Jeremy T. Knop
EQTAbout Jeremy T. Knop
EQT’s Chief Financial Officer since July 24, 2023, Jeremy T. Knop previously led EQT’s M&A strategy as EVP Corporate Development (Mar 2022–Jul 2023) and SVP Corporate Development (Jan 2021–Mar 2022); earlier, he spent ~9 years at Blackstone’s energy credit team and started in Barclays’ Global Natural Resources Investment Banking. He holds a BBA in Finance from Texas A&M University and was 35 at the time of his CFO appointment in July 2023 . During 2020–2024, EQT’s cumulative TSR rose from $117 to $447 per $100 invested (company TSR), while “compensation actually paid” remained indexed to performance; free cash flow per share was the most heavily weighted STIP metric in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| EQT Corporation | Chief Financial Officer | Jul 24, 2023 – Present | Leads finance, capital allocation, hedging; signed multiple EQT 8-Ks and 10-Q certifications as CFO . |
| EQT Corporation | EVP, Corporate Development | Mar 2022 – Jul 2023 | Led M&A strategy execution for EQT . |
| EQT Corporation | SVP, Corporate Development | Jan 2021 – Mar 2022 | Built EQT’s M&A pipeline and evaluation processes . |
| The Blackstone Group | Principal / VP / Associate / Analyst (Energy Credit) | Aug 2012 – Jan 2021 | Managed multi‑billion energy credit portfolios; deal sourcing, due diligence, execution; served on portfolio-company boards across upstream/midstream . |
| Barclays Capital | Analyst, Global Natural Resources IB | Jun 2010 – Aug 2012 | Transaction execution and analysis in energy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Blackstone portfolio companies | Director (while at Blackstone) | 2012 – 2021 | Board oversight for upstream/midstream portfolio companies as part of energy credit mandates . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 428,846 | 533,258 (paid) ; Annual base set to $540,000 effective Mar 4, 2024 |
| Target Annual Incentive ($) | 450,000 | 540,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 29,700 | 31,050 |
| Total Reported Compensation ($) | 2,738,318 | 4,030,171 |
Notes:
- 2024 base salary level increased to $540,000 (effective Mar 4, 2024); 2023 base was $500,000 effective on CFO appointment (Jul 24, 2023) .
- 2024 target bonus set at $540,000 (equals 100% of base on stated amounts) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (STIP) – Design, Outcomes, and Payout
- 2024 STIP metrics and weights: Free Cash Flow per Share (30%); Total Capex per Mcfe (15%); Adjusted Gross G&A per Mcfe (15%); Cash Operating Margin $/Mcfe (10%); Finding & Development Costs $/Mcfe (10%); EHS Intensity Improvement (20%) .
- 2024 actual performance and funding multiples produced a total funded pool of 1.46x; Knop’s cash award was $788,400 (paid in Q1’25) .
| Performance Measure (2024) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Funding Multiple |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow per Share ($) | 0.00 | 0.91 | 1.82 | 1.98 | 2.0x |
| EHS Intensity Improvement (%) | (15)% | 15% | 50% | (106)% | 0.0x |
| Total Capex per Mcfe ($/Mcfe) | 1.06 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 2.0x |
| Adjusted Gross G&A per Mcfe ($/Mcfe) | 0.156 | 0.146 | 0.136 | 0.135 | 2.0x |
| Cash Operating Margin ($/Mcfe) | 1.46 | 1.56 | 1.66 | 1.60 | 1.4x |
| Finding & Development Costs ($/Mcfe) | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 1.2x |
| Aggregate Funding | 1.46x |
| STIP Item | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Target ($) | 450,000 | 540,000 |
| Actual Payout ($) | 472,500 | 788,400 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTIP) – Grants, Metrics, Vesting
- 2024 LTIP mix: 60% PSUs, 40% time-based RSUs; three-year PSU performance period (Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026); RSUs vest pro rata over three years on each grant anniversary .
- 2024 awards to Knop: Total target value $2,600,000 comprising 42,450 PSUs and 28,300 RSUs (grant date 2/16/24; approved 2/7/24); grant-date fair values: PSU $1,701,396; RSU $976,067 .
- 2024 PSU performance matrix combines absolute TSR CAGR (rows) and relative TSR percentile (columns), 0–2.0x payout cap .
- 2022 PSU program certified at 2.15x payout in early 2025 (driven by absolute and relative TSR and a 1.1x net-zero modifier) .
| 2024 LTIP (Knop) | Value/Shares |
|---|---|
| Total Target LTIP Value ($) | 2,600,000 |
| Time-Based RSUs (#) | 28,300 |
| PSUs at Target (#) | 42,450 |
| RSU Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | 976,067 |
| PSU Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | 1,701,396 |
| PSU Performance Period | 2024–2026 |
| RSU Vesting | Pro rata annually over 3 years |
Vesting Calendar and Potential Selling Pressure
- 2022 RSUs: final tranche vests 2/4/2025 .
- 2023 RSUs: vest on 2/13/2025 and 2/13/2026 .
- 2023 CFO appointment RSUs: one grant vests 1/3 annually beginning 7/24/2024; a second grant vests cliff on 7/24/2028 .
- 2024 RSUs: vest 2/16/2025, 2/16/2026, 2/16/2027; 2023 PSUs settle in early 2026; 2024 PSUs settle in early 2027 (subject to performance) .
Stock vested in 2024: 24,284 shares; value realized $847,360 (net shares withheld for taxes = 6,479) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 30,590 EQT shares (less than 1% of class) as of Feb 3, 2025 .
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for NEOs; Knop at 5.7x; requirement $1,620,000; aggregate qualifying value owned $3,054,442 .
- Prohibitions: hedging and pledging of EQT securities by officers/directors are prohibited; clawback policy (NYSE/SEC compliant) adopted for recovery of incentive comp upon accounting restatements .
| Ownership Detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | 30,590 |
| Unvested RSUs (#) and Market Value ($) | 28,768; $1,326,492 (at $46.11 as of 12/31/2024) |
| Unearned PSUs (#) and Payout Value ($) | 86,302; $3,979,385 (at max multiple; at $46.11 as of 12/31/2024) |
| Ownership Guideline (x salary) | 3x; Actual 5.7x |
| Hedge/Pledge Permitted? | No (prohibited) |
Note: Outstanding awards and values reflect proxy methodology and closing price $46.11 on 12/31/2024; actual payouts depend on future performance and stock price .
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Plan: For NEOs other than CEO, upon termination without cause or resignation for good reason, severance equals 1x (base salary + average bonus over prior 3 years) paid over 12 months; pro‑rata current-year bonus; lump-sum COBRA equivalent for 18 months; RSUs vest pro‑rata; PSUs continue to vest pro‑rata based on actual results .
- Change of Control (double-trigger within 2 years): cash severance 2x (base + 3-year average bonus) paid within 60 days; pro‑rata bonus; treatment of equity per plan (accelerate/assume/convert) .
- Restrictive covenants: non-compete and non-solicit for 12 months for participating NEOs (24 months for CEO) .
- Excise tax “best net” cutback; no gross‑ups .
| Potential Payments (as of Dec 31, 2024) | Termination by Company Without Cause ($) | For Cause ($) | Resign for Good Reason ($) | Resign Without Good Reason ($) | Change of Control ($) | Death ($) | Disability ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Payments under Severance Plan | 1,727,951 | — | 1,727,951 | — | 1,852,602 | — | — |
| Short-Term Incentive | — | — | — | — | 788,400 | 788,400 | 788,400 |
| Long-Term Incentive | 2,785,587 | — | 2,785,587 | — | 5,927,291 | 5,927,291 | 1,902,610 |
| Total | 4,513,538 | — | 4,513,538 | — | 8,568,294 | 6,715,691 | 2,691,010 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: For NEOs (ex‑CEO), 2024 pay skewed heavily to equity and variable incentives, consistent with peer median targeting .
- Shift toward PSUs: 2024 LTIP continues 60% PSUs/40% RSUs design, emphasizing TSR performance; payout capped at 2.0x .
- Performance target rigor: 2024 STIP retained multi-metric design, increasing weights on EHS intensity and adjusted gross G&A per Mcfe; committee used linear interpolation and applied constant commodity prices only for cash operating margin metric; total funding 1.46x .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 98% shareholder support in prior year, indicating broad investor alignment with program design .
Performance & Track Record (Signals for Execution Risk)
- Hedging philosophy and operational flexibility: Knop described a shift from heavy basis hedging (~90%) to more opportunistic hedging and dynamic curtailments, coordinating trading, production, and midstream to optimize realizations—reducing need for defensive basis hedges in 2026+ .
- Cost structure and midstream FCF: Management expects ~$250mm of midstream FCF from growth projects to reduce EQT breakeven by ~$0.10/Mcfe, taking modeled breakeven below $2 by decade-end; Knop reiterated flexibility to reallocate volumes as basis tightens .
- Tactical curtailments and capital timing: Knop detailed responsive curtailment strategy (turning volumes on/off with in-basin pricing) and year-end Capex lumpiness, targeting consistent guidance delivery .
Equity Ownership Guidelines, Pledging/Hedging, Clawback
- Ownership guidelines: CEO 8x base; other NEOs 3x base; mandatory retention of net shares if not in compliance; qualifying holdings exclude unearned PSUs and options .
- Prohibitions: hedging/short-sales/options and pledging of EQT securities prohibited for officers/directors .
- Clawback: NYSE/SEC-compliant recovery policy for erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon restatements .
Compensation Peer Groups and PSU Peers
- 2024 PSU “Performance Peer Group” emphasizes gas‑weighted E&Ps (2x weight for six peers with highest dry gas reserves) and includes S&P 500 as a governor; performance assessed on absolute and relative TSR over three years .
Vesting Schedules (Detail)
| Award | Grant Date | Shares/Units | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (annual) | 2/16/2024 | 28,300 | 1/3 each on 2/16/2025, 2/16/2026, 2/16/2027 |
| PSU (annual) | 2/16/2024 | 42,450 target | 3‑yr performance (1/1/2024–12/31/2026); settle early 2027 |
| RSU (annual) | 2/13/2023 | — | Remaining 2/13/2025 and 2/13/2026 |
| PSU (annual) | 2/13/2023 | — | 3‑yr performance (2023–2025); settle early 2026 |
| RSU (CFO appointment) | 7/24/2023 | — | 1/3 each on 7/24/2024–2026 |
| RSU (CFO appointment – cliff) | 7/24/2023 | — | 100% on 7/24/2028 |
| RSU (legacy) | 2/4/2022 | — | Final tranche 2/4/2025 |
Note: 2024 vesting/realization included 24,284 shares vested and $847,360 value realized (tax withholding applied) .
Employment Start and Tenure
- Appointed CFO effective July 24, 2023; previously EVP & SVP Corporate Development at EQT since January 2021 .
- Participates in EQT’s Executive Severance Plan and standard indemnification agreement .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited (alignment positive) .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; “best net” cutback only (shareholder‑friendly) .
- Robust clawback policy (NYSE/SEC compliant) .
- Change‑in‑control is double‑trigger for equity (no automatic single‑trigger accelerations under policy) .
- Say‑on‑pay at 98% support suggests low governance friction risk .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Finance, capital markets, and energy credit expertise; extensive M&A leadership at EQT; prior energy investing (Blackstone) and energy IB (Barclays); BBA Finance, Texas A&M University .
Compensation & Ownership Summary (Multi‑Year)
| Component | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 428,846 | 533,258 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,807,272 | 2,677,463 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | 472,500 | 788,400 |
| All Other Comp ($) | 29,700 | 31,050 |
| Total ($) | 2,738,318 | 4,030,171 |
| Beneficial Ownership (sh) | — | 30,590 (as of 2/3/2025) |
| Ownership Guideline vs Actual | — | 3x vs 5.7x multiple; $1.62m required vs $3.05m owned |
Compensation Mechanics and Policies (Key Clauses)
- Double‑trigger CoC, no option grants currently, and no hedging/pledging allowed; equity grants typically approved prior to grant and not timed around MNPI releases .
- Severance includes pro‑rata current-year bonus and healthcare cash equivalent; restrictive covenants for 12 months (non-compete, non‑solicit) for NEOs .
Notable Disclosures (Background, Appointments)
- Appointment 8‑K specifies initial base salary ($500k), 2023 target bonus ($450k), and one‑time equity awards ($733k split 60/40 PSU/RSU; plus $300k RSU cliff vest at 5 years) as part of CFO onboarding .
- CFO frequently represents EQT in financing/strategic 8‑Ks and SEC certifications, signaling central role in capital structure optimization .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Pay mix is meaningfully at‑risk with 60% PSU weighting, TSR‑based design, and FCF/share driving STIP—strongly aligning Knop’s incentives with shareholder value creation; ownership exceeds guideline at 5.7x salary and no pledging permitted .
- Retention: Multi‑year RSU/PSU vesting and a moderate severance package (1x cash; 2x on CoC with double‑trigger) support retention while limiting “golden parachute” risk .
- Trading signals: Concentrated vesting windows (2/4, 2/13, 2/16, 7/24) and substantial unearned PSUs (at max depiction) may create periodic supply; 2024 realized vesting was modest vs total equity, mitigating near‑term selling pressure .
- Execution: Knop’s shift to opportunistic hedging and coordinated curtailments, plus midstream FCF accretion, indicate a disciplined, flexible approach to cash flow durability—supportive for EQT’s break‑even reduction and volume optionality; risks remain tied to commodity volatility and TSR‑based PSU outcomes .