Alexander Brackenridge
Executive Vice President and Chief Investment Officer at EQR
Executive
About Alexander Brackenridge
Alexander Brackenridge, 61, is Executive Vice President and Chief Investment Officer of Equity Residential, serving as CIO since September 2020 and with the company since 1993; he holds an MBA from Yale University and is a member of NMHC and ULI . In 2024, his performance assessment reflected strong capital allocation and portfolio optimization: ~$1.6B of acquisitions (avg. age 5 years, 5.1% acquisition cap rate) and ~$975.6M of dispositions (avg. age 35 years, 5.4% disposition yield), plus Company same-store revenue growth of 3.0% and inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability World and North America Indices; his overall AIP/AIP-equity achievement was 132.32% of target for 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Residential | EVP & Chief Investment Officer | Sep 2020–present | Leads capital allocation across expansion/established markets; 2024 program included ~$1.6B acquisitions at 5.1% cap and ~$975.6M dispositions at 5.4% yield; supported same-store revenue growth of 3.0% . |
| Equity Residential | EVP – Investments | Feb 2015–Aug 2020 | Senior investment leadership preceding CIO role . |
| Equity Residential | SVP – Investments | May 2002–Jan 2015 | Investment leadership across cycles . |
| Equity Residential | Investments/Asset Mgmt roles | 1993–Apr 2002 | Progressive roles; built long-tenured institutional knowledge . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Multifamily Housing Council (NMHC) | Member | n/a | Industry engagement and policy advocacy . |
| Urban Land Institute (ULI) | Member | n/a | Industry best practices, capital markets insights . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 600,000 | EVP pay level aligned with market; no employment agreements . |
| 2023 | 600,000 | — |
| 2022 | 600,000 | — |
| 2024 Target Pay Components | Amount ($) | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | 600,000 | Fixed cash. |
| Target Performance Bonus (AIP – Cash) | 900,000 | At-risk cash. |
| Target Performance Equity Grant (AIP – Equity) | 1,140,000 | At-risk equity (Share/Option Awards). |
| Target LTI Awards (3-year performance plan) | 1,110,000 | At-risk, 0–200% based on quantitative metrics . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Results and Payouts
| Component | Target | Actual Score | Weighted Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Goals | n/a | 140.12% | — |
| Business Unit Goals | n/a | 125.00% | — |
| Individual Goals | n/a | 100.00% | — |
| Overall AIP/AIP-Equity | 100% | 132.32% | 132.32% |
| AIP Outcomes (2024 performance; paid/awarded 2025) | Target ($) | % of Target Achieved | Actual ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Bonus (Cash) | 900,000 | 132.32% | 1,190,880 |
| Performance Equity Grant (AIP Equity) | 1,140,000 | 132.32% | 1,508,448 |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTI) – Structure and Metrics
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity Apartments Index | 35.0% | -400 bps | 0 bps | +400 bps |
| TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity REIT Index | 20.0% | -500 bps | 0 bps | +500 bps |
| Net Debt to Normalized EBITDAre | 22.5% | 6.00x | 5.00x–4.00x | 3.00x |
| Normalized FFO per share (avg of annual targets) | 22.5% | $3.80 | $3.84–$3.86 | $3.93 |
- Payout curve: 0%–200%, with 50%/100%/200% at Threshold/Target/Maximum; linear interpolation between points .
- 2022–2024 LTI result (for all NEOs): 141.20% achievement at performance period end; settled in early 2025 per plan terms .
2024 Grants (Awarded January/February 2024)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Terms | Brackenridge (Units/Shares) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LTI Awards (2024–2026 performance period) | 1/1/2024 | Threshold/Target/Max 8,860/17,720/35,440; settle after 3 years; 0–200% payout | 17,720 (Target) | 1,109,981 |
| AIP Share Awards for 2023 service | 2/1/2024 | Vest in full on 3rd anniversary of grant date | 20,524 | 1,251,143 |
| AIP Option Awards for 2023 service | 2/1/2024 | Vest ~ratably over 3 years; strike at grant close | 0 | 0 |
Multi-Year Summary of Performance-Linked Pay (SEC SCT components)
| Year | Share Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive Plan (Cash Bonus) ($) | Total Compensation ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 2,361,124 | 0 | 1,190,880 | 4,164,991 |
| 2023 | 2,459,968 | 0 | 987,750 | 4,057,618 |
| 2022 | 2,228,336 | 0 | 1,125,000 | 3,968,292 |
- 2024 equity vesting realized: 22,091 share awards vested; value realized $1,333,091; no option exercises .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of March 31, 2025)
| Holder | Common Share Equivalents | Options Exercisable in 60 Days | % of Common Shares | % of Common Share Equivalents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alexander Brackenridge | 110,646 | 15,516 | <1% | <1% |
- Ownership guidelines: EVPs must hold shares ≥3x base salary; compliance window is five years from appointment/promotion; all executives met requirements or were within the timeframe in 2024 .
- Hedging/pledging: Hedging and pledging prohibited for executives and trustees; pledged shares by trustees/executives were zero as of March 31, 2025 .
Outstanding Unvested/Unearned Awards (as of December 31, 2024)
| Award Type | Quantity | Reported Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Earned/Unvested Share Awards | 53,663 | 3,850,857 | Value at $71.76 closing price; time-based vesting policy applies . |
| Unearned/Unvested LTI Awards | 59,385 | 4,261,468 | Reflects LTI awards at indicated valuation % of target as of 12/31/24; settle at end of respective 3-year periods . |
Stock Options (as of December 31, 2024)
| Exercisable | Unexercisable | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15,516 | — | 72.02 | 02/01/2029 |
Vesting Mechanics and Near-Term Supply
- AIP share awards vest on the third anniversary of grant; e.g., 20,524 shares granted 2/1/2024 would vest 2/1/2027, subject to continued service/retirement provisions .
- LTI awards cliff-vest after the three-year performance period (2024–2026 awards settle post-12/31/2026 based on metric achievement) .
- 2024 realized vesting: 22,091 shares (value $1.33M) vested in 2024, indicating periodic equity conversion that can create episodic supply; no options exercised in 2024 .
Employment Terms
Severance & Change-in-Control (CIC)
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Accrued Bonus/LTC | Benefits | Equity | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIC + termination without Cause (or resign for Good Reason) | 5,940,000 | 2,040,000 | 54,002 | 8,112,324 | Total $16,146,326 (as of 12/31/2024 assumptions) . |
| Termination w/o Cause or resign for Good Reason (non-CIC) | 2,250,000 | 2,040,000 | 20,772 | 6,578,120 | Total $10,888,892 (as of 12/31/2024 assumptions) . |
| Death/Disability | — | — | — | 8,112,324 | Total $8,112,324 . |
Key terms:
- CIC Agreements provide cash severance equal to 2.25x base salary + target bonus + target performance equity grant for EVPs, plus 2.25 years of continued benefits; equity vests on a double-trigger under the Share Incentive Plan (CIC + qualifying termination) .
- Non-CIC qualifying termination cash severance: 1.5x base salary + target bonus for EVPs .
- Excise tax: CEO has a gross-up; EVPs (including Brackenridge) have a modified cutback to avoid excise tax if beneficial on an after-tax basis .
- No employment agreements with executives; clawback policy in place .
Deferred Compensation (SERP)
| Executive Contributions (2024) | Company Contributions (2024) | Earnings (2024) | 12/31/2024 Balance |
|---|---|---|---|
| $0 | $0 | $234,045 | $2,273,821 |
- Employee-funded SERP allows deferral of up to 25% salary and up to 100% bonuses/equity; no company contributions or guarantees .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 achievements under Brackenridge’s remit included executing the Company’s capital allocation strategy—expanding into higher-growth markets (~10% of assets by NOI in expansion markets), ~$1.6B acquisitions (avg. 5 years old, 5.1% cap) and ~$975.6M dispositions (avg. 35 years old, 5.4% yield), supporting portfolio quality and long-term returns .
- Company same-store revenue grew 3.0% YoY in 2024 (high end of guidance and above apartment peer average), with enhanced data/analytics in investment decisions and sustainability leadership (DJSI World and North America inclusion) .
- Result: 2024 AIP/AIP-equity payout for Brackenridge at 132.32% of target (Corporate 140.12%, BU 125%, Individual 100%) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Equity-heavy, option-light design: For 2022–2024, Brackenridge received $0 in option awards annually in the SCT, with performance share/units dominating long-term pay—consistent with REIT practice of emphasizing relative TSR, leverage, and FFO-based metrics .
- Objective, formulaic metrics: LTI metrics and ranges are fully disclosed (TSR vs indices, leverage, Normalized FFO/share) with a 0–200% payout range; 2022–2024 plan settled at 141.20%, validating pay-for-performance linkage .
- Governance protections: No employment agreements, robust clawback, prohibition on hedging/pledging, and double-trigger equity vesting under CIC reduce misalignment risk .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited; pledged shares by executives/trustees were zero as of March 31, 2025 .
- Option repricing: Not permitted .
- CIC Economics: EVP CIC cash multiple of 2.25x salary+target bonus + target performance equity grant, plus equity acceleration upon double-trigger termination—market-aligned but meaningful .
- Tax gross-ups: None for EVPs; modified cutback applies (CEO retains historic gross-up) .
Equity Ownership & Guideline Compliance
- EVP guideline: 3x base salary; executives met or were within the compliance window in 2024 .
- Beneficial ownership: 110,646 common share equivalents; <1% ownership; 15,516 options exercisable within 60 days as of 3/31/2025 .
- Outstanding unvested equity: 53,663 earned/unvested shares and 59,385 unearned/unvested LTI awards as of 12/31/2024 .
Employment Terms Summary
- No employment agreement; severance governed by Company policy and CIC Agreements .
- Non-CIC severance: 1.5x base + target bonus; CIC severance: 2.25x base + target bonus + target performance equity grant; benefits continuation 2.25 years; double-trigger equity acceleration .
- Excise tax: Modified cutback for EVPs .
- Deferred comp: $2.27M balance; no Company contributions; employee-directed investments .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: High unvested equity balances (time-based and performance-based) and a 3x salary ownership guideline—with hedging/pledging prohibitions and zero pledged shares—support strong alignment and reduce misalignment risk; double-trigger CIC equity treatment reduces windfall risk absent termination .
- Pay-for-performance signal: 2024 over-target AIP (132.32%) and 2022–2024 LTI outcome (141.20%) indicate incentives are paying out for measurable results (TSR relative performance, leverage discipline, and FFO trajectory), supportive for execution confidence but implying continued performance expectations embedded in forward LTI .
- Selling pressure watch: 22,091 shares vested in 2024 (value $1.33M) and the 2/1/2024 AIP share grant of 20,524 shares vests on 2/1/2027; additional unvested shares and LTI units should vest per schedule/performance, creating periodic supply events to monitor around vesting windows .
- CIC economics: EVP CIC cash severance (2.25x) plus equity acceleration on double-trigger could be material in a sale scenario but is typical among large-cap REITs; EVPs lack tax gross-ups (modified cutback), limiting excess payments risk versus CEOs with legacy gross-ups .
- Track record: 2024 capital allocation and portfolio upgrades (younger assets at attractive cap rates, disposal of older assets), alongside Company same-store revenue growth, reflect disciplined execution under his investment leadership—supportive for long-term value creation signals .