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Edmund L. Quatmann, Jr.

Chief Legal Officer at Caesars EntertainmentCaesars Entertainment
Executive

About Edmund L. Quatmann, Jr.

Edmund L. Quatmann, Jr., 54, is Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of Caesars Entertainment (CZR), a role he has held since May 2017; he previously served as Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. (2008–2017). He holds a B.S. from Purdue University and a J.D. from St. Louis University School of Law . Company 2024 performance framing executive pay: net revenues were $11.2B vs. $11.5B in 2023, with consolidated Adjusted EBITDA down 5.1% YoY; Digital segment metrics improved, and the company refinanced ~$4.4B of debt and executed asset sales, contextualizing 2024 incentive outcomes . Compensation is tied to pay-for-performance: 2024 annual bonus was based on Adjusted EBITDA, and LTI mix was 50% RSUs/50% PSUs with PSUs 80% rTSR vs. S&P 500 and 20% three‑year Adjusted EBITDA; 2022 PSU cycle paid 71.7% of target (EBITDA component at 90.5%) . Shareholders supported the program with ~82% Say‑on‑Pay approval in 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc.Chief Legal Officer & Secretary2008–2017Led legal function through merger with Caesars; sustained public company governance and regulatory compliance .

External Roles

  • No public-company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Mr. Quatmann in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Bonus ($)Stock Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($)All Other Comp ($)Total ($)
2024800,000 4,395,346 492,000 66,702 5,754,048
2023775,000 2,094,492 796,700 110,003 3,776,195
2022775,000 131,750 1,539,047 852,500 60,951 3,359,248
  • 2024 base salary as of 12/31/2024: $800,000 (up from $775,000 in 2023; +3.2%) .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (Short-Term Incentive, 2024)

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumActual 2024Payout vs Target
Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA90% of target; $3,645,000k 100% of target; $4,050,000k 115% of target; $4,657,500k 92.3% of target; $3,739,000k 61.5%
ItemValue
2024 Target Bonus (% of salary)100%
2024 Actual Bonus ($)492,000 (61.5% of target)
  • STI structure is single financial metric (Adjusted EBITDA) with a 50%–200% payout band; 2024 achievement at 92.3% of target yielded 61.5% payout .

Long-Term Incentives (LTI)

2024 Design and Target

  • LTI mix: 50% RSUs / 50% PSUs (by value); PSUs: 80% rTSR vs S&P 500, 20% 3-year Adjusted EBITDA .
  • 2024 LTI target opportunity: 250% of base salary (split evenly between RSUs and PSUs) .
Element2024 Detail
LTI Target as % of Salary250%
RSU Target Grant Value$1,000,000
PSU Target Grant Value$1,000,000
rTSR Payout Slope35th pct = 50%; 50th = 100%; 75th = 200%; capped at 100% if 3-yr TSR negative

2024 Grants (Grant Date: Jan 26, 2024)

Award TypeShares/UnitsGrant-Date Fair Value ($)
Time-based RSUs (annual)21,877 973,308
Contract Renewal RSUs (time-based)49,505 2,202,477
PSUs – Adjusted EBITDA (target)4,375 194,644
PSUs – rTSR (target)17,502 1,024,917

Vesting and PSU Outcomes

  • Contract Renewal RSUs vest one‑third on each of the first three anniversaries of January 1, 2024 (service-based) .
  • 2022 PSU cycle overall paid 71.7% of target; EBITDA PSU paid 90.5% based on 2022–2024 actuals (2024 target $4,050m; 2023 $3,954m; 2022 $3,893m) .
  • 2024 stock vested: 14,668 shares for Mr. Quatmann; value realized $653,050 .

Forward-looking LTI Changes (2025 Awards)

  • Beginning 2025, PSUs no longer include Adjusted EBITDA; PSUs are 60% three‑year free cash flow and 40% three‑year rTSR (payout 0%–160% for FCF, with 90%/100%/120% thresholds) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines

ItemValue
Shares Beneficially Owned (Apr 1, 2025)75,520; <1% of outstanding (212,145,588 shares)
Executive Ownership GuidelineOther Executive Officers: 2x base salary
Compliance Status (as of 12/31/2024)Each NEO met guidelines
Hedging/Short Sales/Options PolicyHedging prohibited; no short sales; no exchange‑traded options; pre‑clearance required
PledgingNo pledge disclosed for Mr. Quatmann; pledges disclosed for others (e.g., Anthony L. Carano: 72,800 shares)

Selected Outstanding Equity Awards at 12/31/2024 (Unvested/Unearned)

Award (Grant/Type)UnitsMarket/Payout Value ($)
PSUs (1/28/2022; rTSR tranche, threshold basis)3,018 100,862
PSUs (1/28/2022; EBITDA, at 90.5% of target)2,940 98,255
RSUs (1/28/2022; remaining time-based)3,095 103,435
PSUs (2023 grants; tranche A)5,465 182,640
PSUs (2023 grants; tranche B)5,179 173,082
RSUs (2023 time-based)11,210 374,638
PSUs (2024 rTSR)8,751 292,458
PSUs (2024 EBITDA)3,806 127,197
RSUs (2024 time-based, annual)21,877 731,129
RSUs (2024 Contract Renewal)49,505 1,654,457
  • No stock options outstanding or exercised by NEOs in 2024; equity is RSU/PSU-based .
  • Deferred compensation balance for Mr. Quatmann at 12/31/2024: $1,889,942; 2024 contributions $282,185; 2024 earnings $130,989 .

Employment Terms

Key Agreement Terms (Amended effective Jan 1, 2024)

  • Term through Jan 1, 2027 with automatic one‑year renewals; CIC extends term by an additional two years from CIC date .
  • Severance (other than CEO): 1.0x (salary + target bonus) for termination without cause/for good reason; 2.0x if within two years after CIC; pro‑rated bonus (actual) or target after CIC; 12 months health benefits (18 months after CIC); outplacement up to $10k .
  • Restrictive covenants: 12‑month post‑termination non‑compete and non‑solicit; perpetual confidentiality .
  • Double-trigger change-in-control features are embedded in program design .

Potential Payments if Triggered on 12/31/2024 (Illustrative, per proxy methodology)

ScenarioCash Severance ($)Other Benefits ($)RSUs/PSUs ($)
Involuntary termination without cause or for good reason2,092,000 31,291 1,542,901
Death800,000 3,682,282
Disability800,000 21,291 3,682,282
Change in Control (no termination)4,336,446
Termination without cause/for good reason following a CIC4,000,000 31,937 4,336,446

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash/equity mix: Significant tilt to equity via RSUs/PSUs; 2024 LTI target increased to 250% of salary for Mr. Quatmann (from 200% in 2023), enhancing long-term alignment but also increasing unvested equity overhang .
  • Metric design evolution: 2024 PSUs are 80% rTSR/20% EBITDA; 2025 PSUs pivot to 60% FCF/40% rTSR, reducing overlap with EBITDA-driven STI and sharpening focus on cash generation/deleveraging .
  • STI rigor/outcome: 2024 EBITDA at 92.3% of target paid 61.5% of target bonus, demonstrating downside sensitivity to underperformance .
  • Governance features: Double-trigger CIC, clawback policy, robust ownership guidelines; no excise tax gross‑ups or option repricings .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval ~82%; the company responded to prior feedback by reducing metric overlap (removing EBITDA from 2025 PSUs, adding FCF) .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Legal/regulatory leader with ~17 years as public-company CLO across gaming (Isle of Capri 2008–2017; Caesars since 2017); B.S. Purdue; J.D. St. Louis University; responsibilities include legal, governance and secretary functions .

Work History & Career Trajectory

OrganizationRoleTenureNotes
Caesars EntertainmentEVP, Chief Legal Officer & Secretary2017–PresentExecutive officer; secretary; integral to compensation, risk and governance processes .
Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc.Chief Legal Officer & Secretary2008–2017Led legal through to merger with Caesars .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Details

  • Meets 2x salary ownership guideline; all NEOs in compliance as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Anti‑hedging/short sale policy in effect; no pledging disclosed for Mr. Quatmann (pledging by others noted separately) .
  • 2024 vesting delivered 14,668 shares ($653,050 value), indicating scheduled equity flow but no Form 4 sale data in proxy; NEOs exercised no options in 2024 .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity component (RSUs/PSUs), ownership guideline compliance, and anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging posture support alignment with shareholders; absence of options reduces leverage risk .
  • Retention risk and vesting overhang: Multi‑year Contract Renewal RSUs (49,505 units) vest ratably through 2027, plus sizeable 2023–2024 RSUs/PSUs, provide retention hooks but can create periodic supply from tax withholdings/settlements; no pledging by Mr. Quatmann mitigates forced‑sale risk .
  • Pay-for-performance integrity: 2024 STI paid 61.5% amid EBITDA under‑target; 2022–2024 PSU outcome at 71.7% underscores symmetric outcomes; 2025 PSU shift to FCF could tighten cash discipline and deleveraging focus—key for equity value given balance sheet priorities .
  • Change‑in‑control economics: Double-trigger; 2.0x cash (non‑CEO) and equity acceleration present manageable parachute levels (no excise tax gross‑ups), limiting shareholder dilution risk while ensuring continuity .