Barry S. Altshuler
About Barry S. Altshuler
Barry S. Altshuler, 66, is Executive Vice President – Investments at Equity Residential (EQR), a role he has held since February 2015, after serving as SVP – Investments (2007–2015), VP of Acquisitions (2002–2006), and VP of Asset Management (1998–2002). He serves on the Executive Committee of the Real Estate Board of New York, the University of Florida Real Estate Advisory Board, and is a member of NMHC and ULI; he also served as President of the California Apartment Association from January 2019 to January 2022 . As performance context for executive incentives in 2024, EQR delivered 20.7% total shareholder return (TSR), 3.1% Same Store NOI growth, and Normalized FFO per share of $3.89, with disciplined capital allocation across ~$1.6B acquisitions and ~$975.6M dispositions .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Residential | EVP – Investments | Feb 2015–present | Senior investments leadership at a period of active portfolio optimization and capital allocation prioritizing Expansion Markets |
| Equity Residential | SVP – Investments | 2007–2015 | Senior leadership within investments function |
| Equity Residential | VP of Acquisitions | 2002–2006 | Acquisitions leadership |
| Equity Residential | VP of Asset Management | 1998–2002 | Asset management leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes / impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real Estate Board of New York | Executive Committee | N/A | Executive-level industry engagement |
| University of Florida | Real Estate Advisory Board | N/A | Advisory role |
| NMHC | Member | N/A | Industry policy and best practices network |
| Urban Land Institute (ULI) | Member | N/A | Industry thought leadership |
| California Apartment Association | President | 2019–2022 | Sector advocacy leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Disclosure status | Not disclosed in the company’s 2025 or 2024 Summary Compensation Tables; Mr. Altshuler is not listed among named executive officers (NEOs) in those years . |
Performance Compensation
Program structure applies to executives (CEO and direct reports). While Mr. Altshuler’s individual payouts are not disclosed, the Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) and Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) metrics and vesting terms are uniform for executives.
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Annual Incentive Plan structure (Other NEOs weighting): Corporate Goals (65%), Business Unit (25%), Individual (10%). Corporate Goals consist of Same Store NOI growth (20%), Normalized FFO/share (20%), Corporate Responsibility (15%), Normalized G&A and Property Management Costs (10%). Performance is measured vs Threshold/Target/Maximum (50%/100%/200%) with interpolation .
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LTI Plan: 3-year forward-looking plan with 0–200% payout based on: Relative TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity Apartments Index (35%), Relative TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity REIT Index (20%), Net Debt to Normalized EBITDAre (22.5%), and Normalized FFO/share (22.5%). Awards cliff-vest at three years, post-performance certification; executives pre-elect share or unit settlement; grant size set in January following Board approval .
| 2024 AIP Corporate Metrics (apply to executives) | Weight (Other NEOs) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Same Store NOI growth (YoY) | 20% | 1.00% | 1.50–2.00% | 3.00% | 3.10% | 200.00% |
| Normalized FFO per share | 20% | $3.80 | $3.84–$3.86 | $3.93 | $3.89 | 142.86% |
| Corporate Responsibility (scored across sustainability/engagement/accountable leadership) | 15% | 10 pts | 14 pts | 20 pts | 17 pts | 150.00% |
| Normalized G&A and Property Mgmt Costs | 10% | $187.5M | $184.0–$185.0M | $179.5M | $189.4M | 0.00% |
| LTI Plan Metrics (2024–2026 cycle) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity Apartments Index (bps vs weighted index) | 35.0% | (400) bps | 0 bps | +400 bps |
| TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity REIT Index (bps vs weighted index) | 20.0% | (500) bps | 0 bps | +500 bps |
| Net Debt / Normalized EBITDAre (quarterly, 12-qtr avg) | 22.5% | 6.00x | 5.00x–4.00x | 3.00x |
| Normalized FFO per share (annual, 3-yr avg) | 22.5% | $3.80 | $3.84–$3.86 | $3.93 |
| Vesting and grant mechanics | Details |
|---|---|
| AIP equity grants (Share Awards/Option Awards) | Share Awards cliff-vest at 3 years; Options vest ratably over 3 years; grants occur 2 business days after Q4 earnings 8‑K . |
| LTI awards | 3-year performance period; cliff-vest after performance certification; settlement in restricted shares/units by executive election; dividend/distribution equivalents delivered post-determination (units receive partial distributions during period) . |
Historical LTI outcomes (program pay-for-performance variability):
- 2022–2024 LTI Plan achieved 141.20% of target; component achievements disclosed (e.g., Net Debt/EBITDAre at 200% of target) .
- Prior LTI outcomes: 2018–2020 (61.23%), 2019–2021 (85.74%), 2020–2022 (25.83%), 2021–2023 (95.56%) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (individual) | Not disclosed individually for Mr. Altshuler in the 2025 proxy beneficial ownership table (NEOs and trustees listed; Mr. Altshuler not enumerated) . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited; zero pledged shares by trustees and executives as of March 31, 2025; hedging and margin accounts also prohibited . |
| Ownership guidelines | EVPs must hold at least 3x base salary in ownership; 5-year compliance window; all executives either met requirements or were within permitted timeframe in 2024 . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms / disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | EQR discloses no employment agreements for executives . |
| CIC vesting (equity plan) | Double-trigger: accelerated vesting of unvested Options/Share Awards upon termination (other than for cause) at or within 24 months following a Change in Control; death/disability also accelerate vesting . |
| Retirement/Rule of 70 | Death/disability and age‑62 retirements accelerate vesting; Rule of 70 provides continued vesting if non-compete/non-solicit complied with; NEOs are not “age 62 eligible employees” under the specific legacy definition . |
| Severance/CIC cash economics | The Company discloses CIC Agreements and Severance Plan terms for current NEOs (CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, GC) including 2.25x CIC severance for non-CEO NEOs and 1.5x non‑CIC severance; Mr. Altshuler is not listed among covered NEOs in 2025 and no parallel terms for him are disclosed . |
Performance & Track Record (Company context relevant to executive incentives)
| Metric/Outcome | 2024 Result |
|---|---|
| TSR | 20.7% |
| Same Store NOI growth (YoY) | 3.1% (above original guidance range) |
| Normalized FFO per share | $3.89 (142.86% of target) |
| Capital allocation | ~$1.6B acquisitions (avg. 5 years old) at ~5.1% cap; ~$975.6M dispositions (avg. 35 years old) at ~5.4% yield; portfolio shift toward Expansion Markets (~10% of NOI) . |
Governance and Controls impacting compensation
- Pay program design: High at‑risk mix (approx. 83% of other NEO target comp performance-based) with 3-year LTI metrics focused on relative TSR, leverage, and Normalized FFO/share .
- No hedging/pledging; no option repricing; no employment agreements; clawback policy in line with NYSE/SEC rules .
- Independent compensation consultant (Ferguson Partners); peer group benchmarking targeted around market median .
- Say‑on‑pay support: ~90% approval in 2024; long-term average ~93% since 2015 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong structural alignment via multi-year, performance-weighted LTI program (relative TSR, leverage, and FFO/share), with risk controls (no hedging/pledging, double-trigger CIC vesting, clawback) and ownership guidelines (EVP 3x salary), all supportive of shareholder alignment for executives in Mr. Altshuler’s band .
- Data gaps on individual comp: Mr. Altshuler was not an NEO in 2024–2025 proxies, so base salary, target bonus, and realized incentive payouts are not disclosed; investors should monitor future proxy NEO rosters and any Item 5.02 8‑Ks for changes to coverage or role/contract terms .
- Vesting/selling pressure: AIP equity vests over 3 years (shares cliff; options ratable), and LTI vests after 3-year performance periods, creating periodic vesting events; hedging/pledging bans and trading blackout policies reduce risk of opportunistic transactions, but lack of Form 4 visibility for Mr. Altshuler limits near-term insider-flow insight .
- Retention/exit economics: No executive employment agreements; CIC and severance cash terms are disclosed for current NEOs, but not for Mr. Altshuler. Company-wide double-trigger equity acceleration and robust retirement/death/disability provisions reduce unintended turnover risk while preserving alignment .
References:
- 2025 DEF 14A (filed April 15, 2025): executive bio, compensation program, performance results, ownership, governance, CIC/severance .
- 2024 DEF 14A (filed April 16, 2024): program design, prior LTI results, share ownership guidelines .
- Company performance highlights (capital allocation, TSR) .