Richard Reiss
EXPONENTAbout Richard Reiss
Richard Reiss, Sc.D., is Group Vice President at Exponent (EXPO). He joined Exponent in 2006 as a Principal Scientist and was promoted to Group Vice President in January 2015; he is 58 years old and is a Fellow of the Society of Risk Analysis. Dr. Reiss holds an Sc.D. in Environmental Health from Harvard, an M.S. in Environmental Engineering from Northwestern, and a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from UC Santa Barbara; prior to Exponent he was a Vice President at Sciences International . Company performance context: in 2024, revenues before reimbursements grew 4.3% and adjusted EBITDAS margin exceeded target by 96 bps; EBITDA was $147,058k and net income was $109,002k, and five-year TSR (since 1/3/2020) stood at 133 (indexed to $100) . Compensation at Exponent emphasizes pay-for-performance with metrics including EBITDA, revenues growth, and EBITDA margin used to determine executive payouts .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exponent, Inc. | Group Vice President | 2015–present | Senior operating leader across consulting practices |
| Exponent, Inc. | Principal Scientist | 2006–2014 | Technical and client leadership in environmental health/risk analysis |
| Sciences International | Vice President | Pre-2006–2006 | External leadership in risk/health sciences, foundation for Exponent role |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Society of Risk Analysis | Fellow | N/A | Professional recognition in risk analysis; enhances credibility with clients |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Structure/Policy | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Reviewed annually; set relative to professional services market and internal responsibilities/performance | The Human Resources Committee considers market data and internal parity when setting executive base pay . |
| Benchmarking | Compensia engaged; peer set for CEO/CFO includes CRAI, FCN, HSII, HURN, ICFI, KFY, RGP, HCKT (not targeted to a percentile) | Peer data primarily informs CEO/CFO; broader market data considered for others . |
No individual 2024/2025 base salary was disclosed for Dr. Reiss (not a Named Executive Officer in the latest proxy) .
Performance Compensation
| Program Element | Metric/Mechanics | Targeting/Weighting | Payout/Settlement | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Bonus Pool | 33% of pre-tax income before bonuses, stock comp, FX gains/losses and interest income | Company-wide pool allocation | Paid partly in cash and equity | N/A . |
| Executive Bonus Mix | ~60% cash / 40% fully vested RSUs (for NEOs, generally) | Individual performance for GVPs weighted toward direct consulting vs. unit management; broader contribution for CFO-type roles | Fully vested RSUs deliver shares four years from grant (“settlement deferral”) . | Vested RSUs: delivered in 4 years; Matching unvested RSUs: cliff vest in 4 years . |
| Equity Incentives | RSUs (primary) and options (primarily CEO/CFO grants) | Option grants sized ad hoc by Committee | Options at grant-date closing price | Options vest 25% per year over 4 years; RSUs cliff vest at 4 years . |
| Performance Metrics (illustrative) | Revenues growth and adjusted EBITDAS margin (e.g., CEO 2024 plan) | Equal weights (CEO example) | CEO 2024 composite factor 1.38x based on +4.3% revenue growth and +96 bps adjusted EBITDAS margin beat (formulaic) | CEO example; framework reflects emphasis on top-line and profitability . |
| Company-selected PVP metrics | EBITDA; Revenues before reimbursement growth; EBITDA margin | Used to link compensation to performance in PVP disclosures | — | — . |
For Group Vice Presidents like Dr. Reiss, bonuses are determined on a total compensation basis with emphasis on direct consulting contribution and business leadership; 40% of the annual bonus is generally settled in fully vested RSUs with four-year delivery and an equal number of matching unvested RSUs that cliff vest in 4 years, supporting retention and alignment .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | NEO guidelines: 3x salary (CEO), 2x (EVP/CFO), 1x (other NEOs); measured using 365-day average price for shares and grant-date value for RSUs; retain 50% of net shares until guidelines met . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging of Exponent securities are prohibited for directors and officers (reduces alignment risk) . |
| RSU Settlement/Cliff Schedule (typical) | Recent NEO RSUs cliff vest on fixed March dates (e.g., 3/12/2025; 3/11/2026; 3/10/2027; 3/5/2028), creating known settlement/vesting windows that can influence selling pressure and float . |
| Options | 4-year ratable vesting; 10-year term; retirement (≥59½) continuation if certain non-compete/consulting conditions are met . |
| Historical Section 16 Filings | Dr. Reiss has historical Forms 3/5 (e.g., 2015 Form 3 and 2016/2020 Forms 5) reflecting RSUs and dividend equivalent rights accrual; indicates ongoing equity participation over time . |
The 2025 Security Ownership table does not list Dr. Reiss individually (not a 2024 NEO), so his current total beneficial ownership and % outstanding are not disclosed in the latest proxy .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms/Status |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Company discloses no separate employment/severance contracts for NEOs; compensation is delivered under plan documents (no salary+bonus multiples disclosed) . |
| Change-in-Control | Double-trigger equity acceleration: if awards are assumed/substituted at a change-in-control and the holder is involuntarily terminated within two years (other than for failure to perform), unvested RSUs vest and settle upon termination . |
| Retirement Treatment | For RSUs and options, continuation of vesting at retirement (≥59½) if the executive performs all consulting through the Company and does not become an employee of a past/present client or competitor . |
| Clawback Policy | Mandatory recovery of excess incentive-based compensation after an accounting restatement within a 3-year lookback; applies regardless of misconduct; Nasdaq/SEC-compliant . |
| Deferred Compensation | Executives may elect to defer up to 100% of comp; company contributions above 401(k) limits go to the nonqualified plan (plan exists; Dr. Reiss’s 2024 deferrals not disclosed as he was not a 2024 NEO) . |
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Tenure and expertise | At Exponent since 2006; Group VP since 2015; SRA Fellow; advanced degrees from Harvard, Northwestern, UCSB . |
| Company results context (FY2024) | Revenues before reimbursements +4.3%; utilization improved to 73% (from 69%); EBITDA margin 28.4% (from 27.7%); EBITDA $147,058k; Net Income $109,002k; TSR index = 133 since 1/3/2020 . |
| Compensation linkage | Most important PVP metrics: EBITDA, revenue growth, EBITDA margin, consistent with the bonus/equity framework . |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging ban for officers mitigates alignment and margin-call risk .
- No gross-up or special parachute multiples disclosed; equity acceleration is double-trigger only .
- Clawback policy in force (mandatory) .
- Historical Section 16 timeliness note: 2021 proxy cites late Form 4 filings for several insiders including “Rick Reiss” regarding RSU conversions (administrative timing issue) .
Compensation Committee/Peer Group
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Committee composition | Human Resources Committee of independent directors oversees executive pay . |
| Consultant | Compensia (independent) advised on framework and peer data . |
| Peer group focus | Professional services peers: CRA International, FTI Consulting, Heidrick & Struggles, Huron Consulting, ICF, Korn Ferry, Resources Connection, The Hackett Group; data used for CEO/CFO benchmarking . |
| Say-on-Pay | 92.8% support for FY2023 NEO pay in 2024, with 2024 approach largely consistent with 2023 . |
Vesting Schedules and Potential Insider Selling Pressure
| Instrument | Typical Timing | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Fully vested RSUs (bonus-settled) | Deliver shares 4 years after grant (e.g., March cycles) | Creates predictable delivery dates that may contribute to supply overhang/selling windows . |
| Matching unvested RSUs | Cliff vest at 4 years (e.g., 3/12/2025; 3/11/2026; 3/10/2027; 3/5/2028 in recent NEO schedules) | Concentrated vesting dates can cluster liquidity events . |
| Stock options (where granted) | 25% per year over 4 years; 10-year term | Gradual accretion of exercisable supply; retirement continuation subject to conditions . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment strong: 40% of annual bonus paid in fully vested RSUs with 4-year delivery plus matching unvested RSUs creates multi-year exposure; hedging/pledging bans and stock ownership framework further align incentives with shareholders .
- Retention risk moderate/managed: Four-year cliff RSUs and deferred RSU settlement dates are meaningful retention hooks; retirement continuation of vesting is conditioned on non-compete-like provisions and consulting through Exponent .
- Event risk balanced: No cash severance multiples disclosed; equity acceleration is double-trigger, which limits windfall payouts while protecting against post-deal termination risk .
- Trading signals: RSU settlement and vesting calendars (March cycles) may create periodic selling pressure; monitor Form 4s around those dates for Reiss specifically; historical Section 16 records confirm recurring RSU/DER activity, though current holdings were not disclosed in the latest proxy .
Data limitations: Dr. Reiss was not a Named Executive Officer in the 2025 proxy; his individual base salary, bonus, current equity holdings, and ownership percentage were not disclosed. The analysis relies on company-wide executive compensation policies and recent NEO schedules to assess incentives and potential trading windows .