Steven Miley
About Steven Miley
Steven Miley is Executive Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) of Dime Community Bank. He was promoted to EVP/CMO in September 2023 after serving as Director of Digital Marketing at Legacy Dime (2018–merger close) and then at the Bank post-merger; prior roles include overseeing Strategic Marketing (2018–Feb 2021) and owning/leading a national digital marketing agency for 10 years . Age 60 as of the 2025 proxy . During his CMO tenure, company performance highlights included 20% core deposit growth in 2024 ($1.8B from deposit teams), NIM expansion through 2024, CRE concentration reduction, and CET1 >11%, with 2024 TSR of 18.5% (top quartile vs compensation peers) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dime Community Bank | EVP & Chief Marketing Officer | Sep 2023–present | Leads marketing; period coincides with deposit franchise build (core deposits +20% in 2024) and digital program rollouts cited by the company . |
| Legacy Dime / Dime Community Bank | Director of Digital Marketing | 2018–post-merger (2021+) | Led digital marketing across merger integration . |
| Legacy Dime | Oversaw Strategic Marketing | 2018–Feb 2021 | Marketing leadership during pre-/post-merger period . |
| Private (national marketing agency) | Owner & CEO | 10 years (pre-2018) | Ran a digital marketing agency focused on digital strategy for multiple clients . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| National marketing agency (name not disclosed) | Owner & CEO | 10 years | Specialized in digital marketing and strategy for various clients . |
Fixed Compensation
- Dime’s proxy discloses individual compensation only for Named Executive Officers (NEOs). Steven Miley is an executive officer but not listed as an NEO; his base salary, target bonus, and cash compensation are not individually disclosed .
Performance Compensation
Dime’s executive incentive architecture for NEOs (context for senior executives) emphasizes expense discipline, balance sheet strength, and deposit franchise quality. While Steven’s specific plan terms are not disclosed, the company-wide 2024 AIP/LTIP designs are below:
- 2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Corporate Factor (85% weight) and Discretionary Factor (15%) .
| Metric (Corporate Factor) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Non-Interest Expenses / Avg Assets | 50.0% | 1.75% | 1.55% | 1.35% |
| Relative Asset Quality (NPLs/Loans vs peers) | 12.5% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct |
| Tier 1 Risk Based Capital Ratio | 10.0% | 10.25% | 11.0% | 12.0% |
| CRE Concentration (Consolidated) | 15.0% | 550% | 510% | 470% |
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio | 12.5% | 105.0% | 97.5% | 90.0% |
- 2024 AIP Result (Company): Corporate Factor achieved 123.7% of target, with metrics including 1.54% adjusted non-interest expense/avg assets, 73rd percentile relative asset quality, CET1 12.17%, CRE concentration 447%, LDR 93%; Discretionary Factor paid at 120% of target .
| 2024 AIP Outcome (Company) | Result |
|---|---|
| Corporate Factor attainment | 123.7% of Target |
| Adjusted NIE/Avg Assets | 1.54% |
| Relative asset quality (percentile) | 73rd percentile |
| CET1 (Company) | 12.17% |
| CRE Concentration | 447% |
| Loan-to-Deposit Ratio | 93% |
| Discretionary Factor assessment | 120% of Target |
- 2024 Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP): 60% performance-vested RSAs (PRSAs) and 40% time-vested RSAs. PRSA metrics for 2024–2026: (1) Relative Deposit Franchise Quality (50%), (2) Consolidated CRE Concentration Ratio (50%). Time-based RSAs vest ratably over 3 years; PRSAs cliff-vest based on 3-year performance .
| 2024–2026 PRSA Metrics | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Deposit Franchise Quality (Metro NY/NJ peer set) | 50% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct |
| Consolidated CRE Concentration Ratio | 50% | 490% | 450% | 400% |
- Vesting schedules under the plan: RSAs vest 33% per year over 3 years; PRSAs are earned based on results at end of performance period (2026) .
Note: Steven Miley’s individual award levels, shares, and payouts are not disclosed; tables reflect company plan design for NEOs.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | Not individually disclosed for Steven Miley in 2024–2025 ownership tables . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Company policy prohibits pledging of company stock and hedging by directors, officers, and employees . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Apply to directors and NEOs. 2024 guidelines: CEO 5x salary; other NEOs 2x salary; Directors 5x retainer . Updated Mar 2025: CEO 3x salary; other NEOs 1.5x salary; Directors 5x retainer . |
| Guideline compliance | As of Dec 31, 2024, all directors and NEOs were compliant or within the permitted compliance window . |
Employment Terms
| Item | Steven Miley | Context at Dime |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Not disclosed for Steven –. | The company discloses agreements for CEO (Lubow), CFO (Reddy), CLO (Gunther) and CIC agreements for Fegan and Porzelt; terms include 3x salary+bonus multiples and benefit continuations for qualifying separations, double-trigger on CIC; no tax gross-ups (defense-of-tax-position agreements only) . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | Not disclosed for Steven –. | For covered agreements, restrictions generally include 1-year non-compete and non-solicit (varying terms around CIC) . |
| Clawback policy | Company-wide clawback (July 2023 update) for restatements covering last 3 completed fiscal years; applies to executive officers . |
Company Performance Context (during Steven’s CMO tenure)
| Metric (FY 2024) | Value |
|---|---|
| Core deposit growth | ~20% YoY; ~$1.8B raised by deposit teams (notably non-interest-bearing mix) . |
| Wholesale funding to total assets | 8% (FHLB advances + brokered deposits) . |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio | Reduced below 100% (year-end) . |
| CET1 / Total capital | CET1 in excess of 11%; Total capital >15.5% post follow-on equity raise . |
| NIM trend | Expanded each quarter after 1Q24 trough . |
| Asset quality | NPLs at 0.46% of loans at 12/31/24 vs peer median 0.55% . |
| 2024 Total shareholder return | 18.5% (top quartile vs compensation peer group) . |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say‑on‑Pay Approval | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 81.0% | Continued engagement; AIP/LTIP focus on expense, asset quality, capital, CRE concentration, and deposit franchise quality . |
| 2023 | 80.4% | Added asset quality metric to AIP; removed discretion from time-vested LTIP; increased LTIP emphasis on performance shares . |
Compensation Structure Analysis (implications for a senior marketing executive)
- Shift to balance-sheet-quality metrics: The AIP’s heavy weighting to expense efficiency, capital, asset quality, CRE concentration, and LDR, and LTIP’s emphasis on deposit franchise quality, favor executives who can sustainably grow low-cost deposits and improve mix—areas where marketing, brand, and digital acquisition strategies materially influence outcomes .
- Pay at risk: The LTIP structure (60% performance-vested) and rigorous deposit quality and CRE concentration goals increase long-term pay sensitivity to execution quality (e.g., non-interest-bearing mix, deposit costs) .
- Governance safeguards: Robust clawback, anti-hedging/anti-pledging, and majority-vote director elections reduce misalignment risk; no CIC tax gross-ups (defense-of-tax-position agreements only) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Dime’s incentive architecture places explicit weight on deposit franchise quality and operating leverage—directly adjacent to a CMO’s remit in digital acquisition, brand positioning, and product marketing. This increases the probability that senior marketing contributions translate into above-target AIP/LTIP outcomes when deposit mix and cost improve .
- Retention risk: Absence of a disclosed individual employment/CIC agreement for Steven implies fewer guaranteed protections versus some peers internally (e.g., CFO/CLO), potentially lowering exit costs but also reducing lock-in; this should be monitored via future 8‑Ks or proxy updates –.
- Trading signals: Governance policies prohibit pledging/hedging, limiting forced‑sale or derivative‑driven pressure; company-wide clawback further curbs aggressive incentive gaming . Watch for continued top‑quartile deposit franchise metrics and NIM expansion as confirming signals that marketing-led deposit growth is durable .
Notes
- Where Steven Miley–specific compensation, equity, or contract detail is not disclosed, this report cites company-wide frameworks and NEO program design for context and avoids inference. All facts and figures are sourced from Dime’s 2025 and 2024 DEF 14A filings and related sections as cited above.