Irene Oh
EAST WEST BANCORPAbout Irene Oh
Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer of East West Bancorp, Inc. (EWBC). The Bank entered into an Executive Employment Agreement with Ms. Oh effective December 21, 2016, indicating tenure in the CRO role since 2016 . In 2024, she advanced independent risk management functions and upgraded systems, GRC tools, risk appetite, KRIs, and RCSA, strengthening EWBC’s control environment . EWBC delivered record 2024 performance: revenue ~$2.6B, net income ~$1.2B, EPS $8.33, ROA 1.60%, ROE 15.93%, record loans $53.7B and deposits $63.2B; three-year TSR of 31.97% as of 12/31/2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| East West Bancorp (Bank) | EVP, Chief Risk Officer | 2016–present | Advanced risk management programs, systems, risk appetite/KRI framework, and RCSA; upgraded GRC tools and processes |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $701,100 | $729,200 | +4.0% YoY |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 100% | 100% | Unchanged |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $895,843 | $1,126,149 | Based on corporate and individual performance |
Multi-year compensation detail (pay-for-performance mix):
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 673,319 | 858,902 | 1,024,744 | 40,778 | 2,597,743 |
| 2023 | 697,489 | 897,958 | 895,843 | 14,850 | 2,506,140 |
| 2024 | 724,868 | 1,048,883 | 1,126,149 | 15,525 | 2,915,425 |
Perquisites: 401(k) contributions ($15,525 in 2024) and no special perqs beyond broad-based benefits; Ms. Oh did not use the nonqualified deferred compensation plan in 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Performance-Based Bonus structure (2024):
- Weighting: 70% financial, 30% strategic; for non-CEO NEOs, 35% individual component is added with overall corporate/individual weight split per role .
- Financial metrics and targets: Operating EPS ($7.50), PTPP income ($1,616M), average total loans growth (+$1,250M/2.5%), average total deposits growth (+$2,000M/3.6%), criticized loans ratio at year-end (3.38%); weighting within financial: 25% EPS, 25% PTPP, 10% loans, 20% deposits, 20% criticized loans .
- Payout framework: 0–200% based on achievement; Ms. Oh’s target bonus remained 100% of salary .
2024 bonus outcomes (Ms. Oh):
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate – Financial | 45% | Pre-set metrics | 175% payout | Contributed to 168% corporate blended payout |
| Corporate – Strategic | 20% | Back to Basics, Deepen Relationships, Strategic Growth, Talent | 150% payout | See strategy area scores in text |
| Individual | 35% | Role-specific goals | 129% payout | Risk governance and system upgrades |
| Total Payout (% of Target) | — | 100% target | — | 154% |
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs; 100% of LTI):
- Design: 3 one-year performance periods; cliff payout at end of year 3; metrics vs BKX peers: ROA 37.5%, ROE 37.5%, TSR 25% with 30th/50th/≥80th percentile mapping to 50%/100%/200% payout .
- 2024 first performance period result: 180.4% earned (TSR 57th pct, ROA 100th pct, ROE 91st pct) .
- Ms. Oh 2024 grants: 13,040 target PSUs (grant 3/5/2024), plus 28 RSUs under “Spirit of Ownership” program (grant 2/12/2024) .
LTI calibration (select history):
| Grant Year | Metric Weighting | Earned % by Year | Vest/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSUs | ROA 37.5%, ROE 37.5%, TSR 25% | 2022: 150.0%; 2023: 187.7%; 2024: 180.4% | Vested Mar 4, 2025 (cliff) |
| 2023 PSUs | Same | 2023: 187.7%; 2024: 180.4%; 2025: TBD | Cliff vest Mar 1, 2026 |
| 2024 PSUs | Same | 2024: 180.4%; 2025–2026: TBD | Cliff vest Mar 5, 2027 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 130,835 shares; <1% of outstanding (as of 4/3/2025) .
- Stock ownership guidelines: NEOs must own ≥1x salary; all NEOs met 2024 guidelines; NEOs must hold at least 51% of net shares from option exercises/RSU vesting until retirement .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for directors/officers/employees per Insider Trading Policy; no shorting/derivatives on EWBC stock .
- Options: No outstanding options for NEOs at 12/31/2024 .
- 2024 stock vesting: Ms. Oh had 18,372 shares vest in 2024 (value realized $1,345,150; pre-tax) .
Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024 (Ms. Oh):
| Grant | Type | Unvested (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned/Max (#) | Vest Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02/01/2022 | Time-based RSU | 23 | $2,202 | — | Cliff vest 2/1/2025 |
| 03/04/2022 | Performance RSU | 18,995 | $1,818,961 | — | Cliff vested 3/4/2025 |
| 01/23/2023 | Time-based RSU | 29 | $2,777 | — | Cliff vest 1/23/2026 |
| 03/01/2023 | Performance RSU | 13,755 | $1,317,179 | 7,474 | Cliff vest 3/1/2026 |
| 02/12/2024 | Time-based RSU | 28 | $2,681 | — | Cliff vest 2/12/2027 |
| 03/05/2024 | Performance RSU | 7,843 | $751,046 | 17,387 | Cliff vest 3/5/2027 |
Note: Market values use EWBC close of $95.76 as of 12/31/2024 (per proxy methodology) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement | Executive Employment Agreement effective Dec 21, 2016; amended Dec 21, 2024 to expire Dec 21, 2025; annual renewal by Board and Ms. Oh |
| Base salary/bonus eligibility | Salary reviewed periodically; eligible for annual performance-based bonus and equity awards |
| Termination without Cause | Lump sum severance = 2x current base salary + last annual cash bonus; plus earned but unpaid bonus; as of 12/31/2024, estimated severance $2,584,513 |
| Good reason-equivalents | Includes relocation >50 miles without consent, material breach by Bank, failure of successor to assume obligations post-Change of Control; certain non-renewal scenarios |
| Change-in-Control (double trigger) | If terminated within 2 years post-CoC: (i) RSUs with lapsed performance periods settle based on achieved results; (ii) RSUs with un-lapsed performance convert to time-based at target |
| Death/Disability | Accrued obligations plus any earned bonus; all unvested RSUs immediately vest; value at 12/31/2024 would have been $5,085,191 |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/Nasdaq-compliant policy; recoups erroneously awarded incentive comp on restatement irrespective of cause |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy |
| Tax gross-ups | None for severance/CoC |
| Ownership/holding | NEO ownership guideline (≥1x salary); 51% post-vest/exercise holding until retirement |
Compensation Structure Notes
- At-risk mix is high: EWBC states 68% of non-CEO NEO target pay is at risk (bonus + LTI) with 100% of LTI in performance-based RSUs benchmarked to BKX (ROA/ROE/TSR) .
- No single-trigger CoC severance; no option repricing; no hedging/pledging; no excise tax gross-ups; robust clawback .
- Peer benchmarking: 21-bank peer set updated for 2024 (added CFG, FITB, MTB); Committee does not target a specific percentile; LTI measured vs BKX .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Ms. Oh’s 2024 bonus (154% of target) tracked strong corporate financial and strategic outcomes, and her LTI is fully performance-based vs BKX on ROA/ROE/TSR; this supports alignment with shareholder value creation given EWBC’s record 2024 metrics and 3-year TSR of ~32% .
- Selling pressure signals: Upcoming cliff vesting in 2026–2027 on sizable PSU grants (2013: 13,755; 2024: 7,843 unvested plus unearned potential) could create tax-related selling around vest dates; however, mandatory holding of 51% of net vested shares and a prohibition on hedging/pledging mitigate alignment and overhang risk .
- Retention and CoC economics: Severance set at 2x salary + last bonus (modest for a top-four NEO) with double-trigger CoC treatment; current agreement expires 12/21/2025 and historically renews, but the near-term end date is a modest retention watch item .
- Governance and shareholder sentiment: 2024 Say‑on‑Pay passed with ~98.7% support, suggesting investor acceptance of program design and pay outcomes; robust clawback and no gross-ups/hedging/pledging strengthen governance .