Joseph W. LaPlume
Corporate Executive Vice President, Corporate Development & Strategy at 
CHARLES RIVER LABORATORIES INTERNATIONAL
CHARLES RIVER LABORATORIES INTERNATIONALExecutive
About Joseph W. LaPlume
Corporate Executive Vice President, Corporate Development & Strategy at Charles River Laboratories (CRL); joined CRL in 2005, promoted to EVP in January 2019. Education: MBA and JD from Boston University; BA from Trinity College. Prior roles include corporate lawyer at GTECH and associate at Mintz Levin and Goulston & Storrs . 2024 company performance context: revenue declined 1.9% YoY and non-GAAP EPS was $10.32; PSU payouts tied to prior cycles were below target due to weak relative TSR (2022 grant paid 47.1% of target) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Charles River Laboratories | Senior Corporate Counsel → Deputy General Counsel | 2005–2010 | Supported legal/commercial execution as CRL scaled M&A program |
| Charles River Laboratories | Vice President, Corporate Development | 2011–2014 | Led corporate development; pipeline-building acquisitions |
| Charles River Laboratories | Senior Vice President | 2014–2018 | Expanded remit across strategy/transactions |
| Charles River Laboratories | Corporate Executive Vice President, Corporate Development & Strategy | 2019–present | Oversees strategic planning and all corporate development across segments/geographies |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GTECH Corporation | Corporate lawyer | — | Commercial and transactional execution prior to CRL |
| Mintz Levin | Attorney (private practice) | — | Corporate/M&A legal advisory foundation |
| Goulston & Storrs | Attorney (private practice) | — | Corporate/M&A legal advisory foundation |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary (paid) | $557,975 | Summary Compensation Table |
| Base salary rate (effective 3/31/24) | $562,380 | Approved 2/6/24, effective 3/31/24 |
| Target bonus (% of salary) | 70% | EVP plan target under EICP |
| Target bonus ($) | $393,666 | 70% of 2024 base rate; set 2/6/24 |
| Actual 2024 cash bonus (paid Feb-2025) | $159,238 | Company underperformance drove 40.45% payout |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan (EICP) – 2024 outcome
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout % | Resulting payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRL Revenue (FX-neutral) | 50% | $4,307m | $4,050m | 40.45% | Proportional |
| CRL Operating Income (non-GAAP, FX-neutral) | 50% | $911.9m | $805.9m | 40.45% | Proportional |
| Total | 100% | — | — | 40.45% | $159,238 |
Design notes:
- Common payout scales for executives; min 85% OI/90% revenue; max 200% of target .
- No discretionary adjustments in 2024 .
Long-Term Incentives (granted May 31, 2024)
| Award type | Quantity/Range | Price/Terms | Grant-date fair value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 4,797 | $208.44 strike; 4-year ratable vest | $439,021 |
| Time-based RSUs | 2,111 | 4-year ratable vest | $440,017 |
| PSUs (target) | 1,967 (range 6,054–12,108) | 3-year; 1st-year non-GAAP EPS sets base; 3-yr relative TSR modifier | $1,295,495 |
PSU mechanics and 2024 calibration:
- Base Award from 1st-year non-GAAP EPS: 90.5% of target EPS ($10.32 vs $11.40) → Base Award 52.5% of target .
- TSR modifier vs S&P 500 Health Care peers at 3-year end adjusts Base Award ±35% (min 65%, target 100%, max 135%), capping final at 200% of target .
- 2022 PSU grant (vesting in 2024) paid 47.1% of target; rTSR ranked 10th percentile; share price fell ~50.4% over the period, aligning realizations with performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (3/21/2025) | 21,223 shares; includes 12,844 options exercisable within 60 days; <1% of shares outstanding |
| Outstanding unvested RSUs (12/28/2024) | 11,634 shares; value $2,165,785 at $186.16 |
| Outstanding PSUs (unvested rights, 12/28/2024) | 17,400 units (mix of cycles; value $3,239,184 at $186.16) |
| Stock options outstanding (select tranches) | 6,685 @ $179.66 (exp. 5/29/2030); 2,607 (869 unexercisable) @ $337.99 (exp. 5/28/2031); 2,239 @ $244.41 (exp. 5/27/2032); 1,313 (3,939 unexercisable) @ $194.12 (exp. 5/26/2033); 4,797 unexercisable @ $208.44 (exp. 5/31/2034) |
| RSU vesting schedule (selected future dates) | 281 (5/28/2025); 414 (5/27/2025); 415 (5/27/2026); 547 (5/26/2025); 547 (5/26/2026); 6,771 (12/25/2026 one-time grant); 548 (5/26/2027); 527 (5/31/2025); 528 (5/31/2026); 528 (5/31/2027); 528 (5/31/2028) |
| Ownership guidelines | Direct reports to CEO: 3× base salary; current NEOs in compliance as of proxy date |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited by policy; none of the 621,783 officer/director shares pledged |
| Deferred Compensation Plan | 2024 employer credit $82,333; aggregate balance $960,810 (as of 12/28/2024) |
| Pre‑retirement death benefit | $3,825,000 (via Deferred Compensation Plan provision) |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms (LaPlume) |
|---|---|
| Severance (no change in control) | Executive Separation Plan: for EVPs, pay continuity based on service. As of 1/1/2025 update: 1 year (<5 yrs) or 2 years (≥5 yrs) base salary; benefits continuation capped at 1 year; non‑compete/non‑solicit for 1 year . |
| Hypothetical termination value (no CIC, 12/28/2024) | Involuntary not for cause: Cash $1,124,760; Benefits $71,339; Retirement (DCP) $725,928; Outplacement $50,000; Total $1,997,027 . |
| Change‑in‑control agreements | Double‑trigger within 1 year: cash = 2× (base + target bonus); 24 months benefits; equity vests (PSUs prorated per performance); outplacement up to $75k; no excise tax gross‑up . |
| Hypothetical termination value (with CIC, 12/28/2024) | Cash $1,912,092; Benefits $94,301; Equity $4,601,736; Retirement (DCP) $960,810; Other $50,000; Total $7,618,939 . |
| Clawback | NYSE/Exchange Act 10D-compliant financial restatement clawback policy . |
Compensation Structure Analysis (alignment and pressures)
- Pay mix heavily at‑risk: equity (PSUs/options/RSUs) plus EICP; 2024 EICP paid 40.45% of target after misses on revenue and operating income, evidencing downside sensitivity .
- PSUs incorporate first‑year non‑GAAP EPS and three‑year relative TSR; 2022 PSU payout at 47.1% on 10th percentile rTSR and share price decline indicates realized pay tracking shareholder returns .
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and robust ownership guidelines reinforce alignment; no pledging disclosed .
- Peer benchmarking uses a regression‑adjusted, broad life sciences peer set; independent consultant Pay Governance engaged; say‑on‑pay support 94.9% in 2024 .
Performance & Track Record (select signals)
- Corporate outcomes during tenure: CRL authorized $1.0B repurchase in Aug‑2024; repurchased $100.7M in 2024 .
- Strategic M&A leadership: signed high‑impact acquisition agreements (e.g., Cognate BioServices—LaPlume executed as EVP on the merger agreement) .
- 2024 macro headwinds: revenue −1.9% and non‑GAAP EPS $10.32 amid NHP supply disruptions and client spending caution, reflected in below‑target short‑ and long‑term incentive outcomes .
Say‑on‑Pay & Governance Context
- Say‑on‑pay approval: 94.9% support at 2024 annual meeting; Board continues shareholder outreach on compensation and ESG topics .
- Prohibitions and policies: hedging/pledging ban; clawback; double‑trigger equity on CIC; no 280G excise tax gross‑ups; 3× salary holding requirement for CEO direct reports .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment and downside capture: 2024 EICP and 2022 PSU outcomes below target confirm pay sensitivity to operating underperformance and rTSR—limiting overpayment risk if macro softness persists .
- Potential selling/vesting pressure: 2024–2028 schedules include ratable RSU/option vesting and PSU settlements; meaningful unvested equity (RSUs 11.6k; PSUs 17.4k units as of YE‑2024) could create episodic supply around vest dates, though policy bans hedging/pledging and ownership rules support retention .
- Retention/CIC economics: Double‑trigger 2× cash plus full equity acceleration on a qualifying termination within 1 year of CIC (est. $7.6M package at 12/28/2024 valuations) reduces management turnover risk in strategic scenarios but adds potential take‑out costs .
- Strategic execution risk: Corporate development track record is robust, but industry headwinds (client budget restraint, NHP supply issues) tie payout realizations to operational recovery and relative share performance (PSUs rTSR mod) .