Lisa Muschong
DTE ENERGYAbout Lisa Muschong
Lisa A. Muschong is Vice President, Corporate Secretary & Chief of Staff at DTE Energy. She oversees board governance, shareholder engagement, and enterprise-priority execution for the CEO/COO; she joined DTE in 1991 after earning a BA in Finance (Michigan State) and an MBA (Walsh College) . She is 55 years old as of March 13, 2025 and has held her current position since November 2, 2015 . Company performance context during her recent tenure includes five-year TSR of 129% and 2024 operating EPS of $6.83, with cash from operations of $3.64B and a 6.9% dividend increase, aligning incentive frameworks to investor outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DTE Energy | Vice President, Corporate Secretary & Chief of Staff | 2015–present | Leads governance framework, board effectiveness, ESG shareholder engagement; supports CEO/COO on enterprise priorities |
| DTE Energy | Director, Investor Relations | Not disclosed | Communicated DTE’s business, financial and operating strategies to analysts/investors |
| DTE Energy | Manager, Corporate Budget/Forecast/Reporting (Controller Organization) | Not disclosed | Led corporate FP&A processes supporting financial discipline and planning |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Goodwill Industries of Greater Detroit | Director (Board) | 2010–present | Governance of workforce development social enterprise; community impact oversight |
| Detroit Edison Credit Union | Director (Board) | Nine years (earlier in career) | Financial institution governance and member service oversight |
| Women of DTE (ERG) | Executive Champion | Not disclosed | Culture-building; leadership development and engagement for women at DTE |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Amount/Level | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Not disclosed | DTE does not individually disclose compensation for the Corporate Secretary when not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) . |
| Target Annual Bonus % | Not disclosed | For executive officers, AIP targets are set by role; 2024 NEO targets ranged 70%–135%; 2025 NEO targets ranged 75%–145% of salary. Individual targets for non-NEOs are not disclosed . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design and 2024 outcomes for DTE executive officers (framework Lisa participates in):
| Metric (Company Executives) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout % | Notes/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating EPS | 20% | $6.54 | $6.69 | $6.83 | $6.83 | 200.0% | Annual cash; paid post year-end upon O&C Committee certification |
| Cash from Operations ($mm) | 20% | $2,975 | $3,306 | $3,637 | $3,650 | 200.0% | Same vesting |
| Net Promoter Score | 15% | 27 | 33 | 39 | 31 | 75.0% | Same vesting |
| OSHA Recordable Incident Rate | 5% | 0.68 | 0.55 | 0.42 | 0.70 | 0.0% | Same vesting |
| High Energy Serious Injury/Fatality | 5% | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 100.0% | Same vesting |
| Employee Engagement (Gallup) | 5% | 4.17 | 4.29 | 4.44 | 4.35 | 140.0% | Same vesting |
| Storm Customers Restored ≤48h | 10% | 88% | 93% | 98% | 95% | 140.0% | Same vesting |
| CEMI4 % of Customers | 5% | 11.1% | 9.3% | 7.5% | 7.8% | 182.8% | Same vesting |
| Nuclear Unit Capability Factor | 10% | 86.4% | 88.0% | 88.7% | 82.6% | 0.0% | Same vesting |
| % HCA Miles Assessable by ILI | 5% | 96.76% | 96.85% | 96.89% | 96.92% | 200.0% | Same vesting |
| Weighted Average Payout | 100% | — | — | — | — | 136.39% | Aggregate payout factor for Company execs |
Forward-looking 2025 AIP weights (structure continuity):
| 2025 AIP Measure | Weight |
|---|---|
| Operating EPS | 20% |
| Cash from Operations | 20% |
| Customer Satisfaction | 15% |
| Employee Engagement (Gallup) | 5% |
| Safety Performance | 10% |
| Utility Operating Excellence Index | 30% |
| Notes | AIP payout 0%–200% of target; targets set by O&C Committee |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) for executive officers:
- Mix and vesting: ~70% Performance Stock/Share Units (PSUs) and ~30% time-based Restricted Stock; PSUs measured over three years; RS typically vests over three years .
- PSU performance measures: For DTE executive officers, 80% relative TSR vs. regulated utility peer group and 20% 3-year cumulative operating EPS (0%–200% payout). Double-trigger vesting on change in control; if awards are not assumed, they accelerate; otherwise accelerate upon qualifying termination .
- Minimum vesting: Equity plan requires minimum one-year vesting; DTE has not granted options since 2010 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Policy/Status |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | Executives must hold multiples of base salary in DTE equity within 5 years; CEO 5x; certain NEOs 4x; others 1–3x depending on level. As of Dec 31, 2024, 100% of NEOs and other required employees (≥5 years in role) met guidelines . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Strict prohibition on hedging transactions and pledging DTE stock (including margin accounts) by officers and directors . |
| Award design | No stock option grants since 2010; no buyouts/repricing of underwater options; minimum 1-year vesting; typical 3-year vesting . |
| Individual holdings | Not disclosed for Ms. Muschong; proxy ownership tables cover directors and NEOs only . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Summary |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance Allowance Plan (non-CIC) | For all officers except the CEO: if involuntarily terminated without cause, severance equals 100% of base salary plus target bonus; plus choice of 12 months COBRA premiums or lump-sum equivalent; plus up to 6 months outplacement (or cash equivalent), subject to release of claims . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double-trigger equity vesting (accelerate if not assumed; if assumed, accelerate upon qualifying termination). CIC severance agreements provide cash severance and benefits continuation; NEO example multiples were 2x salary+target bonus, with additional non-compete consideration equal to 100% of salary+target bonus; no excise tax gross-ups . |
| Clawback | Company will seek recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation for current/former executive officers in the event of a material accounting restatement (3-year lookback) . |
| Non-compete consideration | NEO example includes separate non-compete payment (100% of base+target bonus) as consideration; applies in CIC agreements . |
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment: Executive pay is heavily at-risk and tied to TSR and operating EPS over multi-year periods; hedging/pledging bans and robust ownership guidelines mitigate misalignment and event risk .
- Retention risk balanced: Non-CIC severance for officers (1x base+target) and double-trigger CIC protections provide retention and transactional certainty without shareholder-unfriendly gross-ups or single-trigger payouts .
- Calendar watchouts: Equity grants/vests typically cluster in Q1 (e.g., Feb awards and 3-year vesting cycles), which can create episodic trading windows/flows across the exec team; monitor filings around certification/vesting dates for potential liquidity events. Specific Form 4 activity for Ms. Muschong was not identified in the reviewed sources; ongoing monitoring is advised .
- Shareholder sentiment: Say‑on‑pay support has been high (96.2% approvals in 2023 and 2024), indicating investor acceptance of the pay framework that also governs officers reporting to the CEO .
Notes on disclosure limits: DTE’s proxy discloses compensation, ownership, and CIC economics for Named Executive Officers; Ms. Muschong is an executive officer but not an NEO, so individualized salary/bonus, equity grants, and holdings are not disclosed in the proxy. The analysis above therefore focuses on applicable company policies and executive frameworks that govern her compensation, ownership alignment, and employment terms .
References:
; ; ; ; DTE Corporate Biography PDF and Executive Committee page