
Raul Fernandez
About Raul Fernandez
Raul J. Fernandez, 58, has served as DXC’s President and Chief Executive Officer since February 1, 2024 (Interim CEO since December 18, 2023) and as a director since 2020 . He is a technology entrepreneur and operator (founder/CEO of Proxicom; CEO, Dimension Data North America; Chairman/CEO, ObjectVideo), and Vice Chairman/co-owner of Monumental Sports & Entertainment . Under his first full year, DXC emphasized cash generation and profitability: FY2025 revenue $12.871B, EBIT $696M, adjusted EBIT $1.019B (7.9% margin), cash from operations $1.398B, and free cash flow $687M; FY2025 short‑term incentives paid at 91% of target on performance vs preset goals .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proxicom (NASDAQ: PXCM) | Founder and CEO | 1991–2000s (IPO 1999) | Built an early global e‑commerce solutions provider; led to IPO and subsequent sale to Dimension Data . |
| Dimension Data North America | Chief Executive Officer; director of parent (2001) | 2000–2002 | Scaled information systems integration footprint in North America . |
| ObjectVideo | Chairman and CEO | Through 2017 | Led intelligent video software business to sale to Alarm.com in 2017 . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monumental Sports & Entertainment | Vice Chairman & co-owner | Ongoing | Co-owner of major D.C. sports franchises; alternative Governor to NBA Board . |
| Broadcom, Inc. | Director (former) | 2020–Apr 2024 | Public company directorship . |
| GameStop Corp. | Director (former) | 2019–2021 | Public company directorship . |
| Kate Spade & Co. | Director (former) | Until 2017 | Board service until acquisition by Coach, Inc. . |
| Carrick Capital Partners | Special Advisor | Ongoing | Advisory role . |
| Volition Capital | Strategic Advisory Board member | Ongoing | Advisory role . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2026 (effective 4/1/2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,380,000 | 1,500,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 200% (max 400%) | 200% (as per Employment Agreement; updated pay mix otherwise unchanged) |
| Actual STI Payout (% of target) | 91% payout for plan year FY2025 | N/A |
Notes:
- FY2025 STI metrics: 50% Adjusted EBIT Margin %, 50% Organic Revenue Growth %; metric fundings were 96.0% and 85.1% respectively, leading to ~91% overall payout .
Performance Compensation
Annual Short‑Term Incentive (FY2025)
| Metric | Weight | Target/Calibration | Actual | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBIT Margin % | 50% | Threshold at 90% of target; max at 110% of target | 96.0% funding | Contributed to 91% overall STI payout . |
| Organic Revenue Growth % | 50% | Threshold at 95% of target; max at 105% of target | 85.1% funding | Contributed to 91% overall STI payout . |
Long‑Term Incentives (structure and grants)
- FY2025 regular-cycle LTI design (CEO): 70% PSUs (100% weighted to cumulative FCF over 3 years with ±20% rTSR modifier), 30% time-based RSUs vesting over 3 years .
- FY2026 special front‑loaded awards (in lieu of FY2026–FY2028 annual grants) granted May 16, 2025: 85% PSUs (FCF 80% + Revenue 20% over 3 years, with rTSR ±20% modifier; no positive rTSR modifier if absolute TSR is negative; max 200% including modifier), 15% RSUs vesting in 3 equal annual installments .
| Award | Grant date | Shares/Target | Vesting/Metrics | Grant date fair value / notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 PSUs | 5/21/2024 | 514,757 target (threshold 257,379; max 1,029,514) | 3-year cumulative FCF; ±20% rTSR modifier; vests after FY2027 | $8,431,720 grant date fair value . |
| FY2025 RSUs | 5/21/2024 | 220,610 | 1/3 per year on anniversaries of grant (2025–2027) | $3,509,905 grant date fair value . |
| FY2026 PSUs (front‑loaded) | 5/16/2025 | 2,282,784 target | 3-year cumulative FCF (80%) + Revenue (20%); rTSR ±20% modifier; max 200% incl. modifier; no positive modifier if TSR negative | In lieu of annual LTI for FY2026–FY2028 . |
| FY2026 RSUs (front‑loaded) | 5/16/2025 | 402,844 | Vests in three equal annual installments (2026–2028) | In lieu of annual LTI for FY2026–FY2028 . |
| FY2024 CEO PSUs | 3/31/2024 | 106,666 target; threshold 53,333 shown outstanding | Two‑year stock‑price hurdle PSUs; vests at close of FY2026 if hurdles met | Target award value $2,879,982 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (5/28/2025) | 249,638 shares; <1% of shares outstanding . |
| Unvested time‑based RSUs (3/31/2025) | 220,610 (from FY2025 grant) . |
| Unvested PSUs (3/31/2025) | 257,379 (FY2025 PSUs at threshold) and 53,333 (FY2024 CEO PSUs at threshold) . |
| Options | No stock options granted to NEOs in FY2025 . |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO must hold stock equal to 7x base salary . |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited; pre‑clearance and 10b5‑1 plan requirements apply . |
| 2025 vesting activity | 12,400 shares vested; $253,084 value realized on vesting . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| Effective dates | Interim CEO 12/18/2023; CEO 2/01/2024 . |
| Employment Agreement term | Effective 4/1/2024 through 3/31/2025 with automatic 1‑year renewals unless notice 6 months prior; extended by 3 years to March 31, 2028 in May 2025 . |
| Cash compensation | Base salary $1,380,000 (FY2025); increased to $1,500,000 effective 4/1/2025; target bonus 200% of base (max 400%) . |
| Regular annual LTI (FY2025) | Target $14,950,000; 70% PSUs / 30% RSUs . |
| Special front‑loaded LTI (FY2026) | PSUs and RSUs in lieu of FY2026–FY2028 annual grants; see above . |
| Severance (non‑CoC) | 2x (base + target bonus) paid over 24 months, plus pro‑rata bonus; equity: pro‑rata RSUs vest; PSUs remain outstanding pro‑rata and vest based on actual performance . |
| Severance (CoC; double‑trigger) | 3x (base + greater of 3‑yr avg bonus, target, or most recent bonus); generally lump sum if within 2 years post‑CoC; equity vests at greater of target or actual as of CoC . |
| Example payout tables (3/31/2025 hypotheticals) | CoC total $29.30M (cash $14.94M; PSUs $10.60M; RSUs $3.76M) . Non‑CoC without cause/Good Reason total $11.84M (cash $10.80M; RSUs $1.04M; PSUs performance‑based, potential value noted) . |
| Restrictive covenants | Non‑compete and non‑solicit for 12 months post‑employment; confidentiality . |
| Clawbacks | Executive compensation recovery policy applies; CEO 2024 interim cash sign‑on carried full clawback if departing before successor appointment . |
| Tax gross‑ups | None under agreement; no excise tax gross‑ups . |
| 409A | Potential 6‑month payment delay for specified employees; earnings credited during delay . |
Board Governance (as Director)
- Service/independence: Director since 2020; as CEO he is not independent .
- Board leadership: Roles split—independent Chair (David L. Herzog) and CEO; committees chaired by independent directors .
- Committee roles: No committee assignments disclosed for CEO; all standing committees comprised entirely of independent directors .
- Attendance and executive sessions: In FY2025, no director attended fewer than 91% of meetings; independent directors held four executive sessions .
Director Compensation (context)
- Standard non‑employee director retainer: $100,000 cash + $240,000 annual RSUs; role‑based retainers for Chair/committee chairs; RSUs vest at earlier of 1 year or next annual meeting .
- As CEO, Fernandez receives no separate director compensation .
Compensation & Incentive Data (selected multi‑year items)
| Item | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
| STI payout (% of target) | 59% | 91% |
| FY results context (company-level) | Revenue $13,667M; Net income $86M; EBIT $193M; Adjusted EBIT $1,009M; CFO $1,361M; FCF $756M . | Revenue $12,871M; Net income $396M; EBIT $696M; Adjusted EBIT $1,019M; CFO $1,398M; FCF $687M . |
Perquisites and Other Benefits
- FY2025 perqs for Fernandez: personal use of corporate aircraft ($555,103), executive concierge life insurance premiums ($95,862), basic life insurance premiums ($2,520) .
- No pension/SERP participation; no nonqualified deferred compensation participation by NEOs in FY2025 .
Related Party Transactions and Conflicts
- FY2025: No related‑party transactions requiring disclosure .
- FY2024: DXC engaged RemoteRetail, majority‑owned by Fernandez, for “work‑from‑anywhere” services beginning 2021; DXC also acquired a $2.5M minority equity interest in 2023; Fernandez recused from negotiations; arrangements on arm’s‑length terms .
Say‑on‑Pay and Peer Group
- Say‑on‑pay support: 89% approval at 2024 annual meeting .
- Peer benchmarking: Broad IT/services peer set used for FY2025 decisions; CEO target pay aligned near peer median .
Compensation Committee & Advisors
- Compensation Committee members: Akihiko Washington (Chair), Anthony Gonzalez, David Herzog, Dawn Rogers; all independent .
- Independent advisor: Pay Governance (no conflicts) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Heavy weighting to performance equity, with FY2026 front‑loaded PSUs (80% FCF/20% Revenue plus rTSR modifier) and high CEO ownership guideline (7x salary), strengthens pay‑for‑performance and long‑term alignment; hedging/pledging prohibitions further align incentives .
- Cash discipline focus: FCF‑centric PSUs (FY2025 100% FCF with rTSR; FY2026 FCF/Revenue with rTSR) incentivize cash generation and disciplined capital allocation; monitor for potential under‑investment risk if cash metrics overly dominate .
- Vesting/flow supply: Material FY2026–FY2028 vesting cadence (front‑loaded RSUs and potential PSUs) creates identifiable insider vesting windows; policy requires pre‑clearance and restricts hedging/pledging, but vesting may still create episodic selling pressure around release dates .
- Downside protection/exit economics: Double‑trigger CoC with 3x multiple and broad equity acceleration is market‑standard but sizable; non‑CoC 2x multiple with continued PSU participation on actuals aligns with ongoing performance risk sharing .
- Governance: Separation of Chair/CEO, independent committees, strong executive sessions cadence, and high say‑on‑pay support (89%) indicate supportive stewardship; prior RemoteRetail dealings were mitigated by recusals and no FY2025 related‑party transactions .