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Thomas R. Reeg

Thomas R. Reeg

Chief Executive Officer at Caesars EntertainmentCaesars Entertainment
CEO
Executive
Board

About Thomas R. Reeg

Thomas R. Reeg is Chief Executive Officer of Caesars Entertainment (CZR) and a director since July 2020; he has been CEO since January 2019, previously serving as President (2014–2018) and CFO (2016–2019) at Eldorado/Caesars following earlier roles in high-yield portfolio management at AIG and credit research at Bank One covering gaming/lodging sectors . Age: 53 . 2024 operating scorecard: Net Revenues $11.2B vs. $11.5B in 2023; Adjusted EBITDA down 5.1% YoY; Digital segment revenue/margin improved; balance sheet de-risking via $2.9B term loan and $1.5B notes, extending maturities to 2027; asset sales (WSOP $500M, LINQ Promenade $275M) reduced debt . On long-term equity, 2022 PSUs paid 71.7% overall; the 2022 three-year rTSR ranked ~3rd percentile (below threshold) but was certified at 61.5% to recognize strategic execution; the 2022 stock-price hurdle award paid 0 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Caesars/EldoradoChief Executive Officer; DirectorCEO since Jan 2019; Director since Jul 2020Led integration/portfolio optimization; deleveraging and refinancing; Digital expansion
Eldorado ResortsPresident; CFO; SVP Strategic DevelopmentPresident 2014–2018; CFO 2016–2019; SVP 2011–2014Led M&A/scale-up phase pre-Caesars merger
AIG Global Investment GroupManaging Director & Portfolio Manager (High Yield)2002–2005Co-managed HY mutual fund portfolios
Bank One Capital MarketsSenior High-Yield Research AnalystPre-2002Covered casino, lodging and leisure sectors—deep domain expertise

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Recreational Enterprises, Inc. (REI)Vice President; DirectorCurrentREI is a <5% CZR shareholder; Reeg disclaims beneficial ownership of REI’s CZR shares
Autocam CorporationDirector2007–2010Prior public board experience
NGA HoldCo, LLCBoard of Managers2007–2011Prior investment vehicle board

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Base Salary ($)2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
Target Annual Bonus (% of salary)200% 200% 200%
LTI Target (% of salary)450% (CEO prior policy) 450% 475%

Notes:

  • 2024 LTI mix: 50% RSUs (3-yr ratable vest) and 50% PSUs (80% rTSR vs S&P 500; 20% Adjusted EBITDA; 3-year) .
  • 2024 contract renewal RSUs: 70,126, vest in three equal installments on each of the first three anniversaries of Jan 1, 2024 .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual Incentive (STI) structure and 2024 outcome:
    • Metric: Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA; threshold 90% pays 50%; target 100% pays 100%; max 115% pays 200% .
    • 2024 Actual: 92.3% of target; payout 61.5% of target; CEO bonus earned $2,460,000 .
2024 STI (Adjusted EBITDA)ThresholdTargetMaximumActual
Performance requirement90% of target 100% 115% 92.3%
Consolidated Adj. EBITDA ($000s)3,645,000 4,050,000 4,657,500 3,739,000
Payout (% of target)50.0% 100.0% 200.0% 61.5%
  • Long-Term Incentive (LTI) design and context:
    • 2024 PSUs: 80% rTSR vs S&P 500 and 20% Adjusted EBITDA; payout curve: 35th pct=50%, 50th=100%, 75th=200%; negative TSR cap at 100% .
    • 2022 PSU vesting: averaged 98.1% vs EBITDA targets (payout 90.5%) and rTSR ranked 3rd percentile (below threshold) but certified at 61.5% recognizing strategic actions; overall 71.7% payout .
    • 2022 CEO Hurdle Award: performance RSUs with $125/$150/$175 stock price hurdles—no vesting; value zero at Feb 2025 end .
    • 2025 change: remove EBITDA from PSUs; new mix 50% RSUs, 50% PSUs with 60% free cash flow (annual targets, 0–160% payout) and 40% rTSR vs industry peer set .
2024 LTI Grant Detail (Target Values)RSU Target ($)PSU Target ($)PSU Metrics/WeightsVesting
CEO (475% of salary)4,750,000 4,750,000 rTSR 80%, Adj. EBITDA 20% RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; PSUs over 3-year performance then service vesting as applicable

Multi‑Year Summary Compensation (Total Reported)

Metric ($)202220232024
Salary2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
Stock Awards (RSUs/PSUs grant-date fair value)24,616,624 12,161,765 13,535,975
Non‑Equity Incentive (STI)4,400,000 4,112,000 2,460,000
All Other Compensation333,296 336,594 375,959
Total31,349,920 18,610,359 18,371,934

Perquisites detail (2024): Personal aircraft incremental cost $297,221; residential security $60,184; other insured benefits and 401(k) match included .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Stock ownership policy: CEO must hold 5x base salary; all NEOs met guidelines as of 12/31/24 .
  • Beneficial ownership (Record Date 4/14/2025): 554,375 CZR shares (<1%); comprised of 307,716 via family LLC, 240,419 in a revocable trust, and 6,240 in 401(k) .
  • Pledging/hedging: Hedging prohibited by policy; no pledge disclosed for Mr. Reeg; pledges disclosed for other insiders (e.g., Caranos) in footnotes .
  • Potential selling pressure (vesting overhang):
    • Time‑based RSUs: 103,916 from 1/26/2024 grant outstanding at 12/31/24 (3‑yr ratable vest) .
    • Contract Renewal RSUs: 70,126, vest 1/1/2025–1/1/2027 in equal thirds .
    • PSUs: multiple unearned tranches outstanding at 12/31/24 (e.g., rTSR and EBITDA PSUs; the 2022 hurdle tranches 50k/75k/100k subsequently forfeited in Feb 2025) .
Outstanding Equity (as of 12/31/2024)Units (#)Status/Type
RSUs (various 2021–2023 grants)17,522; 17,077; 17,972 Unvested RSUs
2022 Hurdle Award tranches50,000; 75,000; 100,000 Unearned at 12/31/24; forfeited 2/2025
2023–2024 PSUs (examples)31,732; 30,072; 41,566; 18,081 Unearned PSUs (rTSR/EBITDA)
2024 Annual RSUs103,916 Time‑based RSUs (3‑yr)
2024 Contract Renewal RSUs70,126 Time‑based RSUs (3‑yr)

Employment Terms

  • Contract term: Amended and restated effective Jan 1, 2024; runs to Jan 1, 2027 with automatic one‑year renewals; change‑in‑control (CIC) extends term two years from CIC date .
  • Severance (no‑cause or good reason): 1.0x (base + target bonus), pro‑rated actual bonus, 12 months health, 12 months outplacement (≤$10k) .
  • CIC double trigger: 2.99x (base + target bonus), pro‑rated target bonus, 24 months health, 12 months outplacement (≤$10k) .
  • Potential payouts table (as of 12/31/2024 scenario): Cash severance $8.46M no‑cause/good‑reason; $21.94M post‑CIC; equity acceleration values as disclosed; benefits continuation amounts itemized .

Board Governance & Service

  • Role: Director since July 2020; management director; not independent under Nasdaq due to executive status .
  • Committees: None .
  • Board structure: Executive Chairman (Gary L. Carano); CEO (Reeg); independent Lead Director (David P. Tomick); Vice Chair (Don R. Kornstein). Each standing committee comprised solely of independent directors .
  • Attendance/executive sessions: 100% attendance by incumbents in 2024; independent directors met in executive sessions at each of four in‑person meetings .
  • Director compensation: Employee directors (incl. CEO) receive no board fees; non‑employee program includes $100k cash retainer, committee fees, and $250k equity grant for 2024 .
  • Dual‑role/independence notes: Board disclosed Reeg and certain directors invested together in a start‑up (disclosed and assessed for independence); Reeg and Executive Chairman also serve as officers/directors of REI (a <5% shareholder) without REI comp committee .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee: Independent directors (Kornstein—Chair; Mather; Pegram) .
  • Consultant: Aon engaged; $150k in 2024 for executive comp advisory; separate corporate services ($4.7M) assessed; committee determined independence and no conflicts .
  • Peer group used for pay benchmarking (unchanged 2024): Boyd, Carnival, Hilton, Hyatt, Las Vegas Sands, Marriott, MGM, Norwegian, Penn Entertainment, Royal Caribbean, Wynn .
  • Say‑on‑pay: 82% approval at 2024 annual meeting; in response to feedback, 2025 PSUs replaced EBITDA with free cash flow to reduce metric overlap .

Related‑Party and Risk Indicators

  • Related‑party: Company leases space from casinos owned by director Pegram (Board determined immaterial to his independence); Reeg joint start‑up investment disclosed with Pegram and Tomick .
  • Clawback and trading policies: Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback; strict insider‑trading and anti‑hedging policies; equity grant timing controls .
  • Perquisites optics: CEO personal aircraft use incremental cost $297,221 (2024); residential security program instituted for executives .

Investment Implications

  • Pay alignment: High at‑risk mix (approx. 87% for CEO) with multi‑year PSU structure tied primarily to rTSR (and now FCF) links outcomes to shareholder returns and cash generation; the zero‑paying 2022 hurdle award and below‑target 2024 STI underscore rigor, though the discretionary 61.5% rTSR certification for 2022 introduces some subjectivity .
  • Overhang/flow: Material RSU vests from 2024 annual (103,916) and contract renewal (70,126) awards over 2025–2027 could create periodic selling pressure; absence of disclosed pledging by Reeg reduces alignment risk relative to certain peers/insiders .
  • Retention/CIC: Moderate severance (1.0x) and market CIC multiple (2.99x) with double trigger and healthcare/outplacement support; auto‑renewing term to 2027 enhances retention but limits turnover option value without cost .
  • Execution track: 2024 fundamentals softened (EBITDA −5.1%), but debt maturity extension and asset sales improved resilience; Digital momentum is a positive lever under Reeg’s oversight; LTI pivot to FCF in 2025 better aligns with deleveraging/owner priorities .

Overall: Reeg’s package is heavily performance‑weighted with clear vesting schedules and robust ownership requirements. Watch rTSR/FCF PSU attainment versus revised metrics, quarterly RSU vest cadence (liquidity), and any further discretionary adjustments to PSU outcomes. A clean pledging profile and strict hedging prohibition support alignment, while related‑party disclosures are acknowledged and monitored by the Board .