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Richard J. Campo

Richard J. Campo

Chief Executive Officer at CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST
CEO
Executive
Board

About Richard J. Campo

Richard J. Campo is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Camden Property Trust; he has served on the Board since 1993 and co-founded Camden’s predecessor companies in 1982. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting from Oregon State University and previously worked in the finance department of Century Development Corporation . Age: 70; Board service since 1993; Executive Committee Chair . Performance context: Core FFO per share was $6.85 in 2024, Same Property NOI growth was 1.1%, Net Debt/Adjusted EBITDAre was 3.90x, and weighted average yields on stabilized developments were 5.78% . Pay-versus-performance disclosure shows ongoing linkage of CEO compensation to TSR, Net Income, and Core FFO per share; Core FFO per share tracked at $6.85 in 2024 and the press release noted Q1 2025 outperformance and a raised FY25 Core FFO guidance midpoint to $6.78 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Camden Property TrustChairman of the Board and CEO1993–presentCo-founder; leadership across corporate finance, capital markets, strategic planning, and M&A
Camden predecessor companiesCo-founder1982–1993Built platform for multifamily REIT operations
Century Development CorporationFinance departmentPrior to 1982Foundational finance experience supporting later REIT leadership

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
None (public companies, past 5 years)Company discloses no current or past 5-year public directorships for Campo

Board Governance and Service

  • Board leadership: CEO and Chairman is combined in Campo; Camden uses a Lead Independent Trust Manager (Kelvin R. Westbrook) with robust responsibilities to counterbalance and ensure independent oversight .
  • Committees and roles: Campo chairs the Executive Committee; independent managers chair Audit (Brunner), Compensation (Khator), and Nominating, Corporate Governance & Sustainability (Sevilla-Sacasa). Campo is not a member of the three independent committees .
  • Board independence: Majority independent; only Campo and Oden are employees .
  • Meeting cadence and attendance: Board met five times in 2024; all Trust Managers attended ≥80% of meetings of the Board and committees on which they served .
  • Board refreshment and retirement policy: Independent Trust Managers generally do not stand for election after age 75 (exceptions possible); ongoing refreshment since 2017 .

Dual-role implications: Combined CEO/Chair can elevate entrenchment and independence concerns; Camden’s governance includes annual election by majority vote, independent committees, regular executive sessions without management, and a Lead Independent Trust Manager empowered to set agendas and liaise between independent managers and the CEO to mitigate risks .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)$700,000 $721,000 $742,630
Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary)400% 400% 400%
Summary Compensation Total ($)$6,176,567 $6,911,304 $7,224,768

Notes: 2024 base salaries increased 3% YoY aligned to peer market levels . Say-on-pay received ~91% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus (Structure and 2024 Payout)

Item202220232024
Total Annual Bonus ($)$3,823,434 (cash + shares) $3,823,532 (cash + shares) $4,205,900 (cash + shares)
Portion Paid in Cash ($)$1,911,773 $1,911,773 $2,102,950
Portion Paid in Shares (Count; $ value)12,594 shares; $2,062,519 24,394 shares; $2,867,759 30,057 shares; $2,867,738
Vesting (bonus shares)25% at grant; 25% each next 3 years; Campo’s awards vest immediately due to Retirement Eligibility

Notes: NEOs may elect up to 50% of annual bonus in shares valued at two-thirds of closing price (i.e., 150% of cash amount), promoting retention and alignment; all NEOs elected the maximum in 2024 .

2024 Performance Award Program (Corporate Metrics and Outcomes)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaxActualAchievement
Core FFO per share40%$6.59 $6.74 $6.89 $6.85 137%
Same Property NOI growth30%(1.50%) 0.00% 1.50% 1.1% 137%
Net Debt/Adjusted EBITDAre20%5.00x 4.75x 4.50x 3.90x 150%
Weighted Average Yields (stabilized dev.)10%5.37% 5.62% 5.87% 5.78% 132%
Total100%139%
Campo 2024 Performance Award (Cash)Value
Notional Shares Held60,000
Performance Award Cash Payment (paid in 2025 for 2024)$343,608

Long-Term Incentive Awards

Award TypeGrant DateSharesVestingNotes
Annual Share AwardFeb 19, 202514,669Immediate (Retirement Eligible) Granted due to strong 2024 performance
Annual Bonus Share Award (from 2024 bonus)Feb 19, 202526,531Immediate (Retirement Eligible) Bonus share conversion at two-thirds price; value 150% of cash

Forward design change: Beginning 2026, annual share awards will be PSUs with a three-year performance period, split 50% on relative TSR and 50% on financial measures (Core FFO/share and Net Debt/EBITDAre), enhancing performance-based equity .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership MetricValue
Total Beneficial Ownership (shares)391,433
Unvested Awards Outstanding (12/31/2024)None (Retirement Eligible – awards vest at grant)
Shares Acquired on Vesting in 202442,271 shares; $4,033,076 value
Shares Pledged as Collateral106,514 shares pledged to a financial institution (margin/pledge discouraged by policy)
Ownership VehiclesIncludes 285,779 shares via family limited partnership (≈99% owned by family trust; ≈1% by Campo) and 3,929 shares via estate where Campo is trustee
Stock Ownership Guidelines (CEO)6× salary or 40,500 shares; all senior officers currently in compliance
Hedging/Pledging PolicyHedging prohibited; pledging generally discouraged; margin accounts discouraged

Pledging red flag: 106,514 pledged shares introduce potential forced-sale risk under adverse conditions; governance policies discourage pledging and prohibit hedging .

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Agreement TermCampo’s employment agreement expires July 22, 2025; auto-extends one year annually on July 22
Non-Compete / Non-Solicit12 months post-termination; not applicable if termination without cause or, for Campo, resignation for good reason
Bonus EligibilityTarget bonus set by Compensation Committee; eligible for long-term equity awards
Severance (No Cause / Good Reason)Lump sum equal to 2.99× the greater of current annual total compensation or average of prior three years; plus prorated target bonus and benefits continuation for one year (offset for comparable benefits)
Change-in-Control (CIC)Campo entitled to severance benefits upon CIC regardless of termination (“single-trigger”), plus prorated target bonus; vesting accelerates for awards under death/disability; CIC table shows identical totals with or without termination
Clawback PolicyCompliant with SEC/NYSE; recovers erroneously awarded incentive comp for three fiscal years preceding a required restatement
Insider Trading PolicyProhibits short sales and hedging; sets blackout windows

Potential Payments Upon Termination or CIC (As of 12/31/2024)

ScenarioBonus ($)Severance ($)Options/Awards ($)Tax Gross-Up ($)Total ($)
Without Cause2,970,520 24,182,283 27,152,803
Death or Disability2,970,520 24,182,283 27,152,803
CIC with Termination2,970,520 24,182,283 27,152,803
CIC without Termination2,970,520 24,182,283 27,152,803

Legacy gross-up note: Company states any tax gross-up provisions exist only in pre-2013 agreements; no new arrangements include gross-ups .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy mix and at-risk pay: More than half of NEO compensation is non-cash, multi-year equity; bonus share elections and vesting structures further tie comp to share performance; clawback policy enforced .
  • Metric rigor: Annual performance awards rely on quantifiable REIT-operational metrics (Core FFO/share, Same Property NOI, Net Debt/EBITDAre, yields) with threshold/target/max bands; 2024 achievement was 139% overall .
  • Shift to PSUs in 2026: Introduction of PSUs linked to relative TSR and financial metrics increases direct pay-for-performance sensitivity vs. time-based shares .
  • Peer benchmarking: Compensation Committee uses CBIZ and a defined REIT peer group (AvalonBay, Equity Residential, Essex, UDR, MAA, Invitation Homes, etc.) to calibrate pay .
  • Say-on-pay support: ~91% approval at 2024 meeting supports the program’s shareholder acceptance .

Performance & Track Record

Performance Measure20202021202220232024
Value of $100 (Camden TSR)$2,808,294 $3,682,054 $3,674,346 $4,178,445 $4,710,971
Net Income ($000)$128,579 $312,376 $661,508 $410,553 $170,840
Core FFO per Share$5.10 $5.39 $6.52 $6.82 $6.85

Q1 2025 operations: Core FFO $1.72 per diluted share (vs. $1.70 Q1 2024); occupancy 95.4%; raised FY25 Core FFO guidance midpoint to $6.78; CEO commentary highlighted revenue and interest expense outperformance .

Equity Ownership & Director Compensation (Board context)

  • Independent director cash fees: $80,000 annual fee in 2024; incremental fees for roles (Lead Independent $35,000; Audit Chair $30,000; Compensation Chair $25,000; NCG&S Chair $20,000; committee member fees). Equity grants: ~$110,000 fully vested at re-election; option to take fees in shares (150% of cash) with 4-year vest; certain age-related accelerated vesting .
  • Campo and Oden receive no additional director pay as employees; their compensation is in NEO tables .

Compensation Peer Group (2024)

American Homes 4 Rent; AvalonBay Communities; Brixmor Property Group; CubeSmart; Douglas Emmett; Equity LifeStyle Properties; Equity Residential; Essex Property Trust; Federal Realty; Gaming & Leisure Properties; Invitation Homes; Kimco Realty; Mid-America Apartment Communities; NNN REIT; Sun Communities; The Macerich Company; UDR; Uniti Group .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Single-trigger CIC cash severance (benefits paid even without termination for Campo/Oden): Governance risk; increases transaction-related payouts independent of job loss .
  • Pledging: Campo has 106,514 shares pledged; company discourages pledging, prohibits hedging .
  • Large severance multiple: 2.99× annual total compensation; material payout risk under various scenarios .
  • Clawback adopted; hedging prohibited; regular executive sessions and majority independent board mitigate some governance concerns .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Table (Detailed)

ItemCount / Value
Beneficial ownership (Campo)391,433 shares
Pledged shares106,514 shares
Family LP holdings285,779 shares via family LP structures
Unvested awards outstanding at 12/31/2024None (Retirement Eligible)
Shares vested (2024)42,271 shares; $4,033,076 realized
Notional shares for Performance Award60,000
Ownership guideline statusIn compliance (CEO guideline: 6× salary or 40,500 shares)

Employment & Contracts Table (Key Economics)

ProvisionTerms
Agreement auto-renewalAnnual one-year extension on July 22
Severance (No Cause / Good Reason)2.99× annual total comp; plus prorated target bonus; benefits continuation
CIC triggeringBenefits payable with or without termination (single-trigger)
Non-compete / Non-solicit12 months; exceptions for no-cause or good-reason terminations
ClawbackThree-year lookback upon restatement (SEC/NYSE standard)

Performance Compensation Detail Table (2024 Payouts)

ComponentStructureCampo 2024 Outcome
Annual Cash BonusTarget 400% of salary; paid in cash and shares$2,102,950 cash; 30,057 shares via bonus conversion
Bonus Share Vesting25% at grant; 25% annually for 3 years; Retirement Eligible vests immediatelyImmediate vesting for Campo
Performance Award (cash)% of dividends × notional shares; based on corporate metric achievement$343,608 cash in 2025 for 2024 (60,000 notional shares; 139% achievement)
Annual Share Award (LT equity)Time-based vest over 3 years; Retirement Eligible immediate14,669 shares granted 2/19/2025 (vest at grant)
Bonus Share Award (LT equity)From bonus election; vest schedule as above26,531 shares granted 2/19/2025 (vest at grant)

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say-on-Pay approval approximately 91%; Compensation Committee maintained approach, continued emphasis on variable and equity-based compensation .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Financial and real estate expertise; corporate finance, capital markets, strategic planning, M&A; extensive governance experience; Bachelor’s in Accounting (Oregon State University) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong pay-for-performance constructs tether incentives to REIT-operational metrics (Core FFO/share, NOI, leverage, yields), with enhanced PSU design planned for 2026; this supports disciplined capital allocation and operational focus .
  • Governance risks: Combined CEO/Chair with single-trigger CIC severance and significant 2.99× severance multiple elevate payout risk in transactions; mitigants include a robust Lead Independent role, majority-independent committees, and executive sessions .
  • Ownership and selling pressure: Immediate vesting due to Retirement Eligibility increases liquidity of awards; large pledged-share position (106,514) is a watchpoint for forced-sale dynamics in stress scenarios; the company discourages pledging and enforces hedging prohibitions and ownership guidelines .
  • Performance outlook: Q1 2025 results exceeded guidance midpoints and FY25 Core FFO guidance was raised; ongoing operational performance supports incentive payouts and potential TSR alignment, but macro uncertainty and leasing trends warrant monitoring .