Sean Quinn
Chief Financial Officer at CMPR
Executive
About Sean Quinn
Sean E. Quinn is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Cimpress (CMPR); he has served as CFO since October 2015 and EVP since July 2016, after joining Cimpress in October 2009 and previously serving as Chief Accounting Officer and in other finance roles; he is 46 years old. Before Cimpress, he was a certified public accountant with KPMG LLP (Philadelphia, London, Boston) from September 2001 to October 2009, and he currently serves on the board of Credit Acceptance Corporation.
Cimpress’ incentive design for FY25 for executives (including Quinn) is anchored to in-year performance on revenue (20% weight), adjusted EBITDA (40%), and unlevered adjusted free cash flow (40%) with payout multipliers from 0% to 160%; in May 2025, the Compensation Committee amended FY25 PSUs to include a 60% minimum payout multiplier to balance performance orientation with retention.
Company performance context: Cimpress cumulative TSR (from a $100 base on 6/30/2020) was $61.57 in FY25 vs $114.76 in FY24; adjusted EBITDA was $433,167k in FY25 vs $468,682k in FY24.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cimpress | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer | CFO since Oct 2015; EVP since Jul 2016 | Finance leadership; incentive design tied to revenue, adjusted EBITDA, and unlevered adjusted FCF for FY25/FY24 PSUs |
| Cimpress | Senior Vice President | Oct 2015–Jul 2016 | Transitioned to EVP/CFO; senior finance leadership |
| Cimpress | Chief Accounting Officer | Nov 2014–Oct 2015 | Accounting leadership |
| Cimpress | Various finance roles | Oct 2009–Nov 2014 | Progressive finance responsibilities |
| KPMG LLP (Philadelphia, London, Boston) | Certified Public Accountant | Sep 2001–Oct 2009 | Audit/accounting background |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Acceptance Corporation | Director | Not disclosed | Current public company directorship |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $800,000 | $800,000 | $800,000 |
| Bonus ($) | — | — | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $9,765 | $10,096 | $10,500 |
| Total ($) | $4,209,727 | $4,210,093 | $5,484,024 |
Note: FY25 totals include incremental fair value from the 60% minimum payout modification to FY25 PSUs; for Quinn this incremental fair value was $873,528.
Performance Compensation
Equity Grants and Realized Pay
| Item | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Awards (grant-date fair value, $) | $1,699,975 | $3,399,997 | $4,673,524 |
| Option Awards (grant-date fair value, $) | $1,699,987 | — | — |
| Value of Shares Vested (Realized) ($) | $724,799 | $3,459,764 | $4,243,727 |
| Value from Option Shares Vested (Realized) ($) | $246,344 | $655,621 | $287,716 |
| Realized Compensation ($) | $1,771,143 | $4,915,385 | $5,331,443 |
FY25 PSU Design and Weighting
| Metric | FY25 Target (Cimpress) | Weighting | Threshold (Multiplier) | Target (Multiplier) | Maximum (Multiplier) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3,540,262,654 | 20% | 95% (60%) | 100% (100%) | 105%+ (160%) |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $506,994,004 | 40% | 90% (60%) | 100–103% (100%) | 110%+ (160%) |
| Unlevered Adjusted Free Cash Flow | $332,190,015 | 40% | 90% (60%) | 100–103% (100%) | 110%+ (160%) |
In May 2025, a 60% minimum payout multiplier was added for FY25 PSUs to enhance retention; vesting is 25% on August 15, 2025 and 6.25% quarterly thereafter until August 15, 2028, subject to continued employment.
FY25 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Quinn)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares at Threshold (#) | Shares at Target (#) | Shares at Max (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8/15/2024 | FY25 PSUs | 26,407 | 44,012 | 70,419 | $3,799,996 |
| 5/23/2025 | FY25 PSU modification | — | — | — | $873,528 |
Vesting Schedules (Future Supply Considerations)
- FY25 PSUs: 25% on 8/15/2025; 6.25% quarterly thereafter through 8/15/2028, subject to service.
- Options (2022 grants): 25% on 6/30/2023; then 6.25% quarterly through 6/30/2026, 10-year term.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 101,290 CMPR shares; less than 1% of outstanding. |
| Shares acquirable by 12/15/2025 | 68,806 shares via options/PSUs/RSUs vesting by that date. |
| Ownership guidelines | Executive officers must hold ≥3x base salary in Cimpress equity (incl. shares, RSUs/PSUs, vested in-the-money options) based on 2-year avg share price; all execs satisfied or on track as of 6/30/2025. |
Outstanding Equity Awards at 6/30/2025 (Quinn)
| Type | Quantity | Price/Value | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options – exercisable | 55,649 | $46.20 strike | Expire 8/15/2032; quarterly vesting schedule noted below. |
| Options – unexercisable | 18,549 | $46.20 strike | Expire 8/15/2032; vest through 6/30/2026. |
| Unvested RSUs (footnote 6) | 41,136 | $1,933,392 | Valued at 6/30/2025; vesting per award terms. |
| Unvested RSUs (footnote 7) | 26,407 | $1,241,129 | FY25 PSU-related count shown as “Share Units That Have Not Vested.” |
| Unvested RSUs (footnote 22) | 2,804 | $131,788 | |
| Unvested RSUs (footnote 23) | 11,498 | $540,406 | |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 8) | 24,301 | $1,142,147 | Equity Incentive Plan Awards. |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 9) | 20,306 | $954,382 | |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 10) | 18,898 | $888,206 | |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 24) | 22,952 | $1,078,744 | |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 25) | 19,641 | $923,127 | |
| Unearned PSUs (footnote 26) | 19,410 | $912,270 |
Recent Vesting/Exercises (Liquidity Indicators)
| Fiscal Year | Options Exercised (#) | Value on Exercise ($) | Shares Vested (#) | Value on Vesting ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | — | — | 59,455 | $4,243,727 |
| FY2024 | — | — | 45,978 | $3,459,764 |
Employment Terms
- Executive Retention Agreement: If terminated without cause/death/disability or resigns for good reason pre-CIC or within one year post-CIC, severance equals 100% of current annual base salary and 100% of target annual cash incentive (plus pro rata bonuses), and continuation of benefits for one year for executives other than the CEO; if within 12 months post-CIC, performance awards deemed at 100% target and equity awards accelerate (non-3YMA PSUs), with options exercisable up to 12 months post-termination or original expiry.
- Compensation Recovery (Clawback) Policy: Adopted June 19, 2023; requires recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation received after October 2, 2023 during the three years preceding a required restatement, subject to SEC/Nasdaq parameters.
Illustrative Potential Payments on 6/30/2024 (for context)
| Scenario (Sean E. Quinn) | Cash Payment ($) | Accelerated Options ($) | Accelerated RSUs/PSUs ($) | Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination Without Cause/Good Reason | $800,000 | — | — | $27,691 | $827,691 |
| Change in Control (no termination) | — | $1,536,270 | $7,901,809 | — | $9,438,079 |
| CIC + Termination Without Cause/Good Reason | $800,000 | $1,536,270 | $7,901,809 | $27,691 | $10,265,770 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: FY25 LTI for executives was 100% PSUs (consistent with FY24), with no new options granted since FY2023, emphasizing performance-based equity over options.
- Metric framework: FY25 PSUs increased revenue weighting (to 20%) and reduced adjusted EBITDA/uAFCF weighting (to 40%/40% from 45%/45% in FY24), signaling a modest tilt toward top-line performance alongside profitability and cash flow.
- Modification: The Compensation Committee instituted a 60% minimum payout floor for FY25 PSUs in May 2025 to support retention/motivation—an alignment/retention choice that increases certainty of payout relative to a pure zero floor.
- Peer benchmarking: For FY25, Cimpress refreshed its peer group (14 companies including Etsy, GoDaddy, Wayfair, Squarespace, Dropbox, Shutterstock, LegalZoom, Yelp, TripAdvisor, 4imprint, Upwork, Yeti, Angi, Deluxe) and did not use an external compensation consultant; target LTI grant values increased ~9–12% YoY for NEOs.
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
| Topic | Detail |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers; 4-year compliance window; all executives met or on track by 6/30/2025. |
| Pledging/hedging | Not specifically disclosed in the cited sections. — |
| Ownership concentration | Quinn’s beneficial ownership is modest relative to total shares outstanding (<1%), complemented by substantial unvested/earnout equity that vests through 2028, supporting ongoing retention alignment. |
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cimpress TSR ($100 base on 6/30/2020) | $142.01 | $50.96 | $77.91 | $114.76 | $61.57 |
| Cimpress Adjusted EBITDA (in $000s) | $349,118 | $281,063 | $339,832 | $468,682 | $433,167 |
Compensation metrics in Quinn’s PSUs align with revenue, adjusted EBITDA, and unlevered adjusted free cash flow; Vista-specific metrics apply to Vista’s CEO.
Governance and Shareholder Feedback
- Say-on-pay context: The Compensation Committee considered the 2023 say‑on‑pay vote feedback when setting FY25 compensation policies and decisions.
Employment & Contracts
- Executive retention agreement features described above; no disclosure of non-compete/non-solicit specifics in the cited sections.
Compensation Peer Group (FY25)
- 4imprint Group plc; Angi Inc.; Deluxe Corporation; Dropbox, Inc.; Etsy, Inc.; GoDaddy Inc.; LegalZoom.com, Inc.; Shutterstock, Inc.; Squarespace, Inc.; TripAdvisor, Inc.; Upwork, Inc.; Wayfair Inc.; Yelp, Inc.; Yeti Holdings, Inc.
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Quinn’s compensation is predominantly performance-based via PSUs tied to revenue, adjusted EBITDA, and unlevered adjusted FCF, with multi-year vesting to 2028—strong pay-for-performance linkage and retention mechanics. The 60% floor added to FY25 PSUs improves retention certainty but partially dilutes downside performance sensitivity.
- Supply/overhang: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs and options vesting quarterly through 2026–2028 create a steady cadence of potential share issuance, though FY2025 and FY2024 show no option exercises by Quinn, and realized value has come primarily from RSU/PSU vesting.
- Retention risk: Executive retention agreement provides 1x salary + 1x target bonus severance and single-trigger equity vesting at 100% target on a change in control—supportive of retention but with change-of-control acceleration that investors should factor into event-driven scenarios.
- Ownership: Quinn’s direct beneficial ownership is <1%, but combined with substantial unvested equity and ownership guidelines (3x salary) that management has met or is on track to meet, overall alignment is reasonable.
- Governance: Presence of a clawback policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq enhances downside accountability for financial reporting risk; absence of new option grants since FY2023 shifts emphasis to PSU structures that hinge on operational execution.