Steve Larrabee
Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer at DD
Executive
About Steve Larrabee
Steve P. Larrabee is DuPont’s Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, a role he has held since June 2019; he is 63 years old and holds an MBA from Seton Hall University and a B.S. in Computer Science & Applied Mathematics from SUNY Albany . Prior roles include CIO for the Specialty Products Division of DowDuPont (2017–2019), consultant (At Last Business Solutions, 2016–2017), and CIO at Mars, Incorporated, extending to President, Mars Global Services (2011–2016) . Company-level performance indicators relevant to executive compensation and pay-for-performance alignment improved in 2024: Adjusted EPS rose to $4.07 from $3.48 in 2023, Net Income increased to $703 million from $423 million, and the value of a $100 TSR investment increased to $131 vs $129 for 2023 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DuPont | SVP & Chief Information Officer | Since June 2019 | Executive IT leadership |
| DowDuPont (Specialty Products Division) | Chief Information Officer | 2017–2019 | Division CIO |
| At Last Business Solutions | Consultant | 2016–2017 | Consulting role |
| Mars, Incorporated | CIO; extended to President, Mars Global Services | CIO since 2009; President 2011–2016 | Global services leadership |
External Roles
- No external public company directorships disclosed in executive officer biography for Mr. Larrabee .
Fixed Compensation
- DuPont’s executive pay mix is primarily performance-based, with base salary plus a Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) and long-term equity incentives; executives other than CEO historically target 3x base salary for ownership and must retain 75% of net shares until guidelines met .
- STIP is formulaic with quarterly measurement periods, designed to balance corporate and segment priorities; 2024 metrics include Corporate Adjusted EPS, Segment Organic Revenue, Segment Operating EBITDA, Segment Adjusted Free Cash Flow, and a Sustainability modifier (+/−10%) .
Performance Compensation
STIP Design and 2024 Payout Outcomes
| Component | Metric | Weighting | 2024 Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate | Corporate Adjusted EPS | 50% | Corporate-aligned annual payout factor: 111.9% |
| Business Segment | Segment Organic Revenue | 20% | Electronics & Industrial: 112.8%; Water & Protection: 110.8% |
| Business Segment | Segment Operating EBITDA | 15% | Included in segment-weighted outcomes above |
| Business Segment | Segment Adjusted Free Cash Flow | 15% | Included in segment-weighted outcomes above |
| Modifier | Sustainability | ±10% | +4% applied company-wide in 2024 |
LTI Program Structure and Mix
| Vehicle | Weighting | Vesting / Performance | Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Units (PSUs) | 60% | Three-year performance period | Adjusted ROIC (50%); Adjusted Corporate Net Income (50%); Relative TSR modifier (±25%) vs S&P 500 |
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | 40% | Three-year incremental vesting | Stock price |
2022 PSU Award Results (Performance period ended Dec 31, 2024)
| Metric | Threshold (50% Payout) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual Result | Payout % | Weighting | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted ROIC (avg 2022–2024) | 22.70% | 24.20% | 27.20% | 23.67% | 82.33% | 50.0% | 41.17% |
| Adjusted Corporate Net Income (avg of annual payouts) | See annual table | See annual table | See annual table | 2022: $1,661mm → 73.1%; 2023: $1,537mm → 66.2%; 2024: $1,716mm → 121.7% | 87.0% | 50.0% | 43.50% |
| Relative TSR Modifier | <25th: 0.75; 25–75th: 1.00; >75th: 1.25 | — | — | 43.3rd percentile | 1.00x | Modifier | Applied to PSU payout |
| PSU Payout Factor | — | — | — | — | 84.67% total | — | — |
Note: PSUs granted in 2022 to NEOs resulted in 84.67% payout; counts of PSUs earned for NEOs are disclosed (e.g., Breen: 89,865 units), illustrating realized LTI alignment with multi-year performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; other executive officers 3x base salary; 75% net share retention until compliant; PSUs and options excluded from guideline calculation .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Directors and officers are prohibited from hedging and from holding DuPont securities in margin accounts or pledging them as collateral, reducing misalignment and leverage-related selling pressure risk .
- Beneficial ownership: Individual holdings tables in 2025 proxy list directors and NEOs; Mr. Larrabee is not a 2025 NEO and his individual ownership is not separately disclosed; all directors and executive officers as a group held 2,558,097 shares at March 14, 2025, less than 1% of shares outstanding .
Employment Terms
- Senior Executive Severance Plan (SESP): Provides severance for involuntary termination without cause and enhanced benefits under a double-trigger within 24 months of change in control; severance equals lump-sum cash severance plus annual bonus at greater of actual or target; RSUs vest automatically (pre-2024 fully; 2024 grants pro rata), PSUs remain subject to original performance period on a pro rata basis; options vest and are exercisable for limited post-termination periods .
- Clawback policy: Robust recoupment policy covers cash and equity incentives; enhanced in June 2023 to comply with NYSE listing standards and Dodd-Frank rules, while preserving additional recoupment for misconduct .
- Separation-related HR agreements (Electronics separation): Include 24-month mutual non-solicitation restrictions between RemainCo and ElectronicsCo, and broad employee records, benefits and HR liabilities allocation frameworks around the planned separation targeted for November 1, 2025 .
Company Performance Indicators (Pay vs Performance context)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR value of $100 investment ($) | 113 | 131 | 113 | 129 | 131 |
| Peer group TSR value of $100 investment ($) | 111 | 135 | 127 | 150 | 176 |
| Net Income ($USD Millions) | (2,951) | 6,467 | 5,868 | 423 | 703 |
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 3.37 | 4.30 | 3.41 | 3.48 | 4.07 |
Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Shareholder Feedback
- Governance: Pay mix heavily performance-based; no single-trigger CIC or excise tax gross-ups; no options below market value or repricing; strong ownership requirements and clawbacks; no guaranteed raises/bonuses .
- Peer group used for 2024 benchmarking included diversified industrials and multi-industrials (e.g., 3M, Honeywell, Danaher, TE Connectivity, ITW, Emerson, Eaton, etc.) .
- Say-on-pay: 82.6% support at 2024 annual meeting indicates general shareholder acceptance of pay design and outcomes .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Larrabee’s compensation structure follows DuPont’s design emphasizing PSUs tied to Adjusted ROIC and Adjusted Corporate Net Income with a Relative TSR modifier, plus RSUs with three-year vesting—reinforcing multi-year performance alignment and retention .
- Selling pressure risk: Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies materially mitigate leverage-induced selling or risk-transfer, and ownership guidelines plus 75% retention promote sustained alignment; lack of individually disclosed holdings for Larrabee limits precise skin-in-the-game assessment .
- Separation dynamics: The planned Electronics separation and accompanying HR non-solicitation provisions reduce near-term poaching risk; CIO continuity since 2019 and prior global services leadership experience support execution resilience through portfolio transitions .
- Pay-for-performance: Above-target 2024 STIP payout factors and 84.67% PSU payout for 2022 awards reflect delivery against financial metrics, supporting realized pay outcomes tied to fundamentals and TSR; continued focus on Adjusted EPS, ROIC, and net income aligns incentives with shareholder value creation .