Trevor Lauer
DTE ENERGYAbout Trevor Lauer
Trevor F. Lauer, age 60, serves as Vice Chairman and Group President at DTE Energy, a role he has held since July 3, 2023, after previously serving as President and Chief Operating Officer of DTE Electric beginning April 4, 2016 . 2024 incentive outcomes signal solid operating execution: the Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) paid at 136.39% for Lauer’s cohort on strong cash from operations and EPS, while his 2021-vintage performance shares paid out at 163.6% on above-peer TSR offset by lower DTE Electric ROE performance . Company context during his leadership period includes a five-year TSR of 129% (2019 base = 100%), 2024 operating EPS of $6.83, and 2024 cash from operations of $3.64B .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DTE Energy | Vice Chairman and Group President | 7/3/2023 – present | — |
| DTE Electric Company | President and Chief Operating Officer | 4/4/2016 – 7/3/2023 | — |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or outside roles are disclosed for Lauer in the company’s executive officer listings within the proxy materials reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table values)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 635,615 | 640,000 | 669,231 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,923,680 | 1,320,426 | 1,507,506 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Comp ($) | 540,100 | 253,700 | 742,000 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | — | 534,753 | 584,587 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 52,773 | 55,604 | 57,560 |
| Total ($) | 3,152,168 | 2,804,483 | 3,560,884 |
2024 cash incentive mechanics (AIP)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Base Salary (year-end basis) | $669,231 |
| Target Bonus (AIP Target Award $) | $544,000 |
| Actual AIP Earned | $742,000 |
| Payout Multiplier (Company/Utility measures) | 136.39% |
| Implied Target Bonus % of Salary | ~81.3% (= 544,000 / 669,231) |
Additional fixed/benefit elements
- 2024 “All Other Compensation” includes Company matching contributions to qualified and supplemental savings plans and other executive benefits; Lauer’s components totaled $57,560 ($7,385 Savings Plan match; $32,769 Supplemental Savings Plan match; $17,406 additional benefits) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (2024 measures, weights, targets, results, payout)
| Metric (for Norcia, Ruud, Lauer, Harris) | Weight | Target | Result | Payout | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating EPS | 20% | $6.69 | $6.83 | 200.0% | 40.00% |
| Cash from Operations ($mm) | 20% | $3,306 | $3,650 | 200.0% | 40.00% |
| Net Promoter Score | 15% | 33 | 31 | 75.0% | 11.25% |
| OSHA Recordable Incident Rate | 5% | 0.55 | 0.70 | 0.0% | 0.00% |
| High Energy SIF | 5% | 2 | 2 | 100.0% | 5.00% |
| Employee Engagement (Gallup) | 5% | 4.29 | 4.35 | 140.0% | 7.00% |
| Storm Customers Restored ≤48 hrs | 10% | 93% | 95% | 140.0% | 14.00% |
| CEMI4 % of Customers | 5% | 9.3% | 7.8% | 182.8% | 9.14% |
| Nuclear UCF | 10% | 88.0% | 82.6% | 0.0% | 0.00% |
| % HCA Miles Assessable by ILI | 5% | 96.85% | 96.92% | 200.0% | 10.00% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | 136.39% |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) structure and outcomes
- 2024 LTI grant structure (applies to Lauer): ~70% performance shares (PSUs), ~30% time-vested restricted stock; PSUs measured on 3-year TSR vs peer group (80%) and 3-year cumulative operating EPS (20%); RS vests after 3 years (1/31/2027) .
- 2024 PS payout for awards granted in 2021 (Lauer-specific): weighted average payout = 163.6% driven by TSR at 192% (80% weight) and DTE Electric Average ROE at 50% (20% weight) .
- Increased rigor: beginning with 2022 grants, TSR target and max raised to 55th and 80th percentiles (from 50th/75th) .
- No stock option grants since 2010 (reduces leverage/volatility exposure) .
Select grant details
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Instrument | Target/Qty | Terms | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1/31/2024 | PSUs | 10,000 | 3-year perf (1/1/2024–12/31/2026); TSR 80% / 3-yr OEPS 20% | 1,054,200 |
| 2024 | 1/31/2024 | Restricted Stock | 4,300 | Time-vested; vests 1/31/2027 | 453,306 |
| 2023 | 2/22/2023 | PSUs | 8,100 | 3-year perf (1/1/2023–12/31/2025); TSR 80% / 3-yr OEPS 20% | 913,761 |
| 2023 | 2/1/2023 | Restricted Stock | 3,500 | Time-vested; vests 2/1/2026 | 406,665 |
Stock vested and realized value (2024)
| Type | Shares Vested | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Time-vested RS (granted 1/27/2021) | 3,998 | 414,153 |
| Performance Shares (granted 1/27/2021 and 7/1/2021 adj.) | 16,518 | 1,741,366 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and outstanding/unvested equity
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Stock Owned | 62,915 shares |
| Phantom Stock | 1,587 shares |
| Performance Shares (target; may be earned) | 32,600 shares |
| Unvested Restricted Stock (as of 12/31/2024) | 11,300 shares; $1,364,475 at $120.75 |
| Unearned PSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | 32,600 shares; $3,936,450 at $120.75 |
| Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | ~0.03% (= 62,915 / 207,517,751 ) |
Vesting schedule indicators (time-vested RS)
- Grants on 2/2/2022, 2/1/2023, and 1/31/2024 vest on third anniversary of grant (i.e., expected vest dates 2/2/2025; 2/1/2026; 1/31/2027) .
- Policy alignment: executives are prohibited from hedging or pledging DTE stock; Section 16 insiders are limited to trading during open windows .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Lauer must hold stock = 4× base salary; as of 12/31/2024, 100% of NEOs with ≥5 years in role met guidelines (indicates compliance) .
Employment Terms
Executive Severance Plan (non-CIC; Lauer)
| Component | Amount ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Severance (1× base + target bonus) | 1,224,000 | One times base salary + target bonus as of 12/31/2024 |
| Bonus (AIP target) | 544,000 | Paid due to retirement eligibility, at target |
| Pro-Rated LTIP Awards | 3,601,852 | Pro-rated value of RS/PS at target |
| Supplemental Benefits | 34,400 | COBRA + outplacement cash equivalent |
| Total | 5,404,252 | — |
Change-in-Control (double-trigger; Lauer)
| Component | Amount ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Severance (2× base + target bonus) | 2,448,000 | Two times base + target bonus |
| Bonus | 544,000 | Base × AIP target |
| Pension Enhancement | 313,796 | Two additional years of credits (ESRP) |
| Accelerated LTIP Awards | 5,300,804 | Value of RS/PS accelerated |
| Outplacement | 102,000 | Capped at 15% of base |
| Health & Wellness Benefits | 70,000 | 24 months of benefit coverage |
| Non-Compete Consideration | 1,224,000 | Equals 100% of base + target bonus |
| Total | 10,002,600 | No single-trigger; double-trigger required |
Plan features and governance
- No single-trigger CIC payments; no excise tax gross-ups; clawback policy for restatements; minimum one-year vesting under LTIP; no option repricing .
- All officers (except CEO) covered by Executive Severance Plan; NEOs also party to CIC agreements (double-trigger) .
Deferred compensation and pension
| Item (2024) | Lauer |
|---|---|
| Salary Deferred into Supplemental Savings Plan ($) | 60,461 |
| Company Match to Supplemental Savings Plan ($) | 32,769 |
| Aggregate Earnings in Year ($) | 222,810 |
| Year-End Supplemental Savings Plan Balance ($) | 1,871,202 |
| Change in Pension Value (SCT) ($) | 584,587 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shifts maintain high at-risk pay: LTI delivered ~70% PSUs / ~30% RS in 2024; no stock options since 2010, lowering payout asymmetry vs option-heavy structures .
- Performance rigor increased: PSU TSR target and max moved up to 55th/80th percentile starting with 2022 grants, tightening pay-performance alignment .
- AIP metrics tie to investors and reliability: 2024 payouts maximized on EPS and cash flow while reliability measures were mixed (nuclear UCF zeroed; grid outage frequency CEMI4 strong), producing a 136.39% AIP .
- Volatility across cycles: 2023 AIP for Lauer’s cohort paid 49.56% (after safety zero-out), vs 136.39% in 2024, indicating sensitivity to operational outcomes .
- LTI outcomes historically above target: 2024 payouts for 2021 grants at 163.6% for Lauer (strong relative TSR), though business-unit ROE components can dilute outcomes when below target .
Compensation Peer Group (LTIP TSR comparator set)
The LTIP peer group used for performance shares consists primarily of large, regulated utilities: ALLETE; Alliant; American Electric Power; Ameren; Avista; CenterPoint; CMS; Consolidated Edison; Dominion; Duke; Evergy; Eversource; IDACORP; NiSource; NorthWestern; OGE; Pinnacle West; PNM Resources; Portland General; Southern; WEC; Xcel .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong ownership framework (4× salary guideline) with explicit anti-hedging/pledging and restatement clawback mitigates misalignment risk; Lauer is within the cohort that has met ownership guidelines after five years .
- Incentive design: Heavy weighting to relative TSR and cash/EPS promotes capital discipline and shareholder-value orientation; raised TSR hurdles since 2022 reduce “easy pay” risk .
- Event risk economics: Double-trigger CIC protections total ~$10.0M for Lauer, with significant accelerated equity value; while typical for regulated utilities, this can drive retention through strategic cycles but may create sell pressure around vest/acceleration events .
- Near-term supply/demand on shares: Unvested RS (11,300 sh) vest annually by 2027; 2021 PS payout and 2024 RS/PS vestings realized meaningful value in 2024 ($2.16M total), indicating periodic liquidity events that investors should monitor for trading signals around windows .
- Execution watchpoints: Nuclear UCF and safety metrics can zero out portions of AIP; DTE Electric ROE factors in LTI have pulled Lauer’s PSU payout below the TSR-driven maximum in prior cycles—focus areas for sustaining above-target incentive outcomes .