Jason Taylor
CARLISLE COMPANIESAbout Jason Taylor
Jason Taylor is President of Carlisle Construction Materials (CCM) at Carlisle Companies (appointed November 3, 2025), reporting to the CEO; he joined from Beacon Building Products (QXO, Inc.), where he most recently served as President of the West Division and has an MBA from Harvard Business School and a BS in Business Administration from UC Berkeley . As a newly appointed Section 16 officer, he filed a Form 3 indicating no beneficial ownership of CSL securities as of November 6, 2025 . Carlisle’s incentive programs tie executive pay to operational and shareholder outcomes; in 2024 the company delivered 7.3% sales growth to $4.915B, operating margin expansion of 160 bps to 23.3%, improved working capital efficiency, and earnings of $868M, with 3-year TSR of 61.47% vs S&P MidCap 400 peers leading to 200% performance share payout for the 2022–2024 cycle .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beacon Building Products (QXO, Inc.) | President, West Division | ~14 years at Beacon through 2025 | Led top and bottom-line growth; deep industry relationships with distributors/contractors |
| Beacon Building Products (prior roles) | Various key leadership roles | Not specified | Extensive building products distribution leadership relevant to CCM |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or external board roles were disclosed in the appointment 8-K or press release .
Fixed Compensation
- Compensation terms (base salary, target/actual bonus) for Jason Taylor were not disclosed in the November 3, 2025 8-K; no EX‑10 or offer letter was furnished with compensatory details .
- Company-wide philosophy: base salary reviewed annually; target annual incentive and long-term stock-based awards are expressed as a percentage of base salary, with market benchmarking by Willis Towers Watson .
Performance Compensation
Carlisle’s current incentive design and metrics (illustrative for CCM leadership based on 2024 program):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Adjusted Performance | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCM Business Unit Sales | 35% | $3.253B | $3.351B | $3.481B | $3.617B | Linear from 50% (threshold) to 200% (max) |
| CCM Operating Income Margin | 40% | 27.7% | 28.2% | 28.7% | 29.7% | Linear; independent per measure |
| CCM Avg Working Capital % Sales | 15% | 19.1% | 18.6% | 18.1% | 17.1% | Linear; independent per measure |
| Consolidated Earnings | 10% | $693M | $766M | $803M | $868M | Linear; independent per measure |
Long-term equity components (company program):
- Mix: stock options (10-year term), time-vested restricted shares (3-year vest), performance shares (3-year performance, vest at year 3) .
- Performance shares metric: relative TSR vs S&P MidCap 400; payouts from 0% at <25th percentile to 200% at ≥75th percentile, with linear interpolation between bands .
- Illustrative outcomes: For the 2022–2024 cycle, CSL’s 3-year TSR of 61.47% ranked at the 81.69th percentile, paying performance shares at 200% of target .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Status/Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership at appointment | No CSL securities beneficially owned (Form 3) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 5x prior-year base salary for other named executive officers; CEO 10x; remaining Section 16 officers 3x |
| Retention requirement | Must retain at least half of after-tax value realized from vesting/exercise until guideline met |
| Anti-hedging policy | Hedging transactions prohibited for directors, officers, and employees |
| Clawback | Mandatory clawback of erroneously awarded incentive compensation for Section 16 officers upon accounting restatement, regardless of fault |
Notes:
- As a newly appointed Section 16 officer, Taylor would be subject to the ownership guideline and retention policy; executives have five years to attain the ownership requirement .
- No pledging disclosures specific to Taylor; company policy disclosed prohibits hedging, not pledging .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Company Practice / Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Start date | November 3, 2025 (appointed President, CCM) |
| Non-compete related to equity awards | Employees receiving options/RSUs/PSUs are subject to a non-compete for one year post-termination |
| Change-in-control agreements | Company maintains CIC agreements for certain executives; since September 2012, future agreements use double-trigger severance (termination without cause or resignation with good reason within 3 years post-CIC), age-neutral benefits, and no excise tax gross-up |
| Insider trading policy | Company maintains insider trading policies and procedures; securities trading policy filed with 2024 Form 10‑K |
Note: No CIC agreement or severance terms specifically for Jason Taylor were disclosed in the appointment 8‑K .
Performance & Track Record
- The press release highlights Taylor’s “strong track record of leading top and bottom-line growth” and long-term relationship with Carlisle and the roofing ecosystem, indicating domain expertise and commercial execution capability in distribution and contractor channels .
- Company performance context for incentive alignment (2024): Sales $4.915B (+7.3% YoY), operating margin 23.3% (+160 bps), working capital % sales 17.3% (−110 bps), earnings $868M (+19.1% YoY) .
Compensation Committee & Governance Context
- Compensation Committee membership in 2024 included Chair Corrine D. Ricard and members Robert G. Bohn, Jonathan R. Collins, C. David Myers, Gregg A. Ostrander, and Jesse G. Singh .
- Say-on-Pay approval in 2024: approximately 88% support for NEO compensation .
Investment Implications
- Near-term insider trading/overhang: Form 3 shows zero holdings at appointment, implying no immediate insider selling pressure; expect future Form 4 activity as onboarding awards are granted or guideline-driven purchases occur .
- Alignment and incentive quality: Strong pay-for-performance design with heavy weighting to TSR-based PSUs and business-unit financial metrics (sales, margin, working capital), historically delivering above-target payouts when operational targets are met; supports confidence that CCM leadership incentives are tied to value creation .
- Retention risk: Company-level policies (ownership requirements, one-year non-compete on equity, clawback) create retention hooks; lack of disclosed CIC terms for Taylor suggests standard future-agreement framework (double-trigger, no gross-up) if implemented, which balances retention with governance .
- Execution upside: Taylor’s deep distribution relationships and prior division leadership at Beacon align with CCM’s commercial model, potentially supporting continued margin discipline and working capital efficiency emphasized in annual incentives .