Albert McCoy Jr.
About Albert E. McCoy, Jr.
Independent director of Dime Community Bancshares, Inc. since 2008; age 61. Owner/manager of Phase 2 Holding Corp. and Phase 2 Building Corp., overseeing commercial and residential real estate portfolios; brings local market and community knowledge to the board. Board determined he is independent under Nasdaq standards; all directors attended the 2024 annual meeting; Board met 10 times in 2024 and he serves on the Audit Committee (not chair) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dime Community Bancshares, Inc. | Director | 2008–present | Audit Committee member; committee met 4 times in 2024; oversees auditor selection, financial reporting integrity, and internal audit |
| Dime Community Bank (subsidiary) | Director | Concurrent with DCOM board | Company maintains Compliance Risk, Enterprise Risk, Executive Committees; bank has Credit Risk Committee (membership not disclosed for McCoy) |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 2 Holding Corp. | Owner and Manager | Not disclosed | Real estate portfolio management |
| Phase 2 Building Corp. | Owner and Manager | Not disclosed | Real estate portfolio management |
Board Governance
- Independence: Board determined all directors except the CEO (Stuart Lubow) are independent; McCoy is independent .
- Committee assignments: Audit Committee (Kevin Stein, Chair; members McCoy and Joseph J. Perry). McCoy is not designated an “Audit Committee Financial Expert” (Stein and Perry are) .
- Board/meeting cadence: Board met 10 times in 2024; Audit Committee met 4 times in 2024 .
- Attendance: All directors attended the May 23, 2024 annual meeting .
- Governance controls: Independent Chair; separate Chair/CEO; board committees comprised solely of independent directors; majority vote standard in uncontested elections; ownership guidelines for directors and NEOs; right to retain independent advisors .
- Related-party transaction oversight: Corporate Governance Committee reviews and approves all related-party transactions .
Fixed Compensation (Director)
| Element | 2024 Amount | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Annual non‑employee director retainer | $130,000 | Paid 55% in cash and 45% in common stock; no meeting fees; program largely unchanged since 2021 (some chair retainer eliminations noted) |
| Fees earned or paid in cash (McCoy) | $71,500 | Part of $130,000 retainer; no DSPP participation disclosed for McCoy (only Germano and Perry participated) |
| Stock awards (McCoy) | $58,500 | Time‑vested restricted stock; value corresponds to 2,227 shares granted Jan 1, 2024 (FASB ASC 718) |
| Total (McCoy) | $130,000 | Sum of cash and stock components |
| Chair fees (reference) | $25,000/$15,000 | Audit/Comp/Enterprise Risk chair: $25,000; Corporate Governance chair: $15,000; McCoy is not a chair |
Performance Compensation (Director)
Directors do not have performance‑linked compensation; equity is time‑vested RSAs designed to align interests. 2024 grants vest one year after grant; no options or PSUs for directors.
| Stock Award | Grant Date | Shares | Grant-Date Fair Value | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSA (McCoy) | Jan 1, 2024 | 2,227 | $58,500 | One‑year vest per director program |
The Company’s Directors’ Stock Purchase Program allows electing to receive retainers in stock (converted at closing price on payment date); only Germano and Perry elected in 2024 .
Other Directorships & Interlocks
| Company | Role | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | McCoy’s biography lists his private real estate companies; no other public company directorships disclosed . |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Real estate ownership/operations in the Company’s local markets; community ties regarded as additive to board oversight .
- Independent director; service continuity since 2008 provides institutional knowledge .
- Audit Committee experience (financial reporting, auditor oversight), though not designated a financial expert .
Equity Ownership
| Ownership Item | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Common shares beneficially owned (McCoy) | 207,325 | Includes 1,848 time‑vested restricted shares over which he has voting power; less than 1% of outstanding shares |
| Preferred shares | Not disclosed | McCoy not listed among directors with preferred holdings |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited | Company policy prohibits pledging or hedging of Company securities |
| Ownership guidelines | 5x annual cash retainer (directors) | Company disclosed all directors/NEOs were compliant or within five‑year period to achieve compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 |
Governance Assessment
-
Strengths
- Independence and committee engagement: McCoy is independent and serves on the Audit Committee; board structure includes independent chair and fully independent standing committees .
- Alignment: Director pay mix includes equity (45%) and stock ownership guidelines at 5x cash retainer; anti‑hedging/pledging policies enhance alignment .
- Attendance and cadence: All directors attended the 2024 annual meeting; Board/Audit met regularly (10 board meetings; 4 audit) .
- Shareholder sentiment: 2024 say‑on‑pay approval at 81%, signaling general support for executive pay governance framework .
-
Watch items / potential conflicts
- Related‑party exposure: Company disclosed two residential mortgage loans to two directors and one commercial real estate loan to an entity controlled by a director, all on market terms and overseen per policy; the specific director for the CRE loan is not named, representing a modest conflict‑risk signal to monitor .
- Financial expertise: McCoy is not designated an “Audit Committee Financial Expert”; while acceptable under rules, audit committee efficacy often benefits from multiple designated experts .
- Disclosure granularity: Individual director committee attendance rates and detailed engagement metrics are not disclosed, limiting precision in board effectiveness evaluations .
Overall, McCoy’s long tenure, independence, and audit committee role support board effectiveness; related‑party lending disclosure warrants ongoing monitoring but is mitigated by policy controls and Corporate Governance Committee review .