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David Maughan

Chief Operating Officer, DaVita Kidney Care at DAVITADAVITA
Executive

About David Maughan

David P. Maughan, 48, is Chief Operating Officer, DaVita Kidney Care, appointed effective September 15, 2024, after joining DaVita in 2006 and serving in progressively senior operating roles; he holds a B.A. from Brigham Young University and an MBA from Harvard Business School . Company performance in 2024 featured 43% stock price appreciation, operating income of $2,090 million, adjusted operating income of $1,981 million, and free cash flow of $1,162 million, with Maughan’s 2024 short-term incentive (STI) payout at 181.2% of target, consistent with strong performance against financial and strategic metrics .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
DaVita Kidney CareSenior Vice President, Kidney CareNov 2019 – Sep 2024Oversight of Hospital Services and national Home businesses; led HR, talent strategy, IT, state government affairs, marketing, communications
DaVitaVarious field operations roles2006 – 2019Increasing operational responsibilities across U.S. operations
Goldman SachsFinance (NYC/London)2001 – 2004Financial/analytical experience prior to DaVita

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Goldman SachsFinance2001 – 2004Pre-DaVita capital markets/finance foundation

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 AmountNotes
Base Salary$725,000 Set upon assumption of COO role in 2024
All Other Compensation$3,840 Life insurance premiums $240 and defined contribution plan $3,600

Performance Compensation

2024 Short-Term Incentive Program Metrics and Results

MetricWeightTargetActualPayout %
Adjusted Operating Income50.0% $1,902M $2,053M 200.0%
Adjusted Free Cash Flow20.0% $1,021M $1,220M 200.0%
Home modalities penetration (Q4)7.5% 15.75% 15.63% 76.0%
CKCC patient contact composite7.5% 60.0% 63.10% 162.0%
Teammate engagement3.0% 80.0% 83.97% 199.3%
Water savings projects3.0% 75M gallons 75M gallons 100.0%
Custom strategic objectives (Maughan)9.0% N/AN/A160.0%

2024 STI Outcome (Maughan)

ItemValue
Target Bonus$725,000
Eligible Payout Achieved181.2%
Actual STI Award$1,313,899

2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Awards (Granted March 15, 2024)

Award TypeGrant DateShares/UnitsGrant Date Fair ValueVesting Terms
RSUs3/15/2024 21,954 $3,000,014 Back-loaded: 50% on Mar 15, 2027; 50% on Mar 15, 2028

• Program design: NEO LTI is 60% PSUs (Adjusted EPS 75%; Relative TSR 25%) and 40% RSUs; Maughan, not an NEO at March grant setting, received 100% RSUs under non-NEO practice in 2024 .
• PSU performance rigor (context): 2021 PSUs vested at 90% (Adjusted EPS 74%; Relative TSR 136%); 2022 PSUs vested at 89% (Adjusted EPS 69%; Relative TSR 149%) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (3/31/2025)20,584 shares; <1% of common stock
Ownership Guidelines3x base salary; Compliant as of 12/31/2024
Hedging/PledgingHedging prohibited; pledging prohibited for directors/executives and VP+
2024 Insider Activity35,868 shares acquired on SSAR exercise; value realized $4,411,875; 27,933 shares acquired on vesting; value realized $3,817,044
Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 (by grant)11,476 (3/15/2021) ; 24,406 (3/15/2022) ; 34,290 (9/22/2022) ; 35,508 (3/15/2023) ; 21,954 (3/15/2024)
Market Value of Unvested RSUsValued at $149.55 per share as of 12/31/2024, per table methodology

Employment Terms

TermProvision
Role & DutiesCOO, Kidney Care; full-time devotion; work out of Denver, CO; travel as necessary; board/advisory service requires CEO or Nominating & Governance approval
Base Salary$725,000 per annum
Annual IncentiveTarget 100% of salary for 2024; performance goals set by Compensation Committee
Severance (termination without material cause/disability/death)Benefits per Severance Plan (salary continuation 1 year; offset by other earnings); subject to release, continued cooperation, compliance
Resignation for Good CauseSeverance Plan benefits, not less than 1 year base salary continuation; 2 years if resignation within 60 days following a good cause event occurring within 2 years post-change in control; if termination after April, lump-sum pro-rated prior-year bonus
Change-in-Control Equity TreatmentDouble-trigger acceleration generally if awards not assumed/replaced, or upon termination without cause/resignation for good reason in defined post-CIC window
ClawbacksDodd-Frank Section 10D clawback on restatement; separate misconduct policy allows recoupment up to three years of incentive comp, including time-based equity

Performance & Track Record

  • Executive appointment: Elevated to COO effective September 15, 2024 following 18 years in operations leadership at DaVita .
  • Company’s 2024 performance context: 43% stock price appreciation; operating income $2,090M; adjusted operating income $1,981M; free cash flow $1,162M .
  • No related party transactions: None involving Maughan requiring Item 404(a) disclosure .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • High at-risk pay: STI payout driven by formulaic financial metrics (70%) and strategic objectives (21% common + 9% custom); Maughan’s STI at 181.2% of target reflects strong performance .
  • Equity mix shift: 2024 grant for Maughan was RSUs only (non-NEO practice), back-loaded vesting that increases retention incentive and may defer liquidity until 2027–2028 .
  • Governance protections: Double-trigger CIC equity vesting, prohibition of hedging/pledging, no change-of-control tax gross-ups .

Say-On-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay approval ~95%, with continued shareholder support for pay-for-performance design .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Compliance with 3x salary ownership guideline and prohibition on hedging/pledging support alignment; substantial unvested RSUs create long-dated retention incentives and staggered future vest-driven liquidity windows (notably March 2027 and March 2028 for 2024 grant) .
  • Selling pressure: 2024 included meaningful SSAR exercises and stock vesting; upcoming back-loaded RSU vesting could produce episodic selling pressure near vest dates, subject to 10b5-1 plans and blackout policies .
  • Retention risk: Baseline severance equals one year salary continuation, rising to two years after qualifying CIC triggers; custom objectives set annually link payouts to execution in operations, teammate experience and clinical initiatives, signaling performance-contingent pay with reasonable protection .
  • Performance sensitivity: STI metrics emphasize Adjusted Operating Income and Adjusted Free Cash Flow, reinforcing focus on margin discipline and cash generation; PSU structure (for NEOs generally) ties multi-year outcomes to Adjusted EPS and Relative TSR, aligning value creation with shareholder returns .