John Coleman
About John Coleman
John F. Coleman, 65, is Executive Vice President at EastGroup Properties (EGP). He has served as EVP since May 2017, after holding Senior Vice President roles at EGP from 2001–2017 and previously at Weeks Corporation/Duke Realty (industrial/office REIT) from 1994–2001 . During 2024, EGP’s operational performance included FFO per diluted share of $8.35 (+7.2% YoY), Same PNOI (cash basis) growth of 5.6% YoY, and 96.1% occupancy; three-year TSR ranked in the 80th percentile versus Nareit Industrial constituents, which are the performance anchors underlying executive incentives . The AIP metrics include FFO/share, Same PNOI growth, Debt-to-EBITDAre, and Fixed Charge Coverage; LTIP is 3-year relative TSR versus Nareit Equity and Industrial indices .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| EastGroup Properties | Executive Vice President | 2017–present | Senior operating leadership at an industrial REIT; responsibilities align with regional operations and development/acquisition execution as reflected in AIP objectives |
| EastGroup Properties | Senior Vice President | 2001–2017 | Senior operating leadership contributing to portfolio growth and operating performance |
| Weeks Corporation / Duke Realty | Senior Vice President | 1994–2001 | Senior leadership at industrial/office REIT, bringing sector operating expertise to EGP |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public-company board roles disclosed for Coleman |
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $495,000 | $515,000 | 4.0% increase YoY |
| Target AIP Cash (% of Salary) | — | 70% ($360,500) | Other NEO weighting: Corporate 70% / Individual 30% |
| Target AIP Equity (% of Salary) | — | 70% ($360,500), 1,964 shares at $183.54 ref price | Shares valued at $183.54 at period start |
| Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($) | — | $472,255 | Based on 2024 AIP results |
| All Other Compensation ($) | — | $128,698 | 401(k): $32,810; dividends on vested restricted stock: $95,269; life insurance premium: $619 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Outcomes
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate performance (FFO/share, Same PNOI, Debt/EBITDAre, Fixed Charge Coverage) | 70% (for other NEOs) | Targets not disclosed | Company scored weighted average 133% of target | Contributes to overall 131% total award for Coleman | Equity: 34% at certification; 33% on 1/1/2026; 33% on 1/1/2027 |
| Individual objectives (region-specific occupancy/PNOI/development) | 30% (for other NEOs) | Goals not disclosed | Coleman achieved 125% of target (exceeded Same PNOI and average occupancy objectives; met development goals) | Contributes to overall 131% total award | Same as above |
| AIP Cash Earned ($) | — | $360,500 | $472,255 | 131% of target | Paid in cash |
| AIP Equity Earned (shares) | — | 1,964 | 2,573 | 131% of target | 34% immediate; remainder ratably over next 2 years |
AIP metric definitions and rationale are explicitly linked to REIT operating and balance sheet health (FFO/share, Same PNOI growth, leverage and coverage) .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants and Framework
| Item | Coleman Value/Units | Structure | Vesting | Performance Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LTIP Target ($) | $559,000 | 70% performance-based; 30% service-based | Performance-based: 75% at end of 3-year period; 25% following year. Service-based: 25% per year over 4 years | Relative TSR vs Nareit Equity Index (50%) and Nareit Industrial constituents (50%) |
| Total RSUs at target | 3,046 units | As above | As above | As above |
| Performance-based RSUs | 2,132 units | Earnout 50–200% of target (linear) | 75% after performance period; remainder next year | Relative TSR |
| Service-based restricted shares | 914 shares | 30% of LTIP | 25% per year over 4 years | Service-based retention |
| Status of prior LTIPs | 2022–2024 paid at target; 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 tracking at target (interim) | — | — | Relative TSR tracking |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 97,688 shares |
| Shares outstanding (03/31/2025) | 52,265,432 shares |
| Ownership (% of outstanding) | 0.187% (97,688 ÷ 52,265,432) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Robust guidelines exist; directors: 5x retainer; executives required to meet multiples and all with ≥5 years are in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and officers (alignment safeguard) |
| Options | Company does not grant options to executives |
Vesting Schedules and Unvested Awards (as of 12/31/2024)
| Award Type (Coleman) | Units Unvested | Vesting Schedule / Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 LTIP service-based remaining | 196 | Vested 1/1/2025 |
| 2021 LTIP performance-based remaining | 915 | Vested 1/1/2025 |
| 2022 AIP remaining | 683 | Vested 1/1/2025 |
| 2022 LTIP service-based remaining | 329 | 50% on 1/1/2025 and 1/1/2026 |
| 2023 AIP remaining | 2,301 | 33% on 1/1/2025 and 1/1/2026 |
| 2023 LTIP service-based remaining | 805 | 25% on 1/1/2025, 1/1/2026, 1/1/2027 |
| 2024 LTIP service-based | 914 | On 2/12/2025, 1/1/2026, 1/1/2027, 1/1/2028 |
| 2022 LTIP performance-based (target) | 1,536 | Determined at target in Feb 2025; 75% vested then, 25% on 1/1/2026 |
| 2023 LTIP performance-based (target) | 2,506 | Open (2023–2025) |
| 2024 LTIP performance-based (target) | 2,132 | Open (2024–2026) |
| 2024 AIP corporate-performance tranche (initial placeholder) | 2,063 | Final earned updated to 1,829 shares in Feb 2025; 34% immediate, 33% on 1/1/2026 and 1/1/2027 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Executive Vice Presidents (incl. Coleman) |
|---|---|
| Protection period (post-CoC) | 24 months |
| Cash severance (no CoC, without cause) | 2x average annual compensation (salary+cash bonus) |
| Cash severance (double-trigger CoC) | 3x average annual compensation |
| Death benefit (cash) | 1x average annual compensation |
| Health and life insurance (post-CoC termination) | 24 months continuation; valued at ~$30,000/year assumption |
| Equity acceleration (death/disability) | Full acceleration of service-based; pro-rated performance-based at target for open periods |
| Equity acceleration (termination without cause) | Full acceleration of service-based; previously earned performance-based service tranches accelerate |
| Equity acceleration (CoC – awards not assumed) | Single-trigger: all service-based fully vest; performance-based deemed at target |
| Equity acceleration (CoC – awards assumed + qualifying termination within 2 years) | Double-trigger: full acceleration; performance-based deemed at target |
| Retirement equity policy | Acceleration subject to 12-month/award schedule; performance awards pro-rated subject to noncompete; clawback if breach |
| Clawback policy | Adopted Aug 2023; recovery of excess incentive comp for 3 fiscal years pre-restatement; up to 100% if misconduct contributed |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited |
| Tax gross-ups | None; no single-trigger cash severance provisions; no SERP/non-qualified deferred comp |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Coleman’s incentives are predominantly variable and tied to FFO/share, Same PNOI, leverage/coverage, and multi-year relative TSR—anchoring payouts to value creation versus REIT peers; 2024 AIP paid at 131% and LTIP cohorts track at target, signaling disciplined calibration rather than outsized awards .
- Retention risk: Multi-year vesting, retirement noncompete conditions, and double-trigger equity acceleration under CoC reduce forced turnover risk; EVP severance at 2x (no CoC) and 3x (CoC) plus 24-month benefits further stabilize retention across cycles .
- Selling pressure: No hedging/pledging allowed and staggered vesting of sizable unvested awards mitigate near-term insider selling pressure; equity vests gradually over multiple years .
- Ownership alignment: Coleman’s beneficial ownership of 97,688 shares (~0.187%) plus compliance with stock ownership guidelines supports alignment; strong say‑on‑pay support (97.3% in 2024) reduces governance overhang risk .
- Execution track record: Individual AIP objectives reflect execution on occupancy/PNOI and development goals; company-level TSR 80th percentile over three years and sustained growth in FFO/Same PNOI underpin incentive achievement without discretionary overrides .