Joshua Viets
About Joshua Viets
Joshua J. Viets, 46, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Expand Energy (EXE), serving since February 2022. He spent ~20 years at ConocoPhillips in operations, engineering, subsurface and asset management roles, most recently as Vice President, Delaware Basin; he holds a B.S. in Petroleum Engineering from the Colorado School of Mines . Under EXE’s post-merger strategy, the company highlighted 4Q24 net production of ~6.41 Bcfe/d, ~$1bn Adjusted EBITDAX, and expects ~$500mm annual merger synergies, and was added to the S&P 500 in March 2025, framing operational and shareholder return priorities during his tenure . EXE’s cumulative TSR since listing (Feb 10, 2021) translated a $100 investment to $269 vs $196 for the sector index through 12/31/24, illustrating alignment between pay structure and shareholder outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand Energy (EXE) | EVP & Chief Operating Officer | Feb 2022–Present | Leads operations through merger integration and capital efficiency focus embedded in AIP metrics and LTIP TSR alignment . |
| ConocoPhillips | Vice President, Delaware Basin; prior leadership roles across operations, engineering, subsurface, capital projects | 2002–2022 | Directed Permian Basin operations; broad operational leadership foundation for EXE’s scale and capital efficiency objectives . |
External Roles
No public company directorships disclosed in company biography and filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 525,000 | 585,000 | 600,000 |
| AIP Target (% of Salary) | 100% | 100% | 100% (unchanged) |
| AIP Actual Payout ($) | 661,500 | 906,750 (155% of target) | N/A |
Notes: 2024 AIP payout factor was 155% based on quantitative and qualitative performance; payouts are subject to sustainability gating thresholds (SIF, Methane Intensity) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Program (AIP) – Structure and Results
- Weighting and metric design balanced cash generation, capital efficiency, and sustainability; failure on SIF or Methane Intensity capped other metric payouts at target .
- Company achieved strong results across cash costs and capex efficiency; total company payout factor certified at 155% (Viets’ payout $906,750) .
| Metric (Weight) | Actual | Threshold | Target | Max | Payout Factor | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue incl. Hedges & GP&T ($/mcfe) (20%) | 2.08 | 1.83 | 2.06 | 2.50 | 105% | 21.0% |
| Cash Costs – LOE & G&A ($/mcfe) (15%) | 0.39 | 0.48 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 181% | 27.1% |
| New Well Program Delivery (PIR) (15%) | 0.81 | 0.41 | 0.68 | 0.88 | 165% | 24.8% |
| New Well Capex Efficiency ($/mcfe) (15%) | 1.75 | 2.55 | 2.22 | 2.00 | 200% | 30.0% |
| TRIR (5%) | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.13 | 171% | 8.6% |
| Safety Leadership Engagement (5%) | 9,593 | 3,950 | 4,650 | 6,950 | 200% (capped at target due to SIF) | 5.0% |
| GHG – Emission Intensity (5%) | 1.9 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 180% | 9.0% |
| Qualitative Leadership (20%) | — | — | — | — | 150% | 30.0% |
| Total | — | — | — | — | — | 155% |
2025 AIP shifts to a qualitative framework grounded in License to Operate, Evergreen Value Drivers, and Long-Term Value Drivers, removing gating but targeting zero SIF and continued methane intensity improvement; Viets’ AIP target remains 100% of salary .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP)
Structure and scale:
- 2024 target LTIP: 460% of salary ($2,691,000) with 75% PSUs (50% aTSR, 25% rTSR) and 25% RSUs; equity-settled with dividend equivalents and 3-year vesting (RSUs ratable, PSUs cliff) .
- 2025 target LTIP: $3,300,000 split into RSUs $990,000 and PSUs $2,310,000; mix adjusted to 30% RSUs / 70% PSUs (half aTSR, half rTSR) to balance absolute vs relative performance through cycles .
| LTIP Element | 2024 Target $ | Vesting | 2025 Target $ | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 672,750 | Ratable over 3 years | 990,000 | Ratable over 3 years |
| PSUs – aTSR | 1,345,500 | 3-year cliff; payout 0–200% based on annualized aTSR curve | 1,155,000 (half of PSU target) | 3-year cliff |
| PSUs – rTSR | 672,750 | 3-year cliff; payout 0–200% vs peer/indices | 1,155,000 (half of PSU target) | 3-year cliff |
PSU payout curves: aTSR pays 0% if <0%, 100% at 7.5%, and 200% at ≥20% (annualized); rTSR pays 0% below 20th percentile, 100% at 60th percentile, and 200% at ≥90th percentile, with linear interpolation .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 41,897 common shares as of April 7, 2025 (<1% of outstanding) .
- Unvested and unearned equity at 12/31/24:
| Grant Date | Instrument | Unvested/Target Units | Notes/Value Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/1/2022 | RSU | 5,471 | Market value $544,638 at $99.55/sh |
| 3/15/2022 | RSU | 2,313 | Market value $230,259 |
| 3/15/2022 | PSUs (target) | 20,820 | Value at target $2,072,631 |
| 3/15/2023 | RSU | 4,930 | Market value $490,782 |
| 3/15/2023 | PSUs (target) | 22,187 | Value at target $2,208,716 |
| 3/15/2024 | RSU | 8,364 | Market value $832,636 |
| 3/15/2024 | PSUs (target) | 25,091 | Value at target $2,497,809 |
Alignment practices and restrictions:
- Stock ownership guidelines: EVP requirement = 3x base salary; holding requirement 75% of net shares until met; as of April 7, 2025 all NEOs met minimums .
- Hedging/pledging prohibited; no holding in margin accounts; robust insider trading policy .
- No stock options currently granted by the company .
- RSUs/PSUs accrue dividend equivalents payable at vesting .
Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure:
- RSUs vest annually over 3 years from grant (e.g., March grant cycles), creating recurring vest events that may result in tax-related share sales; PSUs cliff-vest at 3 years based on TSR outcomes .
Employment Terms
- Employment status: At-will; no individual employment agreement .
- Severance and Change-in-Control (CIC) economics (Executive Severance Plan):
- Outside CIC: Cash severance of 1x (base salary + target AIP) for NEOs (Viets), plus a lump sum equal to 12x monthly health premium contribution; unvested RSUs/PSUs forfeited .
- CIC with qualifying termination (double-trigger): Cash severance of 2x (base salary + target AIP) for NEOs; full vesting of RSUs; rTSR PSUs settle based on relative performance through separation; aTSR PSUs vest but settle after performance period; health premium lump sum for 18 months .
- Merger letter agreements deemed the October 1, 2024 merger a CIC and extend the CIC protection window for Viets through October 1, 2026 .
Potential payments for Viets (hypothetical termination at 12/31/24):
- Termination without cause/good reason (non‑CIC): $1,218,014 total (cash severance $1,170,000; PTO $29,813; COBRA $18,201) .
- CIC termination: $9,655,885 total (cash severance $2,340,000; PSU value $5,160,455; RSU value $2,098,315; PTO $29,813; COBRA $27,302) .
- Death: $10,034,795 total (PSU value $7,906,667; RSU value $2,098,315; PTO $29,813) .
Clawbacks and other protections:
- Dodd-Frank compliant clawback policy for incentive compensation upon restatements; applies to awards received on/after Oct 2, 2023 .
- Perquisites limited; no personal use of aircraft permitted; typical benefits include 401(k) match, supplemental life insurance, and executive physicals .
Compensation Structure vs Performance Metrics
- High at-risk mix: For 2024, ~75% of LTIP in PSUs tied to aTSR and rTSR and 25% RSUs; AIP quantitatively tied to cash generation, capital efficiency, and sustainability, with qualitative leadership overlay; 2025 increases PSU weighting to 70% and balances aTSR/rTSR 50/50 to navigate commodity volatility and emphasize peer outperformance .
- 2024 AIP linkage: Achieved strong cost and capital efficiency outcomes; sustainability performance served as gating construct; payout for NEOs at 155% of target .
- TSR alignment: Pay-versus-performance disclosure shows cumulative TSR outperformance vs E&P index over 2021–2024 period, consistent with PSU design .
Compensation Peer Group and Benchmarking
- Compensation peer group used for benchmarking includes APA, CNX, Coterra, Devon, Diamondback, EQT, Marathon, Murphy, Ovintiv, PDC, Range, SM Energy, Southwestern (pre-merger) .
- Relative TSR peer group emphasizes gas-focused peers and indices (e.g., Antero, CNX, Comstock, Coterra, EQT, Gulfport, Range, plus Alerian MLP, S&P 500 Utilities, Industrials, and E&P indices) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Viets’ pay structure is highly equity-driven with 70–75% PSU weighting and explicit TSR performance curves, reinforcing shareholder alignment; ownership guidelines met and hedging/pledging prohibited reduce misalignment risk .
- Retention vs selling pressure: Multi-year RSU/PSU vesting supports retention; recurring March vest dates and 3-year PSU cliffs can create periodic liquidity/tax sale windows but are offset by ownership holding requirements until guidelines are met .
- Change-of-control economics: Double-trigger CIC with 2x cash multiple for NEOs and equity acceleration mechanics adds bounded downside for executives in strategic scenarios; extended CIC protection window through Oct 1, 2026 increases near-term retention .
- Execution risk and value creation: 2024 metrics show strong cost/capex efficiency and sustainability performance; merger synergy target of ~$500mm annually and S&P 500 inclusion underpin scale advantages, but sustained TSR outperformance depends on commodity cycle navigation and delivering on marketing/commercial transformation, all areas within COO’s operational span .