Ricardo Anzaldua
About Ricardo Anzaldua
Ricardo Anzaldua, 71, is Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Everest Group (EG), serving since June 2023; he holds an A.B. from Brown University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School . During his tenure, Everest delivered 2024 gross written premium (GWP) of $18.2B (+9.1% YoY), net operating income of $1.3B, net income of $1.4B, and a 2024 TSR of 9.2% (Everest defines TSR as annual growth in book value per share plus dividends) . In 2023, Everest posted record results with GWP of $16.6B (+19.2% YoY), net operating income of $2.8B, after-tax operating ROE of 23.1%, and TSR of 26.5% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Freddie Mac | EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | 2019–2021 | Led enterprise legal, corporate secretarial and board governance functions . |
| MetLife, Inc. | EVP & General Counsel | Not disclosed | Oversaw global legal operations, compliance, and government relations . |
| The Hartford | General Counsel, Property-Casualty Division | Not disclosed | Led P&C division’s legal function . |
| Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP | Partner; Chair, Diversity Committee | Not disclosed | Corporate legal practice leadership and diversity governance . |
External Roles
None disclosed in EG filings for this period .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $680,000 | $680,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 140% | 140% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $952,000 | $952,000 |
| Plan Maximum Bonus ($) | $1,360,000 | $1,360,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Not disclosed | $682,493 |
Notes:
- 2024 bonus outcomes reflected Company Adjusted Net Operating Income ROE of 8.7%, resulting in below-target payouts for applicable NEOs including Anzaldua .
- For 2024, the Executive Incentive Plan used Company financial performance (Adjusted Net Operating Income ROE) weighted 60% and individual performance weighted 40% .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Operating Income ROE | 60% | Operating plan ROE target (not disclosed) | 8.7% | Below target; contributed to $682,493 bonus |
| Individual goals | 40% | N/A | N/A | Contributed to overall outcome |
Long-Term Incentives and Structure
- 2024 RSUs: $777,095 grant-date fair value .
- 2024 PSUs (target): $383,190 .
- Vesting: Time-vested RS awards granted in 2024 and later vest in equal annual installments over three years; awards prior to 2024 vest 20% per year over five years .
- The company does not currently grant stock options; LTI is delivered via RS and PSUs .
2024 PSU Performance Design
| PSU Metric | Weight | Target/Thresholds | Measurement Window |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Operating Income ROE | 50% | Target 17.0%; 0% payout <8.0%; 25% at 8.0%; 100% at 17.0%; 175% ≥25.0% | FY2024; one-third of award tranche |
| TSR (absolute) | 25% | Target 17.0%; 0% payout <8.0%; 25% at 8.0%; 100% at 17.0%; 175% ≥25.0% | FY2024; one-third of award tranche |
| Relative TSR vs peers | 25% | Median target; 0% <25th percentile; 25% at 25th; 100% at median; 175% ≥75th | 2024–2026 cumulative |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 3,714 shares (as of Mar 17, 2025) . |
| Vested vs unvested | Includes 2,982 restricted (unvested) shares; remaining balance reflects other holdings . |
| Ownership as % of outstanding | Less than 1% (reported as “—%” in proxy table) . |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | None disclosed; company does not currently grant stock options . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by company policy . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for NEOs (six times for CEO) . |
| Compliance status | Not disclosed. |
Employment Terms
| Category | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Amended and Restated effective Apr 22, 2024; indefinite term; role EVP & General Counsel; base salary $680,000; target bonus 140% of base; target stock award 160% of base (subject to adjustment) . |
| Start date | Joined June 12, 2023 . |
| Severance (no CIC): termination without cause or resignation for good reason | Cash severance $2,042,493; unvested RS continue to vest for 12 months (value shown $254,084); PSUs for performance achieved to date ($31,947); benefits continuation ~$30,530; total incremental value $2,359,054 (as of 12/31/2024 scenario) . |
| Change-in-control plan (CIC) | Double-trigger: if terminated without due cause or for good reason within 2 years post-change, immediate vesting of RS; options (if any) vest and remain exercisable for 3 months; PSUs governed by PSU award agreements; cash payment equals average salary+bonus over prior 3 years multiplied by factor (2.0x for Anzaldua in 2024); 2 years medical/dental; special retirement benefits; “Best Net” 280G cutback applied; no excise tax gross-ups . |
| CIC illustrative payout (12/31/2024 scenario) | Cash $2,292,309; RS $762,253; PSUs $313,579; benefits $43,000; total incremental value $3,411,141 . |
| Clawback | Updated effective Dec 1, 2023 to comply with SEC/NYSE; recovers incentive-based comp on restatements and for material willful misconduct; applies to current/former Section 16 officers . |
| Non-compete/other covenants | Non-compete provisions apply under employment agreements (specific durations not disclosed) . |
Compensation Practices, Peer Group, and Say-on-Pay
- Practices: No change-in-control agreement separate for CEO; double-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; prohibition on hedging/pledging; stock ownership guidelines for executives; PSUs used in LTI .
- Compensation peer group (examples): AIG, Arch Capital, Axis Capital, Chubb, Cincinnati Financial, CNA Financial, Hanover Insurance, Markel, RenaissanceRe, W.R. Berkley .
- Say-on-Pay support: 93% approval at 2025 AGM for 2024 compensation; prior year 94.17% approval at 2024 AGM for 2023 compensation .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Anzaldua’s incentives are meaningfully at-risk via PSUs tied to Net Operating Income ROE, absolute TSR, and relative TSR, with a 175% cap and multi-year performance periods—supporting long-term alignment with TSR and profitability objectives .
- Retention dynamics: Standard severance (2x base) outside CIC and 2.0x average salary+bonus under CIC with double-trigger and equity acceleration provide competitive, not excessive, protection; clawback and hedging/pledging prohibitions strengthen governance .
- Potential selling pressure: 2,982 unvested RSs will vest over a three-year schedule (for 2024+ grants), which could create episodic liquidity events; absence of disclosed options reduces additional overhang .
- Ownership alignment: Absolute share ownership is modest (<1%), but executive ownership guidelines (3x salary) and ongoing RS/PSU awards drive continuing exposure to equity outcomes .
- Governance and shareholder support: Strong recent Say-on-Pay outcomes (93%/94.17%) and absence of golden parachute tax gross-ups or single-trigger CIC reduce governance risk signals .