Avinash Reddy
Senior Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer at Dime Community Bancshares, Inc. /NY/
Executive
About Avinash Reddy
Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (also Chief Operating Officer) of Dime Community Bancshares (DCOM). Age 40. Joined Dime in 2017; CFO since 2019, promoted to SEVP & CFO in Feb 2021; in 2024 his remit expanded to oversee all client-facing deposit businesses (branches, private/commercial bank, treasury management). The Q3’25 10-Q certifications reflect his CFO+COO titles. Prior investment banking roles: Evercore (2011–2014), Barclays (2008–2011), Lehman Brothers (2005–2008) .
2024 execution highlights under the leadership team include core deposit growth of ~20% YoY (≈$1.8B from hired teams), wholesale funding reduced to 8% of assets, L/D below 100%, NIM expansion sequentially through 2024, CET1 > 11%, Total Capital > 15.5%, NPLs/Loans at 0.46%; 2024 TSR was 18.5% (top quartile vs comp peer group) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore Partners | Investment Banking | 2011–2014 | Advisory experience in capital markets and M&A |
| Barclays Capital | Investment Banking | 2008–2011 | Financial institutions coverage and transaction execution |
| Lehman Brothers | Investment Banking | 2005–2008 | Early career investment banking experience |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed in the 2025 DEF 14A executive officer biographies for Mr. Reddy .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base salary (paid) | Base salary (rate, if disclosed) | Target bonus % of salary | Actual annual cash incentive (AIP) | Stock awards (grant-date fair value) | All other compensation | Total compensation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $500,000 | — | — | $293,857 | $174,959 | $106,393 | $1,325,209 |
| 2023 | $518,269 | — | 50% | $325,172 | $193,787 | $94,037 | $1,131,265 |
| 2024 | $536,510 | $540,750 effective 4/1/24 | 50% | $332,873 | $216,300 | $99,330 | $1,185,013 |
- Perquisites: cash allowance in lieu of specific perqs of $50,000 (part of “All other compensation”) .
- Deferred compensation (SERP – 401(k) restoration): 2024 registrant contribution $18,084; aggregate balance $109,722 .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Corporate Metrics and Outcomes (85% weight)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Weighted result/payout driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Non-Interest Expenses / Avg Assets | 50.0% | 1.75% | 1.55% | 1.35% | 1.54% | 103.0% of target |
| Relative NPLs/Loans (vs peer group) | 12.5% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | 73rd pct | 146.0% of target |
| Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio (Consolidated) | 10.0% | 10.25% | 11.0% | 12.0% | 12.17% | 150.0% of target |
| CRE Concentration Ratio (Consolidated) | 15.0% | 550% | 510% | 470% | 447% | 150.0% of target |
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio | 12.5% | 105.0% | 97.5% | 90.0% | 93.0% | 130.0% of target |
| Corporate factor total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 123.7% of target |
- Discretionary factor (15% weight): business initiatives and operational items; committee assessed at 120% of target .
- AIP gate: no payout if Total Risk-Based Capital < 10.5% at year-end (passed) .
- Mr. Reddy 2024 AIP payout: $332,873 (123.1% of target) .
2024–2026 LTIP (60% PRSAs, 40% RSAs)
| PRSA performance metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Deposit Franchise Quality (Metro NY/NJ banks) | 50% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | Measured on cost of total deposits and % non-interest bearing for 2026 vs named peers |
| Consolidated CRE Concentration Ratio | 50% | 490% | 450% | 400% | Measured at 12/31/2026 |
| 2024 LTIP grant detail (Reddy) | Value/Shares |
|---|---|
| PRSA target grant value | $129,783 |
| Time-vested RSAs (shares) | 4,648 |
| Time-vested RSAs grant-date fair value | $86,520 |
| Total LTIP at target | $216,300 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Common shares beneficially owned | 45,674; includes 7,681 time-vested restricted shares with voting power |
| Ownership as % of outstanding | <1% |
| Preferred stock owned | 5,730 shares |
| Stock ownership guideline | Other NEOs: 1.5x base salary; five years to comply; retain 100% of vested shares until compliant |
| Compliance status | All directors and NEOs were in compliance or within the five-year window as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited (policy and insider trading policy) |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/SEC-compliant 3-year recoupment on restatement; excess incentive-based comp clawed back |
Vesting Schedules and Unvested Holdings (as of 12/31/2024)
| Category | Shares/Value | Vesting detail |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested time-based RSAs | 12,273 shares; $377,149 (at $30.73) | 4,592 vests 2/1/2025; 675 vests 3/31/2025; 2,358 vests equally on 3/31/2025 and 3/31/2026; 4,648 vests ratably over 3 years from 3/31/2024 |
| PRSAs (target unearned) | 13,416 shares; $412,274 (at $30.73) | Cliff vesting at target: 1,139 (2024), 5,305 (2025), 6,972 (2026), subject to performance |
| Stock options | None disclosed outstanding/exercisable |
- 2024 shares vested and value realized: 9,087 shares; $189,613 (based on vest dates’ close) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key provisions |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement (Reddy) | 3-year term with daily auto-renewal; base salary not less than $500,000; target cash bonus at least 45% of base; annual equity award at least 35% of base; $50,000 cash in lieu of perqs . |
| Severance (pre-CIC) | If terminated without cause or for good reason: Pro Rata Bonus; 3x (base + Recent Bonus); Company contributions to qualified/supplemental DC plans for 36 months; 150% of monthly healthcare/life premiums x 36; outplacement (tax timing-limited) . |
| Severance (post-CIC, double trigger) | If within 2 years after CIC, without cause/for good reason: Pro Rata Bonus; 3x (base + greater of target bonus in CIC year or 3-year average bonus); plan contributions for 36 months; 150% healthcare/life premiums x 36; outplacement; 280G cutback to best-after-tax if applicable . |
| Equity on death/disability/CIC qual. termination | Unvested time-based awards vest; unvested performance awards vest pro-rata based on actual (or target if not determinable) and are accelerated subject to 409A . |
| Restrictive covenants | One-year non-compete and non-solicit; following a CIC, non-compete/non-solicit 6–24 months as mutually set . |
| Clawback | SEC/Dodd-Frank restatement policy (3-year lookback) . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited . |
| 280G tax | Defense-of-tax-position agreement covers defense costs only; no excise or tax gross-up ; Company policy: no tax gross-ups on CIC . |
Performance & Track Record (selected indicators)
| Metric/initiative | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Core deposit growth | ~20% YoY in 2024; ≈$1.8B from hired deposit teams, with high non-interest-bearing mix . |
| Wholesale funding | Reduced to 8% of total assets . |
| Liquidity profile | Loan-to-deposit ratio reduced below 100%; higher cash position . |
| NIM trend | Expanded each quarter after Q1’24 through year-end . |
| Asset quality | NPLs/Loans at 0.46% at 12/31/2024 (better than peer median 0.55%) . |
| Capital | CET1 > 11%; Total Capital > 15.5% after ~$136M equity raise in Nov 2024 . |
| TSR 2024 | 18.5% (top quartile vs peer group) . |
| Role expansion | 2024 responsibilities broadened to deposit franchises; CFO also listed as COO in Q3’25 filings, underscoring central operating role . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: Reddy’s 2024 target mix at median peer-aligned levels—AIP 50% of salary; LTIP 40% of salary with majority performance-based (60% PRSAs), emphasizing long-term, balance-sheet-quality factors (deposit franchise quality, CRE concentration) .
- Governance safeguards: double-trigger CIC; no hedging/pledging; 1.5x salary ownership guideline for NEOs; SEC-compliant clawback; no tax gross-ups; AIP gate tied to capital adequacy .
- Say-on-pay: 81.0% support in 2024; Compensation Committee uses independent advisor (Pay Governance) and peer benchmarking across 22 banks .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Commentary
- Skin-in-the-game: 45,674 common shares (<1% of outstanding), plus 5,730 preferred shares; unvested equity provides multi-year exposure; policy prohibits hedging and pledging; ownership guideline enforces meaningful holding (1.5x salary) with retention of vested shares until compliant .
- Vesting overhang and selling pressure: Visible vesting dates in 2025–2026 for time-based RSAs; PRSAs cliff-vest through 2026 conditional on performance, potentially creating future liquidity events but contingent on results .
Employment Terms (Economics and Triggers)
- Strong retention economics: 3x salary+bonus severance (pre- and post-CIC) with benefits continuation and plan contributions; one-year non-compete (6–24 months post-CIC) mitigates immediate departure risk; equity acceleration is performance-sensitive .
- Shareholder-protective features: double-trigger CIC, clawback, 280G cutback, no tax gross-ups, and anti-hedging/pledging policies .
Compensation Peer Group (for benchmarking)
Atlantic Union, Berkshire Hills, Brookline, ConnectOne, Customers, Eagle, Eastern, First Commonwealth, First Financial, Flushing, Fulton, Independent Bank Corp., OceanFirst, Park National, Peoples Bancorp, Provident, S&T Bancorp, Sandy Spring, TowneBank, United Bankshares, WesBanco, WSFS; asset sizes ~$8.75B–$30B (median ~$14B); Dime at $14.3B YE’24 (median) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Heavy use of performance equity and balance-sheet health metrics (deposit quality, CRE concentration, capital, NPLs, cost discipline) ties compensation to franchise resilience and re-rating catalysts; 2024 AIP paid at 123.1% on strong capital/asset quality/CRE mix progress .
- Retention and key-man risk: Reddy’s expanded CFO+COO scope elevates centrality; robust severance and non-compete reduce near-term attrition risk, but the breadth of remit concentrates execution risk in a single executive .
- Trading signals: Multi-year vesting (RSAs through 2026; PRSAs cliffing 2025–2026) creates identifiable windows for potential insider liquidity, though anti-hedge/pledge policies and ownership guidelines dampen short-term selling pressure; options are not a factor .
- Governance quality: Double-trigger CIC, clawback, no gross-ups, and majority performance weighting in LTIP are shareholder-friendly; 81% say-on-pay support and top-quartile 2024 TSR corroborate investor acceptance of incentives and strategy .