Mario Caracappa
About Mario Caracappa
Mario Caracappa, age 76, is Executive Vice President and Chief Treasury Management Officer at Dime Community Bank. He joined Dime in June 2020 as SVP and Director of Treasury Management, was promoted to EVP in February 2021, and became Chief Treasury Management Officer in December 2024 . His 25+ years of treasury management leadership span BankUnited (Senior Executive Vice President, 2012–2020) and Capital One/North Fork (Divisional Senior Vice President and Manager of Treasury Management & Corporate Products, 1996–2008), positioning him to drive deposit growth, pricing discipline, and treasury product adoption . Company performance context relevant to his remit: core deposits grew ~$1.8B with 20% YoY core deposit growth in 2024; wholesale funding reduced to 8% of assets; CET1 reached 12.17%; loan-to-deposit ratio improved to 93%; CRE concentration declined to 447%; and 2024 TSR was 18.5% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dime Community Bank | EVP & Chief Treasury Management Officer | Dec 2024–present | Leads treasury management strategy and deposit franchise quality |
| Dime Community Bank | EVP, Treasury Management | Feb 2021–Dec 2024 | Expanded treasury offerings; supported deposit team onboarding |
| Dime Community Bank | SVP & Director of Treasury Management | Jun 2020–Feb 2021 | Established treasury management leadership at Dime |
| BankUnited | Senior Executive Vice President, Treasury Management | 2012–2020 | Led corporate treasury management across products and clients |
| Capital One Bank (formerly North Fork) | Divisional SVP & Manager, Treasury Management & Corporate Products | 1996–2008 | Managed treasury products, pricing, and client solutions |
External Roles
None disclosed in company filings for Caracappa .
Fixed Compensation
Mario Caracappa is not listed among the Named Executive Officers (NEOs) in DCOM’s proxies; therefore, his base salary, target bonus, and equity grant levels are not disclosed in the Summary Compensation Tables .
Performance Compensation
DCOM’s incentive architecture provides strong context for how executive performance is measured; while Caracappa’s individual plan is not disclosed, the NEO framework shows the levers tied to treasury outcomes (deposit quality, capital/liquidity, L/D, CRE concentration).
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Corporate Factor
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual (2024) | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Non-Interest Expense / Avg Assets | 50.0% | 1.75% | 1.55% | 1.35% | 1.54% | Above target; supports operating leverage |
| Relative Asset Quality (NPLs/Loans) vs Peer Group | 12.5% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | 73rd pct | Top-quartile credit quality |
| CET1 Ratio (Consolidated) | 10.0% | 10.25% | 11.0% | 12.0% | 12.17% | Above max; strong capital |
| CRE Concentration (Consolidated) | 15.0% | 550% | 510% | 470% | 447% | Better than max; diversification progress |
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio | 12.5% | 105.0% | 97.5% | 90.0% | 93.0% | Between target and max; improved funding mix |
Discretionary Factor (15% weight) focused on deposit/account growth from new teams (7.5%) and other initiatives (7.5%); Committee applied 120% of target to Discretionary Factor based on execution in 2024 .
2024 Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Performance Shares (2024–2026)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Measurement Period | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Deposit Franchise Quality (Metro NY/NJ) | 50% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | Jan 1–Dec 31, 2026 | PRSAs vest based on achievement at end of 2026 |
| Consolidated CRE Concentration Ratio | 50% | 490% | 450% | 400% | Dec 31, 2026 | PRSAs vest based on achievement at end of 2026 |
| Time-Vested RSAs | 40% of LTIP value | n/a | n/a | n/a | Grant date Mar 2024 | RSAs vest ratably over 3 years (33%/yr) |
Note: AIP and LTIP metrics above apply to NEOs; Caracappa’s individual targets/payouts are not disclosed .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Pledging/hedging: Directors, officers and employees are prohibited from pledging DCOM securities (margin accounts or loan collateral) and from hedging (short sales, options, swaps, collars, exchange funds), strengthening alignment and reducing forced-sale risk .
- Clawback: SEC-compliant policy recoups excess incentive-based compensation over the three completed fiscal years preceding any required accounting restatement (no taxes considered in recouped amounts) .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Updated March 2025—Directors 5x cash retainer; CEO 3x base salary; other NEOs 1.5x base salary (performance-based shares don’t count until vested). Compliance monitored annually; all directors/NEOs compliant or within phase-in . Caracappa is not an NEO; guidelines for him are not disclosed .
- Beneficial ownership: Caracappa’s individual shareholdings are not disclosed in the security ownership tables; group totals and specific NEO/director holdings are provided, but his position is absent .
Employment Terms
No employment agreement, severance, non-compete, or change-in-control terms are disclosed for Caracappa. NEO agreements feature double-trigger CIC severance multiples, accelerated vesting on death/disability, COBRA/life premium support, retirement plan accruals, outplacement, and 280G “best-net” cutbacks; these terms are not stated for Caracappa .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and signal quality: Caracappa’s treasury leadership coincides with franchise-strengthening outcomes—~$1.8B core deposit growth, L/D improvement to 93%, CET1 at 12.17%, CRE concentration down to 447%, and top-quartile asset quality and TSR—reducing funding/lending risk and supporting NIM expansion potential .
- Insider selling pressure: Anti-pledging/anti-hedging policies across officers mitigate forced sales and hedged exposure; Caracappa’s individual ownership/transactions are not disclosed, limiting direct read-through for selling pressure .
- Retention risk: At age 76, succession planning in treasury is prudent; absence of a disclosed employment or CIC agreement for Caracappa reduces visibility on retention economics if approached by competitors .
- Pay-for-performance structure: Although his personal targets are undisclosed, the company-wide AIP/LTIP constructs emphasize deposit franchise quality, capital/liquidity discipline, CRE diversification, and relative TSR—areas where the treasury function is pivotal, suggesting strong linkage between operational execution and incentive outcomes for senior leaders .
Company performance context (2024)
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Core deposit growth | ~$1.8B; 20% YoY |
| Wholesale funding (% of assets) | 8% |
| CET1 (Consolidated) | 12.17% |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio | 93.0% |
| CRE concentration (Consolidated) | 447% |
| 2024 TSR | 18.5% |
| Equity raise | ~$136M net proceeds (Nov 2024) |
Additionally, 2024 say-on-pay approval was 81.0%; compensation peer group comprises 22 banks selected for asset size, geography, and loan mix comparability .