Jeffrey Hurd
Equitable HoldingsAbout Jeffrey Hurd
Jeffrey J. Hurd (age 58) is Chief Operating Officer of Equitable Holdings (EQH), with strategic oversight of Human Resources, Information Technology, Operations, Communications, Corporate Real Estate, Security, and the Innovation & Design Office; he joined Equitable in January 2018 after a 20-year career at AIG culminating as EVP & COO . EQH delivered 2024 Non-GAAP Operating Earnings of $2.0B, cash flow of $1.5B, and AUM/A of $1,019B, and EQH’s TSR outperformed its peer group in four of the past five years, evidencing a favorable backdrop for pay-for-performance calibration . As COO, Hurd led EQH’s “Efficiency Moonshot,” achieving $100M run‑rate expense savings in 2024, and drove culture and operational initiatives (e.g., headquarters relocation on time/on budget, improved engagement and wellness scores) that supported performance-linked incentive outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equitable Holdings | Chief Operating Officer; Management Committee member | 2018–present | Enterprise Efficiency Moonshot; $100M run‑rate expense savings; agile/GenAI program; new HQ executed on time/on budget; improved engagement and wellness metrics |
| American International Group (AIG) | EVP & COO; previously CHRO, CAO, Deputy GC, Head of Asset Mgmt Restructuring | 1998–prior to 2018 | Senior operator through large-scale transformation and risk/ops roles; joined EQH in Jan 2018 |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| AllianceBernstein Corporation (EQH subsidiary; publicly traded AB platform) | Director | Current |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 898,765 | 898,765 | 898,808 |
| 2024 Cash Incentive (STIC) | Value |
|---|---|
| STIC Target ($) | 1,500,000 |
| Final Funding % | 142% |
| Individual Assessment % | 120% |
| STIC Actual ($) | 2,556,000 |
• Benefits/perquisites: 401(k) company contributions of $31,050 in 2024; otherwise de minimis perquisites (no car/driver benefit for Hurd) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Short-Term Incentive design and results (corporate scorecard)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold ($m) | Target ($m) | Maximum ($m) | Actual ($m) | Contribution to Initial Funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-GAAP Operating Earnings | 25% | 1,463 | 1,950 | 2,438 | 2,007 | 28% |
| Value of New Business (VNB) | 25% | 438 | 584 | 730 | 757 (adj.) | 50% |
| Cash Flow | 25% | 900 | 1,200 | 1,500 | 1,500 (with $200m excluded for scoring) | 50% |
| Strategic Initiatives | 25% | N/A | Goals exceeded | N/A | Qualitative (130%) | 32% |
| Total Initial Funding | — | — | — | — | — | 160% |
| Final Funding Adjustment | — | — | — | — | — | 142% (exclude $200m special dividend effect) |
• Hurd’s 2024 STIC payout = Target ($1.5m) × Final Funding (142%) × Individual Assessment (120%) = $2,556,000 .
2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) grant (mix, metrics, vesting)
| Vehicle | Grant date | Units (target) | Grant date FV ($) | Vesting | Performance metric/curve |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 2/14/2024 | 29,595 | 1,000,015 | 1/3 on 2/28/2025, 2/28/2026, 2/28/2027 | Service-based; dividend equivalents |
| Performance Shares (TSR) | 2/14/2024 | 19,842 | 750,028 | Cliff on 2/28/2027 | Relative TSR vs peer group; 0% (<30th pct) to 200% (≥87.5th pct) payout |
| Performance Shares (Non-GAAP EPS) | 2/14/2024 | 22,196 | 750,003 | Cliff on 2/28/2027 | Annual EPS factors averaged over 2024–2026; 0%–200% curve |
Notes:
- 2024 LTI mix: RSUs 40%, TSR PS 30%, Non-GAAP EPS PS 30%; PS performance period 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; TSR peer group includes Corebridge and other life/financial peers .
- Hurd’s total 2024 equity award value = $2,500,000, including a $150,000 discretionary increase .
Recent LTI payout quality (realizable performance)
| Grant (EQH PS) | Performance period | Metric | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 Performance Shares | 1/1/2022–12/31/2024 | Relative TSR | 145.6% performance factor; EQH TSR 57.8%, between 50th and 87.5th percentile |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership
| As of | Shares beneficially owned | Percent of class |
|---|---|---|
| March 24, 2025 | 427,919 | <1% |
Unvested awards and near-term vesting cadence (as of FY-end)
| Award (unvested) | Hurd units |
|---|---|
| 2022 Performance Shares vesting 2/28/2025 | 51,097 |
| 2022 RSUs vesting 2/28/2025 (final tranche) | 8,341 |
| 2023 RSUs vesting 2/28/2025 and 2/28/2026 | 20,157 |
| 2024 RSUs vesting 2/28/2025, 2/28/2026, 2/28/2027 | 30,303 |
| 2023 TSR Performance Shares (reporting at maximum) | 76,102 |
| 2024 TSR Performance Shares (reporting at maximum) | 40,634 |
| 2024 Non-GAAP EPS Performance Shares (reporting at maximum) | 45,455 |
Vesting supply/selling pressure markers:
- 2/28/2025: 2022 PS + 2022/2023/2024 RSU tranches vest, creating potential mechanical share deliveries; Hurd had 48,692 shares vest in 2024 (value realized $1,667,153). He did not exercise options in 2024 (EQH has not been granting options) .
Ownership policies and alignment
- Stock ownership guideline: 3x base salary for Management Committee members; counts EQH stock and unvested RSUs toward compliance; 75% net retention of shares until guideline met .
- Hedging and pledging: prohibited for all employees and directors (eliminates pledged‑share overhang risk) .
- Rule 10b5‑1 trading plans permitted under policy .
- Company no longer grants stock options; no repricing without shareholder approval .
Deferred compensation and retirement benefits
| Plan | 2024 executive contributions ($) | 2024 aggregate earnings ($) | 2024 withdrawals ($) | Balance at 12/31/2024 ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post‑2004 Variable Deferred Compensation Plan (Hurd) | 136,454 | 274,277 | — | 3,307,174 |
- 401(k) company contributions for Hurd: $31,050 (2024) .
- Executive Survivor Benefits Plan (grandfathered): Hurd is a participant (provides death benefits under elected options) .
Employment Terms
- Start at EQH: January 2018 (COO; Management Committee) .
- Employment agreement: Only EQH’s CEO has an employment agreement; other NEOs, including Hurd, participate in severance plans rather than individual employment contracts .
Severance and change‑in‑control (CIC) economics
| Plan/Provision | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Severance Plan + Supplemental Severance Plan (Executives) | Additional severance for EQH Program Participants other than CEO, contingent on release; includes 12‑month non‑competition and non‑solicitation (employees/customers) obligations . |
| CIC severance | If job elimination or resignation for good reason within 12 months after a CIC, eligible for 2x (base salary + short‑term incentive compensation) . |
| Equity treatment on CIC | Awards not assumed/replaced with substantially same/better terms fully vest for same per‑share consideration as stockholders (i.e., single‑trigger if unassumed) . |
| Post‑termination equity | Rule of 65 (age + service ≥65; at least age 55 and 5 years of service): continued vesting post‑termination (subject to performance and covenants) for awards held ≥1 year . |
| Clawbacks | Company-wide SEC/NYSE‑compliant clawback covers restatements and misconduct; equity award agreements include additional restrictive covenant and 12‑month look‑back clawbacks . |
| Tax gross‑ups | Company does not provide excise tax gross‑ups upon change in control (good governance practice) . |
Illustrative potential payments for Hurd (as of 12/31/2024; EQH share price on that date, per proxy methodology)
| Scenario | Temporary income payments ($) | Lump sum payments ($) | EQH equity awards ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement | — | 1,500,000 | — |
| Involuntary termination – no CIC | 4,132,125 | 1,540,000 | 23,758,163 |
| CIC without termination | — | — | 7,137,517 |
| Death | — | — | 8,254,297 |
| Disability | — | — | 8,254,297 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix and leverage: 2024 equity mix 60% performance shares (TSR and Non‑GAAP EPS) and 40% RSUs; cash STIC tied equally to Non‑GAAP Operating Earnings, VNB, Cash Flow, and Strategic Initiatives; no options granted, reducing risk of option repricing concerns .
- Performance calibration: Corporate STIC scorecard exceeded targets in 2024 (Initial Funding 160%; Final Funding 142% after adjustment), and 2022 PS paid at 145.6% on 3‑year relative TSR, aligning realized pay with multi‑year shareholder returns .
- Governance safeguards: Robust clawbacks, strict anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging, stock ownership requirements, and no excise tax gross‑ups (shareholder‑friendly) .
- Peer benchmarking: Compensation targeted around market median with life/financial peers; COO compensation reviewed for internal equity due to role uniqueness (mitigates peer‑group gaming risk) .
Say‑on‑Pay and Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 96.1%, indicating broad shareholder support for program alignment and governance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Hurd’s incentives are tightly linked to profitability (Non‑GAAP EPS), cash generation, new business value, and relative TSR, with majority at‑risk and multi‑year, suggesting strong pay‑for‑performance alignment .
- Retention risk: Significant unvested equity and Rule‑of‑65 favorable vesting reduce near‑term voluntary attrition risk; however, potential involuntary termination equity acceleration is material (proxy point‑in‑time estimate $23.8M), which would be a one‑time overhang if triggered .
- Trading/overhang: Prohibited hedging/pledging lowers governance risk; near‑term vesting events (2/28/2025) could create modest supply from RSU/PS settlements; Hurd had no option exercises in 2024 and realized $1.67M from vestings, consistent with program mechanics rather than opportunistic selling .
- Execution track record: 2024 operating results (Non‑GAAP Operating Earnings $2.0B; $1.5B cash flow; AUM/A $1.019T) and expense run‑rate savings progress bolster confidence in operational execution under Hurd’s remit; relative TSR outperformance in 4/5 years supports long‑term value creation orientation in incentives .
Overall: Incentive design and realized outcomes show credible pay‑for‑performance alignment, governance strength (no pledging, robust clawbacks), and manageable selling pressure concentrated around scheduled vesting. Retention risk appears contained by substantial unvested equity and continued leadership of core enterprise efficiency and technology initiatives tied to multi‑year goals .