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Ernest C. Garcia III

Ernest C. Garcia III

President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman at CARVANACARVANA
CEO
Executive
Board

About Ernest C. Garcia III

Ernest C. Garcia III, age 42, is Carvana’s co-founder, President, CEO, and Chairman, serving since inception in 2012; he holds a B.S. in management science and engineering from Stanford University and previously held analytics and finance roles at DriveTime and RBS Greenwich Capital . Under his tenure, Carvana delivered record 2024 results with net income of $404M and Adjusted EBITDA of $1.378B, selling 416,348 retail units; five-year TSR was 120.9% per the proxy’s pay-versus-performance disclosure . Carvana’s revenues rose to $13.673B in 2024 from $10.771B in 2023, with Adjusted EBITDA up from $339M to $1,378M; management emphasizes profitable growth with unit expansion and GPU improvements .

Performance context202220232024
Total revenues ($USD Millions)$13,604 $10,771 $13,673
Net income ($USD Millions)$(2,894) $150 $404
Adjusted EBITDA ($USD Millions)$(1,041) $339 $1,378
Retail vehicle unit sales412,296 312,847 416,348
5-year TSR120.9%

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
DriveTimeFinancial Strategist; Managing Director of Corporate Finance; VP & Treasurer; Director of Quantitative Analytics2007–2013Built consumer credit scoring and deal structuring models underpinning retail pricing and risk analytics
RBS Greenwich CapitalAssociate, Principal Transactions Group (consumer-credit investments)2005–2006Credit investing expertise and structured finance exposure

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Not disclosed in proxy biographyNo external public-company directorships mentioned in the proxy biography

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base salary$930,000 $930,000 (voluntary temporary reduction affected early 2023 pay) $930,000
All other compensation (cell phone, etc.)$557 $712 $2,164
CEO total compensation (SCT total)$5,594,436 $6,454,661 $10,595,400

Notable practices and policies:

  • CEO pay set below market median at Garcia’s request due to significant ownership .
  • No excise tax gross-ups; no option repricing without shareholder consent; executives prohibited from hedging .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold ≥6x base salary (currently $5.58M); CEO in compliance as of proxy date .

Performance Compensation

2024 equity mix significantly increased at-risk pay and tied PSUs to operational/financial milestones. 2023 introduced PSUs tied to Adjusted EBITDA and Core Free Cash Flow that fully vested by Q1 2024 .

2024 Incentives (granted Jan 24, 2024 unless noted)Grant size (shares)Target valueVesting scheduleMetric / triggerPayout status
Stock Options97,735 at $42.03 + 37,099 at $51.97$3,420,739 target; $5,117,706 grant-date FV25% on Apr 1, 2025; then monthly over 36 months Time-basedUnvested at year-end 2024
Time-based RSUs32,578$1,140,246 target; $1,483,602 grant-date FV25% on Apr 1, 2025; then monthly over 36 months Time-basedUnvested at year-end 2024
PSUs – Adjusted EBITDA (33.3%)22,412$784,427 target; $1,020,642 grant-date FVVests upon rolling-4Q Adjusted EBITDA >$1BAchieved; vested on Q3’24 10-Q filing (Oct 30, 2024) Vested
PSUs – 600k retail units + ≥$1B Adjusted EBITDA (33.3%)22,412$784,427 target; $1,020,642 grant-date FVVests upon rolling-4Q retail units sold reaching 600k concurrently with or after EBITDA triggerNot yet vested as of proxy Unvested
PSUs – 1.0M retail units + ≥$1B Adjusted EBITDA (33.3%)22,412$784,427 target; $1,020,642 grant-date FVVests upon rolling-4Q retail units sold reaching 1.0M concurrently with or after EBITDA triggerNot yet vested as of proxy Unvested

Additional 2023 PSU outcomes:

  • 2023 Adjusted EBITDA PSUs (50%) vested on Q2’23 10-Q filing (Jul 19, 2023) .
  • 2023 Core Free Cash Flow PSUs (50%) vested on Q1’24 10-Q filing (May 1, 2024) .

Pay-for-performance governance:

  • Clawback policy adopted July 25, 2023, aligned with SEC/NYSE rules; mandates recovery for certain restatements .
  • Compensation program design: ~88.1% of NEO target comp at-risk via stock price-linked options/RSUs and PSUs on financial metrics .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ComponentDetail
Beneficial ownership – Class A3,088,984 shares (direct + trusts + vested options/RSUs), ~2% of Class A
Beneficial ownership – Class B27,666,483 shares (direct + trusts), ~35% of Class B; ~32% voting power due to 10 votes/share for Garcia Parties
Voting structureGarcia Parties entitled to 10 votes per Class B share, subject to maintaining ≥25% as-exchanged Class A ownership; all other Class B holders get 1 vote/share
Options (selected outstanding at 12/31/24)Unexercisable: 97,735 @ $42.03 exp 1/24/2034; 37,099 @ $51.97 exp 2/13/2034; plus prior series with varying strikes/expiries; Exercisable totals across series listed in proxy
RSUs outstanding (12/31/24)32,578 (2024 grant; cliff 25% 4/1/2025 then monthly); 58,070 (2023 grant); 3,476 (2022 grant); 302 (2021 grant)
PSUs outstanding (12/31/24)22,412 (600k units tranche); 22,412 (1.0M units tranche), each valued at market in table
Ownership guidelinesCEO must hold ≥6x base salary; compliance confirmed in proxy
Hedging/pledgingHedging prohibited; pledging prohibited absent adequate assurance of other assets to satisfy loans; insider trading policy detailed

Insider selling/vesting signals:

  • 2024 stock vested: Garcia III had 121,008 shares vest across RSUs/PSUs, value realized $14.56M; no option exercises reported for Garcia III in 2024 .
  • Upcoming supply: 2024 option and RSU grants begin vesting 25% on Apr 1, 2025 and monthly thereafter; PSUs could vest upon reaching rolling 600k/1.0M retail units with ≥$1B Adjusted EBITDA .

Employment Terms

TermDetails
Employment agreementNone; no severance agreements; benefits governed by award agreements under 2017 Omnibus Incentive Plan
Change-in-control (CIC)Double-trigger: if involuntary termination without cause within 24 months post-CIC, all unvested options/RSUs/PSUs fully vest; illustrative accelerated vesting value for CEO at 12/31/24: $107.33M at $203.36 stock price
Restrictive covenantsConfidentiality; non-compete 18 months; non-solicit/non-interference 12 months post-termination (Garcia III and certain NEOs)
PerquisitesMinimal; company inventory vehicle program, company phone; 401(k) match applies broadly; Garcia III “All other comp” $2,164 in 2024 (cell phone)
ClawbackEffective July 25, 2023, compliant with SEC/NYSE; recovery required for certain restatements

Board Governance

  • Role: President, CEO, and Chairman; board comprises six directors with five independent and Garcia III as management director .
  • Committees: Audit and Compensation & Nominating; independent composition; Garcia III not listed as a member; Audit chaired by Ira Platt; Compensation & Nominating chaired by Gregory Sullivan .
  • Lead Independent Director: Michael Maroone; presides executive sessions; leads agenda and oversight .
  • Controlled company: Garcia Parties hold >50% voting power; eligible for NYSE governance exemptions, though company states it does not currently rely on them .
  • Attendance/executive sessions: 2024 board met 11 times; directors attended ≥90% of meetings; independent directors meet in executive sessions at least annually .

Committee oversight and comp governance:

  • Independent consultant Korn Ferry engaged; committee affirmed consultant independence; peer group established across auto retail, marketplaces, ecommerce, travel, etc. .
  • 2024 say-on-pay passed with ~99.8% support; board recommends annual say-on-pay frequency .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Year-over-year mix: CEO equity grants increased materially in 2024 versus 2023 (options $5.12M vs. $3.47M; RSUs/PSUs $4.55M vs. $2.07M), while base salary held flat at $930k, reflecting stronger at-risk alignment to stock performance and milestones .
  • Formalized PSUs: Introduced in 2023 (Adjusted EBITDA, Core FCF) and expanded in 2024 (Adjusted EBITDA, volume milestones), sharpening pay-for-performance links and reducing discretionary bonuses (explicitly none) .
  • Governance protections: Clawback adopted; no gross-ups; prohibition on option repricing; compensation committee independence and use of external consultant; peer benchmarking disclosed .

Related-Party Transactions (DriveTime & Garcia Parties) — 2024 scale indicators

Agreement/Service2024 AmountsNotes
Lease agreements (Blue Mound, TX; Delanco, NJ; Winder, GA; Tempe office arrangements)~$1.9M (Blue Mound/Delanco) ; ~$1.5M (Winder) ; ~$0.8M (Tempe office purchased by DriveTime) Carvana pays rent, insurance, taxes; extensions/terms specified
Loan servicing (own receivables pre-sale)~$6.4M revenues to DriveTime DriveTime performs servicing/admin for Carvana-held receivables
Loan servicing (sold to third parties)~$10.4M revenues to DriveTime DriveTime services loans sold by Carvana
Master Purchase & Sale Agreement (Ally $4.0B commitment Jan 2024–Jan 2025)~$3.0B sold; ~$87.1M servicing revenues to DriveTime DriveTime as servicer; Carvana as seller
Securitization transfer agreements (7 transactions)~$3.8B principal; ~$84.5M servicing revenues to DriveTime DriveTime as servicer; Carvana as trust administrator
Finance receivable facilities (revolvers)$2.7B committed; ~$3.7M servicing revenues to DriveTime Multiple short-term facilities
VSC commissions (administered by DriveTime)~$193M commission revenue to Carvana; ~$19M warranty admin fees to DriveTime VSCs and limited warranty administration
Profit sharing (Transferred Contracts)~$7M recognized by Carvana RH & PPM profit-sharing with DriveTime
Wholesale vehicle transactions~$12.2M revenue; ~$11.3M marketplace platform revenue (DriveTime activity) Competitive auctions/platform
Retail reconditioning services$4.2M revenue; $2.7M expense Services to DriveTime via platform
Aircraft time-sharing reimbursements~$0.7M reimbursed to DriveTime Carvana reimburses actual flight expense
Tax Receivable Agreement (TRA) liability$82M total; ~$61M to related parties; ~$56M to Garcia Parties/entities expected in 2025–2026 TRA pays 85% of realized tax benefits to pre-IPO holders

Governance note: The board reviews/approves related-party transactions with disinterested directors under a formal policy assessing comparability to third-party terms .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay: ~99.8% “For”; board interprets as strong support and continues to evolve program to balance growth/profitability .
  • 2025 advisory frequency: Board recommends annual say-on-pay .
  • Stockholder proposal (simple majority vote): Board recommends “AGAINST,” citing stability of governing documents and need for broad support for fundamental changes .

Equity Ownership & Compensation Tables (multi-year, Garcia III)

Metric202220232024
Stock awards (grant-date FV)$1,318,099 $2,071,711 $4,545,530
Option awards (grant-date FV)$3,953,009 $3,470,000 $5,117,706
Shares vested (count)121,008
Value realized on vesting$14,556,493
Option exercises (count; value)—; ——; ——; —

Vesting schedule details:

  • 2024 options/RSUs: 25% on Apr 1, 2025 then monthly over 36 months .
  • 2024 PSUs: 1/3 vested on achieving rolling-4Q Adjusted EBITDA >$1B; remaining 2/3 contingent on 600k and 1.0M rolling-4Q retail units with EBITDA condition .

Employment & Contracts Matrix (alignment and retention)

ProvisionAlignment impact
No employment/severance agreementsLimits guaranteed cash commitments; equity-centric retention tied to performance and time
Double-trigger CIC accelerationRetain focus in change scenarios; creates potential near-term equity supply if triggered
Non-compete/non-solicit durationsProtects IP/talent; moderates immediate founder exit risk
ClawbackEnforces accountability for restatements; reduces incentive for aggressive accounting

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Garcia III’s large beneficial stake (including high-vote Class B) and strict ownership guidelines align incentives with long-term equity value; 2024’s heightened at-risk equity and milestone PSUs strengthen pay-for-performance ties .
  • Supply/flow: Near-term vesting (Apr 1, 2025 cliff for 2024 grants) and potential PSU vesting on volume milestones could create incremental share supply/insider settlement activity; however, Garcia III reported no option exercises in 2024 and vesting does not equal selling .
  • Governance risk: Controlled-company structure and combined Chair/CEO amplify governance concentration; material related-party flows with DriveTime and TRA payments to Garcia Parties present conflict-of-interest optics, though overseen via policies and disinterested board review .
  • Execution track record: 2024 profitability and unit rebound support vesting of EBITDA-tied PSUs; sustained unit growth toward 600k/1.0M rolling targets would further unlock performance awards, signaling confidence but also tying pay to tangible volume outcomes .
  • Shareholder sentiment: Strong say-on-pay support (~99.8%) suggests investors currently view the compensation design as aligned; continuing annual say-on-pay keeps feedback loop active .