Alissa Vickery
About Alissa Vickery
Alissa B. Vickery is Corpay’s Chief Accounting Officer and twice served as Interim Chief Financial Officer (Oct 3, 2022–May 2, 2023 and again beginning Mar 15, 2025 until the new CFO’s start on Jul 21, 2025), providing continuity through finance leadership transitions . During her interim tenure and in 2024, Corpay delivered record results: revenue $4.0B (+6% YoY), Adjusted EPS $19.01 (+12% YoY), and Adjusted EBITDA >$2.1B (+7% YoY) . Corpay also cites equity-heavy, performance-linked pay design (including negative discretion on payouts) and anti-hedging/pledging and clawback policies that frame incentive alignment and risk controls for NEOs such as Ms. Vickery .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact / notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corpay (NYSE: CPAY) | Interim Chief Financial Officer | Oct 3, 2022 – May 2, 2023 | Served as Interim CFO during prior transition |
| Corpay (NYSE: CPAY) | Interim Chief Financial Officer | Mar 15, 2025 – Jul 21, 2025 | Returned to CAO when Peter Walker became CFO effective Jul 21, 2025 |
| Corpay (NYSE: CPAY) | Chief Accounting Officer | Current (date not disclosed) | Identified as CAO and NEO in 2024 proxy |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary rate ($) | 300,000 | 300,000 |
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock awards ($) | Option awards ($) | All other comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 247,115 | 250,024 | 300,009 | 3,086 | 950,235 |
| 2023 | 284,615 | 434,473 | — | 5,010 | 724,098 |
| 2024 | 300,000 | 352,467 | 300,073 | 4,768 | 957,308 |
| 2024 perquisites and other benefits detail | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Retirement plan contributions | 2,308 |
| Life insurance | 660 |
| Parking/technology allowances | 1,800 |
| Total “All other compensation” | 4,768 |
Performance Compensation
| Program (2024) | Metric(s) and weights | Target | Actual/Result | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Annual Equity Incentive | Adjusted EPS-COMP; non-CEO NEO payout curve approved in 2024 | $250,000 target value; 918 target shares (price $272.38) | 2024 Adjusted EPS-COMP = $19.49; non-CEO NEO payout 109% | 1,001 shares earned | Earned portion vests 5/8 on first anniversary and 3/8 on second (for Ms. Vickery) |
| Annual Bonus Equity Incentive (replaces cash bonus) | Quarterly expenses (25%); strategic initiatives (75%) | 331 target shares (price $272.38); $90,000 target value | Formulaic earned payout 100% (2 of 3 initiatives achieved; 4/4 quarters at/below plan) | Committee applied -25% negative discretion; 249 shares paid | Vested Mar 3, 2025 (for Ms. Vickery) |
| Stock options (time-based) | N/A | 3,130 options (grant 2/14/2024) | Exercise price $272.38 | N/A | Ratable vest over 4 years; time-based only |
Additional design features:
- No traditional cash bonus in 2024; short-term incentive fully equity-settled with potential committee discretion (used to reduce payouts by 25%) .
- Performance metric calibration and payout curves disclosed; CEO program differs, but NEOs generally tied to company/division metrics with one- and three-year horizons .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As of Feb 17, 2025 | Count/Status |
|---|---|
| Common shares beneficially owned | 1,180 |
| Restricted shares subject to vesting (of which 528 vest within 60 days) | 998 (528 within 60 days) |
| Options exercisable (“Right to Acquire”) | 8,647 |
| Total beneficial (common + right to acquire) | 11,353 |
| Ownership as % of shares outstanding | <1% |
| Insider policy on hedging/pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited for officers/directors |
| Ownership guidelines | CFO 4x salary; other executive officers 3x; NEOs in compliance or on track (company statement) |
Outstanding awards detail (12/31/2024):
- Options: 4,424 exercisable @ $224.99 (4/10/2030); 2,294 exercisable and 2,294 unexercisable @ $225.45 (1/24/2032); 3,130 unexercisable @ $272.38 (2/14/2034) .
- Unvested stock/units: 89 (2021 award); 278 (2022 award); 439 (2023 award); 918 target (2024 Company Annual Equity Incentive); 331 target (2024 Annual Bonus Equity Incentive) .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash severance | Equity acceleration | Benefits | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause | 300,000 | — | — | Company assumes Ms. Vickery would receive severance similar to non-CEO NEOs (no individual agreement) |
| Termination without cause following change in control (double trigger) | 300,000 | 1,161,311 | — | Unvested equity accelerates upon qualifying double trigger under 2010 Plan |
| Termination for good reason following change in control | — | 1,161,311 | — | Double trigger construct |
| Death/disability/retirement | — | 713,216 | — | Portion scheduled to vest in year of event vests (non-CEO NEO practice) |
Program features and risk controls:
- Double-trigger change-in-control vesting; below-market severance policies (company-wide) .
- Clawback policies: NYSE-compliant (restatement-based) plus supplemental misconduct-based policy covering earlier periods .
- Insider trading windows and anti-hedging/pledging policy in force .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Ms. Vickery’s 2024 variable comp was entirely equity-settled and tied to concrete metrics (Adjusted EPS-COMP; expenses; specified control remediation initiatives), with committee-applied negative discretion that reduced short-term payouts by 25%—a credible alignment and governance signal .
- Retention/overhang: Her mix includes multi-year vesting (options vest over four years; Company Annual Equity Incentive vests over two years), which promotes retention while spreading potential sellable supply; vest timing for 2024 programs is disclosed and modest in size relative to float .
- Risk controls and shareholder posture: Anti-hedging/pledging, robust clawbacks, and below-market severance reduce governance risk and potential misalignment; say-on-pay support near 90% in 2024 underscores investor acceptance of the program framework .
- Execution indicators: Company-level performance (record revenue, Adjusted EPS, Adjusted EBITDA in 2024) during her finance leadership stints provides supportive context; equity-heavy incentives and disclosure of metric targets/curves increase transparency for assessing future payout sensitivity to performance .