Joseph Korngiebel
About Joseph Korngiebel
Joseph Korngiebel, age 54, is Executive Vice President, Chief Strategy, Product, and Technology Officer at Dayforce, Inc., serving in this role since September 2024 after four years as EVP, Chief Product and Technology Officer (July 2020–September 2024). Prior to Dayforce, he held various roles at Workday, Inc., including Chief Technology Officer (May 2017–July 2020) . During 2024 under the executive team’s leadership, Dayforce delivered $1.8B total revenue (+16% YoY), 98% gross revenue retention, $281.1M operating cash flow (+28%), and $171.5M free cash flow (+63% YoY), while unveiling product innovations such as Dayforce Flex Work and Dayforce AI agents . Company TSR (value of a fixed $100 investment) stood at 107 in 2024; Cloud revenue reached $1,677M (constant currency) and net income was $46M for 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dayforce, Inc. | EVP, Chief Strategy, Product, and Technology Officer | Sep 2024–present | Guides development of new/existing products and long-term strategic vision . |
| Dayforce, Inc. | EVP, Chief Product and Technology Officer | Jul 2020–Sep 2024 | Led product and technology; tenure coincided with rebrand to Dayforce, and launches including Flex Work and AI agents . |
| Workday, Inc. | Chief Technology Officer; prior roles since 2006 | CTO: May 2017–Jul 2020 | Senior technology leadership at a leading enterprise cloud applications provider . |
External Roles
No current public company board service or disclosed external directorships for Korngiebel in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 650,000 | No base salary raise in 2024; Annual STI target increased October 2024 due to promotion . |
| 2023 | 650,000 | |
| 2022 | 650,000 |
| Component | Amount ($) | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (2024) | 278,168 | MIP payout; overall MIP achieved 85.59% . |
| All Other Compensation (2024) | 10,350 | Retirement plan contribution; perqs < $10,000 . |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentives – Management Incentive Plan (MIP, 2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Goal | Max | Actual | Payout earned (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud Recurring Revenue, ex. Float (constant currency) | Equal-weighted | $1,217.3M | $1,248.5M | $1,279.7M | $1,235.7M | Company total payout 85.59% |
| Adjusted EBITDA, ex. Float (constant currency) | Equal-weighted | $299.4M | $315.2M | $331.0M | $309.4M | Company total payout 85.59% |
| Sales PEPM ACV (constant currency) | Equal-weighted | Not disclosed (competitive sensitivity) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Company total payout 85.59% |
- Korngiebel’s Annual STI target increased from 60% to 80% of base salary in October 2024 due to promotion; incremental adjustment paid 100% in cash .
Short-Term Incentives – fPSU (Cost Savings, 2024 one-year)
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost savings initiative (headcount and non-headcount) | $24M (90%) | $26M (100%) | $29M (110%) | >$30M achieved (~2% of pre-tax expenses excl. stock comp) | 110% |
Long-Term Incentives – Financial PSUs (LTI fPSUs, 2024 tranche performance)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Goal | Max | Actual | Payout earned (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dayforce Recurring Revenue, ex. Float YoY growth | Equal-weighted | 17% | 20% | 23% | 19.4% | Company total payout 97.7% |
| Adjusted Operating Profit, ex. Float YoY growth | Equal-weighted | 20% | 30% | 40% | 25.6% | Company total payout 97.7% |
| Sales PEPM ACV YoY growth | Equal-weighted | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Company total payout 97.7% |
Long-Term Incentives – Market PSUs (mPSUs, 3-year, granted 2024)
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Relative TSR vs S&P 1500 Application Software Index (Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026); cliff vest at 3 years | 50% payout at 25th percentile; 100% at 50th; 150% at 75th; 200% at 90th; certification expected 2027 . |
Plan-Based Awards Granted to Korngiebel in 2024
| Award | Grant date | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Max (#) | Grant date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MIP – Cash | — | 32,565 | 195,000 | 325,650 | — |
| MIP – PSUs | 3/1/2024 | 525 | 3,143 | 5,249 | 214,510 |
| STI – PSUs (cost savings) | 3/1/2024 | 9,890 | 10,989 | 12,088 | 749,999 |
| LTI – fPSUs | 3/1/2024 | 6,117 | 36,630 | 61,172 | 2,499,998 |
| LTI – mPSUs | 3/1/2024 | 1,832 | 3,663 | 7,326 | 326,483 |
| RSUs (annual LTI) | 3/1/2024 | — | 36,630 | — | 2,499,998 |
| RSUs (promotion grant) | 11/1/2024 | — | 13,292 | — | 999,957 |
2025 Program Direction (for forward alignment)
- Committee expects to add Free Cash Flow Margin to MIP and Free Cash Flow CAGR to LTI; fPSU financial metrics move to a single three-year performance period with annual vesting against three-year metrics .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares | % of total |
|---|---|---|
| Joseph Korngiebel | 125,062 | <1% (disclosed as less than 1%) |
| Shares outstanding reference | 160,216,283 (incl. exchangeable shares) | — |
Outstanding and Unvested Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Award type | Grant date | Unvested units (#) | Market value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| STI – PSUs (MIP) | 3/1/2024 | 3,143 | 228,308 (at $72.64) |
| STI – PSUs (cost savings) | 3/1/2024 | 10,989 | 798,241 (at $72.64) |
| LTI – fPSUs | 3/1/2024 | 36,630 | 2,660,803 (at $72.64) |
| RSUs (annual LTI) | 3/1/2024 | 36,630 | 2,660,803 (at $72.64) |
| LTI – mPSUs | 3/1/2024 | 3,663 | 266,080 (at $72.64) |
| RSUs (promotion grant) | 11/1/2024 | 13,292 | 965,531 (at $72.64) |
| LTI – fPSUs | 2/28/2023 | 18,282 | 1,328,004 (at $72.64) |
| RSUs | 2/28/2023 | 18,282 | 1,328,004 (at $72.64) |
| LTI – mPSUs | 2/28/2023 | 8,227 | 597,609 (at $72.64) |
| PSUs | 2/24/2022 | 5,880 | 427,123 (at $72.64) |
| RSUs | 2/24/2022 | 7,059 | 512,766 (at $72.64) |
- Vesting results certified March 1, 2025: STI MIP PSUs vested at 85.59% (2,690 units); STI cost savings PSUs vested at 110% (12,088 units); LTI fPSUs vested first tranche at 11,929 units; 2023 LTI fPSUs vested 8,428 units .
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for executive officers; 75% after-tax share retention until compliant; all NEOs met or are complying with retention requirements as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Hedging and pledging: Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy; no exceptions granted in 2024; margin accounts/pledging disallowed .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement date | July 2020 (EVP, Chief Strategy, Product, and Technology Officer) . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Agreements include perpetual confidentiality, assignment of inventions, non-disparagement; non-compete durations disclosed for certain NEOs, but not specifically for Korngiebel in proxy . |
| Clawback | Compensation Recovery Policy applicable to incentive comp after material accounting restatement; additional recovery provisions in 2018 EIP; publicly filed with 10-K . |
| Ownership/retention | Executive ownership guidelines (3x salary); retention requirements as noted above . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited; trading windows and blackout periods enforced . |
Severance and Change-of-Control Economics (Estimated at 12/31/2024)
| Triggering event | Severance payment ($) | Health/Life ($) | Outplacement ($) | Accelerated equity vesting ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in control without termination | — | — | — | 11,773,273 | 11,773,273 |
| Termination without cause, after change in control | 1,430,000 | 12,044 | 10,000 | 11,773,273 | 13,225,317 |
| Termination without cause, no change in control | 1,430,000 | 12,044 | 10,000 | 6,965,111 | 8,417,155 |
| Termination due to death | 390,000 | — | — | 11,773,273 | 12,163,273 |
| Termination due to disability | 390,000 | — | — | — | 390,000 |
- Formula: 12 months base salary + STI at target + pro-rata MIP at target; double-trigger acceleration applies post-change-in-control for awards granted on/after March 8, 2021; RSUs and PSUs accelerate under specified conditions .
Performance Compensation Details (Korngiebel multi-year summary)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock awards ($) | Non-equity incentive ($) | All other comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 650,000 | 7,290,945 | 278,168 | 10,350 | 8,229,463 |
| 2023 | 650,000 | 4,814,474 | 157,034 | 9,900 | 5,631,408 |
| 2022 | 650,000 | 3,944,948 | 162,435 | 9,150 | 4,766,533 |
Director/Committee Governance Signals
- Compensation Committee: independent, uses external consultant; double-trigger equity acceleration; clawback; no hedging/pledging; no tax gross-ups; majority of NEO pay at risk .
- Say-on-Pay: 91.4% approval at 2024 annual meeting; program iterations reflect shareholder feedback (e.g., 2025 metric changes, three-year fPSU period) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Non-GAAP metric reliance in incentive plans (constant currency and ex-float adjustments); disclosure omits targets for Sales PEPM ACV due to competitive sensitivity, reducing external transparency of payout calibration .
- Off-cycle promotion RSU grants ($1.0M for Korngiebel) increase equity overhang but are positioned between 50th–75th percentile peer benchmarks; STI target increased to market median+ post-promotion .
- Strong policy controls: clawback, double-trigger, no hedging/pledging, and ownership guidelines mitigate alignment risks .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance-based equity (fPSUs/mPSUs) and stringent ownership/retention rules align Korngiebel’s incentives with recurring revenue growth, margin expansion, and relative TSR; 2025 shift toward FCF metrics should further strengthen cash discipline .
- Retention risk: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs and promotion-linked grants suggest strong retention hooks; double-trigger protections and sizeable accelerated vesting in change-of-control scenarios reduce flight risk, but elevate M&A-related payout sensitivity ($11.8M equity acceleration for Korngiebel) .
- Trading signals: Annual vesting cycles (e.g., March 1) and blackout windows under Insider Trading Policy shape potential selling pressure; 2024 vesting resulted in acquired shares (no pledging allowed), but actual disposition would depend on 10b5‑1 plans and windows .
- Pay-for-performance calibration: 2024 payouts at 85.59% (MIP) and 97.7% (LTI fPSU) indicate above-threshold, near-target execution against growth and profitability metrics; lack of disclosed Sales PEPM ACV targets warrants monitoring of payout rigor .