winkler
About Julie Winkler
Julie M. Winkler, age 50, has served as CME Group’s Chief Commercial Officer since 2016, leading global sales, product marketing, research and product development, the innovation lab, and overseeing the international and data & analytics business lines. She previously served as Senior Managing Director, Research & Product Development and Index Services (2014), Managing Director, Research & Product Development (2007), and held roles of increasing responsibility at CBOT Holdings since 1996; she is also a director of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC . Company performance indicators tied to her incentive design show CME’s revenue and EBITDA growth over FY 2022–2024 and an above-target TSR outcome on 2022–2024 PSUs; FY 2024 cash earnings were 117.3% of target, driving 186.32% bonus payouts for NEOs . Company revenues and EBITDA:
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $4,753.6MM* | $5,252.2MM* | $5,698.4MM* |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $3,365.3MM* | $3,810.9MM* | $4,273.5MM* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CME Group | Chief Commercial Officer | 2016–Present | Leads sales, product marketing, R&D, innovation lab; oversees international and data/analytics lines |
| CME Group | Senior Managing Director, Research & Product Development and Index Services | 2014–2016 | Advanced product development, index services |
| CME Group | Managing Director, Research & Product Development | 2007–2014 | Built and managed product research & development |
| CBOT Holdings | Various roles of increasing responsibility | 1996–2007 | Pre-merger commercial/product leadership foundation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC | Director | Not disclosed | Index governance and market linkages |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $525,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 100% |
| Target Bonus $ | $525,000 |
| Actual Bonus as % of Target | 186.32% |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $978,180 |
| Annual Equity Award Target (% of Salary) | 300% |
| Annual Equity Award Target ($) | $1,575,000 |
| Actual Annual Equity Award (% of Target) | 100% |
| Actual Annual Equity Award ($ grant-date value basis for program) | $1,575,000 |
| Stock Awards (ASC 718 grant-date fair value as reported) | $1,773,691 |
| All Other Compensation | $114,220 (includes $10,350 401(k) company contribution; $102,830 supplemental plan; $1,040 other) |
| Total 2024 Compensation | $3,415,106 |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Bonus (2024) | Company Cash Earnings | N/A (pool funding metric) | 100% of salary ($525,000) | Company cash earnings at 117.3% of target | 186.32% of target; $978,180 | Cash, 2024 performance year |
| PSUs granted Sept 2024 (2025–2027 performance) | Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | 50% of PSUs | 1,802 target shares; threshold 901; max 3,604 | Not yet determined | Payout curve: 0–200% with cap at 100% if absolute TSR is negative | Vests after 3-year period if earned |
| PSUs granted Sept 2024 (2025–2027 performance) | Absolute Net Income Margin | 50% of PSUs | 1,802 target shares; threshold 901; max 3,604 | Not yet disclosed; committee states goal requires significant effort | Payout curve: 0–200% | Vests after 3-year period if earned |
| Restricted Stock granted Sept 16, 2024 | Time-based | 50% of annual equity award mix | 3,604 shares | Time-based | Vests 25% one year after grant date, then 25% on each anniversary | Four-year ratable vesting |
| PSUs granted Sept 2021 (2022–2024 performance) | Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | Annual award | Target 3,374 shares (implied by award table) | Company achieved 52.2nd percentile TSR; earned 108.70% of target | 3,668 actual shares earned; vested Mar 15, 2025 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 21,885 Class A shares |
| Unvested Restricted Stock (12/31/2024) | 3,604 shares; market value $836,957 (based on $232.23 close) |
| Unearned PSUs (12/31/2024) | 901 TSR and 901 NIM; payout value shown assumes threshold ($209,239 each) |
| 2024 Stock Vested | 10,200 shares; value realized $2,216,575 |
| Ownership Guidelines | NEOs must hold ≥3x base salary; 5 years to comply; all NEOs satisfied as of 2024 review |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted; currently none of executives/directors have pledged shares |
| Options | No stock options granted below market; no option repricing; program emphasizes RS/PSUs |
None of our directors, director nominees or executive officers beneficially own more than 1% of any class; directors and executive officers as a group held ~0.3% of Class A as of March 10, 2025 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Julie Winkler (as of 12/31/2024) |
|---|---|
| Severance Plan Eligibility | Eligible; no individual employment agreement disclosed |
| Involuntary Termination Not for Cause | Cash severance $1,050,000; accelerated equity value $1,717,573; health & welfare continuation $28,607; total $2,796,180 |
| Change-in-Control | Cash severance $1,050,000; accelerated equity value $5,707,052; health & welfare continuation $28,607; total $6,785,659 |
| Death or Disability | Accelerated equity value $5,707,052; other accrued pay includes actual 2024 bonus $978,180 |
| Vesting Mechanics (Awards after 3/1/2024) | Double-trigger vesting upon change-in-control for future awards not subject to employment agreement |
| Retirement Vesting Eligibility | Not eligible for retirement vesting based on age/service as of 12/31/2024 |
| RSU Vesting Schedule | 25% one year after grant; 25% on each anniversary thereafter (subject to standard accelerations) |
| Clawback/Recoupment | Clawback policy compliant with SEC rules; ability to recoup unearned performance compensation; recoup unvested equity for terminations for cause |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted; waivers, if any, would be disclosed; none currently pledged |
| Perquisites/Gross-ups | Modest perquisites; no excise tax gross-ups or perquisite tax reimbursements for NEOs |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Program emphasizes pay-for-performance: at least 50% of target total compensation for NEOs tied to cash earnings, net income margin, or relative TSR goals; annual bonuses funded by cash earnings with a maximum cap at 20% above target .
- Equity mix and vesting designed for retention and alignment: 50% performance shares and 50% time-vested restricted stock; PSUs carry three-year performance periods and transparent payout curves; RS vests ratably over four years .
- Shareholder feedback led to adopting double-trigger vesting post 3/1/2024 for change-in-control—improves governance and reduces windfall risk .
- Benchmarking: CME generally targets total compensation at the 50th percentile of its peer group; TSR peer set used for performance linkage includes Cboe, Deutsche Börse, ICE, LSEG, and Nasdaq .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | Detail |
|---|---|
| Company Cash Earnings (2024) | Achieved 117.3% of target; NEO bonuses paid at 186.32% of target |
| PSU TSR Outcome (2022–2024) | 52.2nd percentile relative to S&P 500; 108.70% of target shares earned; vested March 15, 2025 |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentive quality: Strong linkage of Winkler’s variable pay to cash earnings (dividend-linked metric) and multi-year TSR/NIM PSUs supports long-term value creation and mitigates short-term risk taking .
- Retention risk appears contained: Four-year RS vesting schedule from Sept 2024 and outstanding multi-year PSUs create continuing unvested value; no hedging or pledging and full compliance with stock ownership guidelines reduce forced-selling risk .
- Event risk under change-in-control: Double-trigger protection limits automatic vesting, but modeled accelerated equity value under CIC for Winkler is $5.707MM (plus $1.05MM cash severance), a relevant consideration for deal scenarios .
- Near-term vesting cadence: RS granted Sept 16, 2024 vests annually per policy, creating predictable but modest periodic supply; 2025–2027 PSUs will only settle based on performance against TSR and absolute net income margin, constraining unwarranted dilution .
- Governance signals: Independent compensation committee, no option repricing, clawbacks, and absence of tax gross-ups point to disciplined comp practices, lowering headline and pay-risk factors .