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Christopher B. Gaskill

Vice President and General Counsel at CARLISLE COMPANIESCARLISLE COMPANIES
Executive

About Christopher B. Gaskill

Christopher B. Gaskill is Vice President & General Counsel of Carlisle Companies (appointed May 15, 2025; age 43). He previously served as EVP, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary at Summit Materials and held senior legal roles at The Western Union Company, Cardinal Health, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; he holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law . Company performance context: in 2024, Carlisle’s adjusted Sales rose 7.3% YoY to $4.915B, Operating Income Margin expanded 160 bps to 23.3%, and adjusted Earnings increased 19.1% ; three-year TSR (2012–2024 PSU performance period) ranked at the 81.69th percentile vs. the S&P MidCap 400, paying PSUs at 200% of target . In Q3 2025, Carlisle reported revenue up 1% YoY to ~$1.3B and adjusted EPS of $5.61, with adj. EBITDA margin of 25.9% .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Summit Materials, Inc. (NYSE: SUM)EVP, Chief Legal Officer & SecretaryNot disclosedLed global legal function; ensured corporate governance compliance
The Western Union Company (NYSE: WU)Senior Director & CounselNot disclosedSenior corporate legal role supporting a global payments leader
Cardinal Health, Inc. (NYSE: CAH)Senior CounselNot disclosedSenior corporate legal role at a diversified healthcare company
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLPAttorneyNot disclosedTraining at a top-tier law firm

External Roles

  • No public company directorships or external board roles were disclosed in the appointment 8‑K and press release .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 GC role design (reference)Notes
Base salaryNot disclosed for Gaskill2024 GC (Selbach) base was set via Compensation Committee review; specific GC base not stated .
Target annual bonus (% of base)80% (applied to CFO and General Counsel)Role-based target used for 2024 plan; Gaskill participates in the same program post-appointment .
Bonus capUp to 150% of base for “other NEOs”; 160% for CFO/GC; CEO higherRisk safeguards include capped payouts (linear curve) .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual incentive metrics and weights for CEO/CFO/GC (2024): Sales (25%), Operating Income Margin (20%), Average Working Capital as % of Sales (15%), Earnings (40%) .
  • Consolidated 2024 adjusted outcomes (used for CEO/CFO/GC): Sales $4.915B, OI Margin 23.3%, AWC% Sales 17.3%, Earnings $868M .
  • 2024 GC (Selbach) earned 199% of target on consolidated results; structure expected for GC role going forward .
MetricWeight2024 Threshold2024 Target2024 Maximum2024 Actual (Adj.)
Sales25%$4.599B$4.737B$4.921B$4.915B
Operating Income Margin20%21.2%21.7%22.2%23.3%
Avg. Working Capital as % of Sales15%18.9%18.4%17.9%17.3%
Earnings40%$693M$766M$803M$868M
Resulting Payout vs Target (GC reference)199%

Long-term incentives (LTI) program design (role-wide):

  • Equity mix: typically stock options, time-vested RS (RSUs), and PSUs; vesting 3 years; PSUs earned on 3-year relative TSR vs S&P MidCap 400 (25th=50%; 50th=100%; 75th=200%) with linear interpolation .
  • 2024 GC exception: Selbach’s 2024 grant was solely time-vested RS due to contemplated retirement; future GC awards generally use the blended approach .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemStatus / PolicyEvidence
Beneficial ownership at appointmentForm 3 reported no securities beneficially ownedFiled May 19, 2025 .
Ownership guidelines (executives)5x prior-year base salary for NEOs; CEO 10x; 3x for other Section 16 officersPolicy and retention requirement (hold 50% of after-tax gains until compliant) .
Hedging/PledgingHedging prohibited for directors, officers, employees; pledging not expressly disclosed in proxy section citedHedging ban and policy reference .
ClawbackMandatory clawback for erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation (Section 16 officers), regardless of faultNYSE/SEC-compliant policy .

Employment Terms

TermDetailEvidence
AppointmentAppointed Vice President & General Counsel, May 15, 20258‑K Item 5.02 and press release .
Benefit participationEligible for Supplemental Pension Plan and executive benefit plans8‑K references participation and 2025 proxy ; plan descriptions .
Change-in-control (CiC) protectionStandard executive severance agreement: if employment is terminated within 3 years after a CiC, entitled to 3 years’ compensation (incl. bonus), equity vesting and continuation of benefits, per agreement terms8‑K description .
CiC trigger structure and tax gross-upsCompany policy since 2012: benefits only if terminated without cause or resigns with good reason within 3 years post‑CiC; no excise tax gross-ups in future agreementsCompensation policy .
Equity vesting on separationRS/Options vest on death/disability/retirement at or after 65; options remain exercisable to term; if terminated without cause, options continue to vest per schedule; PSUs generally remain outstanding to end of period (earn based on performance); CiC provisions per agreementAward terms .
Non-compete1-year non-compete requirement tied to equity awardsEquity award condition .

Company Performance During Gaskill’s Tenure (recent quarters)

MetricQ2 2024Q3 2024Q4 2024Q1 2025Q2 2025Q3 2025
Revenue ($, mm)1,450.6*1,333.6*1,122.9*1,095.8*1,449.5*1,346.9*
EBITDA ($, mm)425.1*361.0*251.6*236.7*385.2*343.7*

Values retrieved from S&P Global.*

Additional qualitative performance: Q3 2025 revenue +1% YoY to $1.3B and adjusted EBITDA margin 25.9% per earnings release .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

MeetingApproval of NEO pay (prior year)
2024 Annual Meeting~88% “FOR” (2023 compensation)

Compensation benchmarking and peer context:

  • The Compensation Committee uses Willis Towers Watson market surveys to benchmark total direct compensation (targeting between 1st and 3rd quartiles for size-adjusted peers); PSU TSR comparator is S&P MidCap 400 .

Insider Transactions (last 24 months)

  • Form 3 (initial statement): no CSL securities beneficially owned at appointment (May 19, 2025) .
  • No Form 4 transactions for Gaskill were identified to date in Company filings search.

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: GC role comp is heavily at-risk via annual incentives tied to Sales, OI margin, working capital efficiency, and Earnings, and via LTI with TSR-based PSUs—historically paying above target on strong TSR performance . This aligns legal leadership incentives to enterprise value drivers.
  • Retention and turnover risk: Standard CiC agreement with three years’ compensation and full benefits reduces flight risk during strategic events; policy is double-trigger with no excise gross-ups, limiting shareholder-unfriendly features . One-year non-compete tied to equity promotes retention post-grant .
  • Insider selling pressure: Initial Form 3 shows zero holdings; near-term selling pressure is minimal; as equity is granted, 3-year vesting and ownership retention requirements should mitigate short-term disposal risk .
  • Governance safeguards: Hedging prohibited; mandatory clawback in place; robust stock ownership guidelines (5x salary for NEOs) encourage skin-in-the-game over time .