Andrew O’Brien

About Andrew O’Brien

Andrew M. O’Brien, age 50, is Senior Vice President, Strategy, Commercial, Sustainability and Technology at ConocoPhillips (appointed 2024). He previously served as SVP, Global Operations (Nov 2022–2024), VP & Treasurer (May 2021–Nov 2022), VP, Corporate Planning & Development (Aug 2020–May 2021), Lower 48 Finance Manager (Aug 2018–Aug 2020), and Manager, Investor Relations (Nov 2016–Aug 2018). He joined ConocoPhillips on October 13, 1997. Company performance metrics tied to his pay include 2024 corporate VCIP payout of 120% of target (Absolute Adjusted ROCE 14.9%) and PSP 22 three‑year results with 3‑yr TSR ~15.8% (114% payout) .

Past Roles

Organization	Role	Years	Strategic Impact
ConocoPhillips	SVP, Strategy, Commercial, Sustainability & Technology	2024–Present	Enterprise strategy, commercial, sustainability, technology portfolio leadership (per role scope)
ConocoPhillips	SVP, Global Operations	Nov 2022–2024	Global operations leadership (per role scope)
ConocoPhillips	VP & Treasurer	May 2021–Nov 2022	Corporate treasury (per role scope)
ConocoPhillips	VP, Corporate Planning & Development	Aug 2020–May 2021	Corp planning & M&A/dev (per role scope)
ConocoPhillips	Lower 48 Finance Manager	Aug 2018–Aug 2020	Lower 48 finance (per role scope)
ConocoPhillips	Manager, Investor Relations	Nov 2016–Aug 2018	Investor engagement (per role scope)

Fixed Compensation

Year	Base Salary ($)	Target VCIP (% of Salary)	Corporate VCIP Payout (% of Target)	Actual VCIP Paid ($)
2024	725,544	83%	120%	722,642

Perquisites and other compensation detail for 2024:

Category	Amount ($)
Personal Use of Company Aircraft	4,101
Other	24,714
Tax & Financial Planning	15,468
Executive Group Life Insurance Premiums	4,362
Tax Reimbursement Gross-Up	23,934
Matching Contributions (Qualified Plans)	37,950
Company Contributions (Non-Qualified DC Plans)	34,604
Total All Other Compensation	145,133

Performance Compensation

2024 Annual Incentive (VCIP) – Metrics, Targets, Actuals, Payouts

Metric	Weight	Target	Actual/Result	Payout	Weighted Payout
HSE (TRR relative; PSE)	20%	Top‑quartile TRR; continuous improvement	Top‑quartile TRR; fewer PSE YoY but increase in serious incidents incl. one fatality	80%	16%
Operations – Production	30% (Ops)	1,941 MBOED	1,955 MBOED (~1% above)	100% (Ops block)	30%
Operations – Capital		$11.4B	$11.8B (~3% above)
Operations – Operating & Overhead Costs		$9.0B	$9.2B (~2% above)
Operations – Milestones		Operational milestones set	Achieved almost all
Financial – Absolute Adjusted ROCE	30% (Financial)	10%	14.9% (matrix payout 198%; 99% weighted)	146% (avg of abs/rel)	44%
Financial – Relative Adjusted ROCE		Peer‑relative	48th percentile (matrix 94%; 47% weighted)
Strategic Milestones	10%	Program objectives	Exceeded (incl. MRO acquisition completion; LNG progress)	150%	15%
Energy Transition Milestones	10%	Emissions intensity & abatement; LCT progress	Achieved targets; projects under budget; LCT opportunities advanced	150%	15%
Total Corporate Payout				120%	120%

Note: Beginning with VCIP 2025, Energy Transition Milestones consolidated into Strategic Milestones (total 20% weighting) .

Long-Term Incentive: PSP 22 (2022–2024) Outcome

Metric	Weight	Result	Payout	Weighted Payout
Relative TSR (3‑yr)	60%	5th (51st percentile); 3‑yr TSR ~15.8%	102%	61%
Relative Adjusted ROCE	40%	4th (61st percentile)	132%	53%
Total	100%		114%	114%

PSP 22 final settlement (Feb 2025): O’Brien received 13,488 units valued at $1,360,978 (settled at FMV on settlement date; not shown in SCT) .

2024 Equity Grants (Award Design and Vesting)

Grant Type	Grant Date	Shares (#)	Grant Date Fair Value ($)	Vesting
PSP (overlapping 3‑yr periods)	2/13/2024	20,983	2,316,208	3‑yr performance (PSP 24 2024–2026; overlapping periods)
Executive RSU Program	2/13/2024	7,140	788,149	3‑yr cliff vest in stock

Option awards: No stock options reported for O’Brien in 2024 grants or outstanding (see Outstanding Equity table; no option rows for O’Brien) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Item	Detail
Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 18, 2025)	13,340 common shares; no options exercisable within 60 days
Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024	25,604 units; market value $2,539,161 (assumes $99.17/sh on 12/31/2024)
Unearned PSUs at 12/31/2024	26,452 units; market/payout value $2,623,293 (at $99.17/sh)
Stock Vested/Settled in 2024	24,475 shares; value realized $2,710,419 (PSP 21 and 2021 RSUs; tax lapsed shares)
Ownership Guidelines	CEO 8x salary; other NEOs 3–4x; NEOs currently exceed guidelines
Pledging/Hedging	Not disclosed in cited excerpts

Implications for selling pressure:

Upcoming vesting/settlement cadence: 2024 RSUs vest in 2027; PSP 23 (2023–2025) expected to settle in early 2026; PSP 24 (2024–2026) in early 2027, creating episodic liquidity windows around early-year settlements (timing per plan design) .

Employment Terms

Term	Key Provisions
Employment Start	October 13, 1997
Early Retirement Eligibility	Not yet eligible as of 12/31/2024 (under age 55)
Executive Severance Plan (CPESP)	If involuntary not‑for‑cause: lump sum 1.5x or 2x (salary + current target VCIP); pension enhancement PV of +1.5 or +2 years age/service (if active in CPRP/KESRP); welfare benefits for 1.5 or 2 years; pro‑rata VCIP for year; “layoff treatment” for equity (partial/full RSU vesting depending on grant age; prorated PSP if ≥1 year served). May require general release and, if requested, non‑compete .
Change‑in‑Control Severance (CICSP)	If terminated w/in 2 years post‑CIC (not‑for‑cause) or resign for good reason: lump sum 2x or 3x (salary + higher of current target VCIP or 2‑yr avg VCIP); pension enhancement PV of +2 or +3 years (if active in CPRP/KESRP); welfare benefits for 2 or 3 years; pro‑rata VCIP. No excise tax gross‑up. Equity acceleration on double‑trigger only (CIC + qualifying termination); options exercisable for remaining term .
Clawback	Incentive pay subject to ConocoPhillips Clawback Policy; plans reference potential clawback .

Quantified incremental severance economics for A.M. O’Brien (as of 12/31/2024):

Scenario	Total Incremental ($)	Notable Components ($)
Involuntary Not‑for‑Cause (Not CIC)	7,472,032	Salary 1,451,088; STI 1,204,403; VCIP 602,202; PSP 22 1,337,605; PSP 23 844,453; PSP 24 452,204; Other RS/RSUs 1,305,137; Incremental retirement 205,130; Post‑employment H&W 69,810
CIC (Involuntary Not‑for‑Cause or Good Reason)	10,313,235	Salary 2,176,632; STI 1,806,605; VCIP 602,202; PSP 22 1,337,605; PSP 23 1,266,680; PSP 24 1,356,613; Other RS/RSUs 1,365,809; Incremental retirement 296,374; Post‑employment H&W 104,715
Death	5,992,701	VCIP 602,202; PSP 22 1,337,605; PSP 23 844,453; PSP 24 452,204; RS/RSUs 1,305,137; Life insurance 1,451,100
Disability	4,541,601	VCIP 602,202; PSP 22 1,337,605; PSP 23 844,453; PSP 24 452,204; RS/RSUs 1,305,137

Pension and nonqualified plans:

Plan	Years/Status	Present Value ($)
CPRP – Title II (U.S.)	27 years	266,151
KESRP (U.S. supplemental)	27 years	281,466
ConocoPhillips UK Pension Plan	15 years; deferred vested; normal pension age 60; O’Brien elected higher accrual for several years; total annual benefit £35,869; PV shown in table	879,154

Compensation Structure Details and Pay Mix (2024)

Component	Amount ($)	Mix (%)
Salary	725,544	~15%
Annual Incentive (VCIP)	722,642	~15%
Equity (PSP + RSUs, grant date value)	3,104,357	~66%
All Other Compensation	145,133	~3%
Total	4,697,676	100%

Notes: Majority of compensation is at‑risk and equity‑based (PSP and RSUs). PSP 22 paid out formulaically at 114% of target; 2024 VCIP corporate payout 120% with strong absolute ROCE (14.9%). No stock options outstanding for O’Brien .

Compensation Metrics, Peer Group, and Governance

VCIP metrics and weights: HSE (20%), Operations (30%), Financial – Absolute and Relative Adjusted ROCE (30%), Strategic Milestones (10%), Energy Transition Milestones (10%; consolidated into Strategic from 2025) .
PSP metrics and peer group: Relative TSR (60%), Relative & Absolute Adjusted ROCE (40% for PSP 24/25; relative only for PSP 22/23) vs S&P 500 (TSR only) and large-cap E&Ps (APA, CVX, DVN, FANG (from PSP24), EOG, XOM, HES (pending acquisition), MRO (PSP22 financial only), OXY; Pioneer retained via XOM post‑acquisition) .
Stock ownership: NEOs exceed ownership guidelines; executives must hold shares until compliance achieved; PSP target units and unexercised options do not count towards guidelines .

Equity Award Overhang and Vesting Schedules

Award Type	As of 12/31/2024	Vest/Settlement Timing
Unvested RSUs	25,604 units; $2,539,161 (at $99.17/sh)	3‑year cliff (e.g., 2024 grants vest in 2027)
Unearned PSP Units	26,452 units; $2,623,293 (at $99.17/sh)	Settle after performance (e.g., PSP 23 in early 2026; PSP 24 in early 2027)

Performance & Track Record Highlights (Company-level)

Measure	Result
2024 Absolute Adjusted ROCE	14.9% (significantly above 10% target)
2024 Corporate VCIP Payout	120% of target
PSP 22 (2022–2024)	114% of target (TSR ~15.8%, 51st percentile; Relative ROCE 61st percentile)

Investment Implications

Alignment and leverage to returns: O’Brien’s pay is predominantly equity‑based (≈66% of 2024 total), tied to three‑year relative TSR and Adjusted ROCE, plus an annual plan centered on HSE, operations, and ROCE—clear pay‑for‑performance linkage. 2024 outcomes (ROCE 14.9%; VCIP 120%; PSP 22 at 114%) indicate above‑target pay driven by execution against capital returns and ROCE metrics .
Retention risk: Strong unvested RSU and PSU overhang (≈52k units combined) vests/settles over 2026–2027 cycles; CPESP/CICSP provide meaningful protection (up to 2x under CPESP; 2–3x under CICSP) with double‑trigger equity acceleration under CIC—mitigating near‑term flight risk but raising CIC cost considerations .
Potential selling pressure: Early‑year PSP settlements (PSP 23 in 2026; PSP 24 in 2027) and 3‑year RSU cliffs (2027) create predictable windows for share delivery and potential insider monetization; 2024 saw $2.71M in value from vested stock to O’Brien (settlement/withholding) .
Governance quality: No excise tax gross‑ups in CIC plan; company-wide clawback policy; ownership guidelines exceeded—constructive signals for alignment. Metrics and peers appear robust and updated for portfolio changes (e.g., Diamondback added; MRO treatment in PSP 22) .