Ted Papapostolou
About Ted Papapostolou
Independent director of Caesars Entertainment (CZR) since March 2025, appointed under a Director Nomination Agreement with the Icahn Group. He is CFO and a director of Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP), with prior service as Chief Accounting Officer and progressive accounting roles, and began his career in Grant Thornton’s audit practice. Education: MBA, St. John’s University (Peter J. Tobin College of Business); BBA, Hofstra University (Frank G. Zarb School of Business). Age not disclosed in CZR’s proxy; tenure on CZR’s board began March 2025 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Icahn Enterprises L.P. | Chief Accounting Officer | Apr 2020–Dec 2023 | Led public company accounting; progressed from internal accounting roles dating to 2007 |
| Icahn Enterprises L.P. | Progressive Accounting Positions | Mar 2007–Mar 2020 | Built finance/accounting expertise across businesses |
| Grant Thornton LLP | Audit Practice | Prior to 2007 | External audit foundation |
| CVR Energy, Inc. | Director and Chairman | Mar 2023–Mar 2025 | Oversight of energy refining and nitrogen manufacturing businesses |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Icahn Enterprises L.P. (NASDAQ: IEP) | Chief Financial Officer; Director; Secretary | CFO since Nov 2021; Director since Dec 2021; Secretary since Apr 2020 | Corporate finance leadership and board oversight across diversified holdings |
| Viskase Companies, Inc. | Director; Chairman | Director since Apr 2020; Chairman since Mar 2023 | Governance oversight in global food packaging |
Board Governance
- Independence: Board determined all current directors except the Executive Chairman (Gary L. Carano) and CEO (Thomas R. Reeg) are independent; Papapostolou is independent under Nasdaq standards .
- Committee assignments: As of the 2025 proxy, not appointed to any standing board committees (Audit, Compensation, CSR, Nominating & Corporate Governance); committee matrix confirms none .
- Appointment context: Added in March 2025 via Director Nomination Agreement with the Icahn Group; the agreement nominates him for the 2025 Annual Meeting and includes standstill and voting commitments .
- Attendance and engagement: In 2024, all incumbent directors (pre-March 2025 appointees) attended 100% of Board and committee meetings; independent directors met in executive session at four regularly scheduled in-person board meetings. Papapostolou joined in 2025; 2024 attendance metrics do not cover him .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Annual Amount ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Annual Retainer (non-employee directors) | 100,000 | Cash retainer |
| Vice Chair Retainer | 100,000 | Applies to Vice Chair (not Papapostolou) |
| Lead Independent Director Retainer | 50,000 | Applies to Lead Independent Director (not Papapostolou) |
| Committee Service – Audit | 20,000 | Per member |
| Committee Service – Compensation | 15,000 | Per member |
| Committee Service – CSR | 15,000 | Per member |
| Committee Service – Nominating & Corporate Governance | 10,000 | Per member |
| Committee Chair – Audit | 40,000 | Not applicable to Papapostolou |
| Committee Chair – Compensation | 30,000 | Not applicable to Papapostolou |
| Committee Chair – CSR | 30,000 | Not applicable to Papapostolou |
| Committee Chair – Nominating & Corporate Governance | 20,000 | Not applicable to Papapostolou |
- Proration: New directors receive a prorated annual equity grant based on appointment date and expected service remainder of the year .
Performance Compensation
| Equity Type | Grant Practice | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (annual grant) | $250,000 grant value, sized using prior 20-day avg price | Fully vested on grant date; settlement per director election (defer option available) | None (time-based only; no TSR/financial metrics for directors) |
Other Directorships & Interlocks
- Current Boards: IEP (director), Viskase (director, chairman) .
- Recent Board: CVR Energy (director, chairman) until March 2025 .
- Icahn Group Agreement: Two designees (Jesse Lynn and Ted Papapostolou) appointed under the March 17, 2025 agreement; Icahn Group agreed not to conduct a proxy contest for the 2025 Annual Meeting .
- Resignation thresholds tied to Icahn Group ownership: If holdings fall below ~10.55M shares, one designee must resign; below ~5.28M shares, both designees must resign; standstill prohibits the Icahn Group from acquiring ≥5% during the standstill period (absent company breach) .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Corporate finance and accounting leadership (CFO of IEP; prior Chief Accounting Officer) .
- Public company governance credentials (IEP director, Viskase chairman; prior CVR Energy chairman) .
- Audit discipline foundation (Grant Thornton audit practice) .
- Selected by CZR pursuant to the Icahn Group nomination agreement due to finance/accounting expertise and leadership experience .
Equity Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | % of Shares Outstanding | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ted Papapostolou | 6,126 | <1% | As of April 1, 2025; CZR outstanding shares 212,145,588 |
- Director stock ownership guideline: Non-employee directors must hold CZR shares equal to 5x annual cash retainer; five years allowed to reach compliance. As of Dec 31, 2024, all non-employee directors met guidelines, but Papapostolou joined in 2025 (compliance timeline applies prospectively) .
Governance Assessment
- Strengths: Independent status; deep finance/accounting background; public company chair experience; addition under a structured nomination agreement with standstill and resignation triggers adds clarity to influence and mitigates prolonged contest risk .
- Risks/RED FLAGS:
- Icahn affiliation/interlock: As IEP CFO and an Icahn Group designee, potential for activist-driven agendas; mitigated by standstill (no ≥5% accumulation) and ownership-based resignation thresholds .
- Limited committee engagement to date: No committee assignments as of the proxy, reducing near-term influence on audit/compensation processes; committee roles may evolve post-appointment .
- Board effectiveness signals: 2024 attendance was 100% among incumbents; robust independent director executive sessions; structured committee oversight of risk, including cybersecurity and gaming compliance .
- Shareholder sentiment: 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~82% suggests acceptable pay governance baseline; Compensation Committee reduced metric overlap and moved to FCF in 2025 PSUs for executives, reflecting responsiveness to investor feedback (context for overall board governance quality) .
Insider Trades
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Latest CZR Form 4 activity (Papapostolou) | Not disclosed in the 2025 proxy; Section 16 note references one late Form 4 for Courtney Mather due to administrative error; no late filings mentioned for Papapostolou . |
Notes on Related Party Transactions (context)
- Related party transaction policy: Audit Committee review/approval required; conflicts assessed per Code and charter .
- Disclosed board-related leases: Certain sportsbook space leases with casinos co-owned by director Michael Pegram and Carano family; board concluded independence remains unimpaired for Pegram given small economic magnitude. No related party transactions disclosed involving Papapostolou .
Appointment Agreement Terms (detail)
| Provision | Summary |
|---|---|
| Appointment & nomination | Icahn designees (Lynn, Papapostolou) appointed Mar 17, 2025 and nominated for the 2025 Annual Meeting . |
| Standstill | Icahn Group will not acquire ≥5% of CZR common stock during the standstill period (subject to carve-outs); no proxy contest for 2025 . |
| Ownership thresholds | If collective holdings drop below ~10.55M shares, one designee must resign; below ~5.28M, both must resign . |
| Committees | As of proxy date, designees not appointed to any board committees . |
Overall, Papapostolou brings strong finance/accounting governance expertise and activist-aligned oversight experience. His independence, low direct CZR ownership, and current absence from committees temper near‑term influence, while the Icahn agreement’s standstill and resignation mechanics partially mitigate conflict and contest risks for investors evaluating board effectiveness .